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SESSIONAL PAPERS

VOLUME 1

FOURTH SESSION OF THE TWELFTH PARLIAMENT

OF THE

DOMINION OF CANADA

SPECIAL SESSION 1914

13-620
11/1/15

VOLUME XLIX

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39. Copy of Order in Council No. P.C. 1213, dated 18th May, 1914, relating to the organization of a Naval Volunteer Force. Presented by Hon. Mr. Hazen, August 18, 1914
Not printed.

39a. Copies of Orders in Council relating to the organization of a Naval Volunteer Force, as follows:—
No. P.C. 1978, dated 1st August, 1914,—Discipline of the Naval Volunteer Force.
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No. P.C. 2049, dated 4th August, 1914,—Placing H.M.C. ships "Niobe" and "Rainbow," with their officers and men at the disposal of His Majesty.
No. P.C. 2050, dated 4th August, 1914,—Placing of Naval Forces and Naval Volunteer Forces on Active Service.
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40. Copy of Orders in Council from August 2nd to August 15th, 1914, bearing on the outbreak of hostilities in Europe. Presented by Sir Robert Borden, August 18, 1914.
Printed for distribution and sessional papers.

40a. Copies of correspondence by cable between His Royal Highness the Governor General and the Secretary of State for the Colonies, from August 1st to August 15th, 1914. Presented by Sir Robert Borden, August 18, 1914.
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40b. Copy of correspondence by cable between the Prime Minister and the Hon. George H. Perley, from August 4th to August 13th, 1914. Presented by Sir Robert Borden, August 18, 1914 .....*Printed for distribution and sessional papers.*

40c. Copy of correspondence respecting the European crisis, presented to both Houses of the Imperial Parliament by command of His Majesty, August, 1914.—(Miscellaneous, No. 6, 1914). Presented by Sir Robert Borden, August 19, 1914.
Printed for distribution and sessional papers.

40d. Copies of Parliamentary Debates of the Imperial House of Commons of Monday, 3rd August, 1914, Vol. 65, No. 112, and of Thursday, 6th August, 1914, Vol. 65, No. 115. Presented by Sir Robert Borden, August 19, 1914.
Printed for distribution and sessional papers.

41. Statement of Governor General's Warrants issued since the last Session of Parliament on account of 1914-15. Presented by Hon. Mr. White, August 20, 1914.
Not printed.

42. Statement of Expenditure on account of "Miscellaneous Unforeseen Expenses," from the 1st April, 1914, to the 18th August, 1914, in accordance with the Appropriation Act of 1914. Presented by Hon. Mr. White, August 20, 1914.....*Not printed.*

43. [illegible] Act for the year ending March 31, 1914. [illegible] Hon. Mr. White, March 9, 1914. *Not printed.*

44. Statement of Treasury Board over-ruling, under Section 14, Consolidated Revenue and Audit Act. [illegible] Hon. Mr. White, March 9, 1914. [illegible]

45. [illegible]
   3. Exports to the British West Indies, with values.
   4. Exports to the Island of Jamaica, with values.—(*Senate*).....*Not printed.*

46. Return to an Order of the Senate, dated 9th June, 1914, showing copies of all correspondence between F. S. Balcom and others, and the Post Office Department, respecting the mail service between Liverpool post office and the railway station at Liverpool, which was given to Mr. Balcom after he had offered to reduce his tender from $375 to $275 per annum.—(*Senate.*).....*Not printed.*

47. Return to an Address of the Senate, dated the 22nd January, 1913, showing copies of all correspondence exchanged between the Catholics of Manitoba and the Government of Canada since the beginning of last session with reference to the school system of that province, or asking for legislation on that subject.—(*Senate.*).....*Not printed.*

48. Return to an Order of the Senate, dated the 6th June, 1914, showing a copy of that part of the report made by Messrs. Bowden, Tiffin and Story, during the autumn of 1908, relating to the Salisbury and Harvey railway, embodied in Sessional Papers Nos. 67, 68, 69 [illegible] *Not printed.*

49. Return to an Order of the Senate, dated the 9th June, 1914, showing a copy of the last annual return made to the Railway Department as require by law, by the Central Railway Company of Canada.—(*Senate.*).....*Not printed.*

50. Amendment to Radiotelegraph Regulations issued by the Minister of the Naval Service under Section 11 of the Radiotelegraph Act, Statutes 1913, Chapter 43. Presented by [illegible] *Not printed.*

DOCUMENTS

RELATIVE TO THE

EUROPEAN WAR

COMPRISING

ORDERS IN COUNCIL, CABLEGRAMS, CORRESPONDENCE, AND SPEECHES DELIVERED IN IMPERIAL HOUSE OF COMMONS.

PRINTED BY ORDER OF PARLIAMENT

OTTAWA
PRINTED BY J. DE L. TACHÉ, PRINTER TO THE KING'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY
1914

[No. 40, a, b, c, d, 1915.]

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Moved by Sir Robert Borden, seconded by Sir George Foster, That the paper (Miscellaneous No. 6, 1914) containing correspondence respecting the European crisis, which has been presented to the Parliament of the United Kingdom and has been laid upon the Table of this House, be printed forthwith, together with the speech of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs delivered in the House of Commons of the United Kingdom on the 3rd of August, 1914, and the speech of the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, also the speech of the leader of the Opposition in the Imperial House of Commons, delivered in the said House of Commons on the 6th day of August, 1914, which contain official explanations of comments on the correspondence aforesaid.

RETURN

(40)

P. C. 2028.

CERTIFIED copy of a Report of the Committee of the Privy Council, approved by His Excellency the Deputy Governor General on the 2nd August, 1914.

The Committee of the Privy Council, on the recommendation of the Right Honourable the Prime Minister, advise that as His Royal Highness the Governor General has received official notice that His Majesty's Government has called out the Royal Naval Reserves, due notice thereof be published in an extra of *The Canada Gazette* in the form hereto attached.

(Sgd.) RODOLPHE BOUDREAU,
Clerk of the Privy Council.

ROYAL NAVAL RESERVES CALLED OUT.

PUBLIC NOTICE is hereby given that His Royal Highness the Governor General has received a telegraphic despatch from the Secretary of State for the Colonies announcing that His Majesty the King has by Royal Proclamation called out the Royal Naval Reserves. Attention is directed to the fact that by this proclamation men serving abroad, whether on shore or in merchant vessels, are required to report themselves to first British Naval, Consular or Colonial Officer they meet, or failing that, to the nearest Registrar on arrival in the United Kingdom.

Of which all persons concerned are required to take notice and to govern themselves accordingly.

By Command,

R. L. BORDEN,
Secretary of State for External Affairs.

Ottawa, 2nd August, 1914.

P. C. 2029.

AT THE GOVERNMENT HOUSE AT OTTAWA.

SECOND DAY OF AUGUST, 1914.

PRESENT.

HIS EXCELLENCY THE DEPUTY GOVERNOR GENERAL IN COUNCIL.

Whereas a grave emergency has arisen in which it is expedient for the Public Service that the Government of Canada should have control over the transmission and reception of telegraph messages by any Cable Company operating telegraph cables within the Dominion of Canada or the territorial waters thereof.

Therefore the Deputy Governor General in Council is pleased to order and it is hereby ordered as follows:—

The Minister of Militia and Defence by warrant under his hand may direct and cause so much of any Cable Company's property, offices or works as are within the Dominion of Canada or the territorial waters thereof or any part of such works to be taken possession of in the name and on behalf of His Majesty and to be used for His Majesty's Service and subject thereto for such ordinary service as to the said Minister may seem fit and in that event any person authorized by the said Minister may enter upon the offices and works of any Cable Company and take possession thereof and use the same as aforesaid.

The Minister of Militia and Defence may when he considers it expedient instead of taking possession of the property, offices and works of any Cable Company, direct and authorize such persons as he thinks fit to assume control of the transmission of messages by any Company's cables either wholly or partly and in such manner as he may direct and such persons may enter upon the Company's premises accordingly: or the Minister of Militia and Defence may direct any Cable Company to submit to him or to any person authorized by him all cablegrams and messages tendered for transmission or arriving by any Company's cable or any class or classes of such cablegrams or messages and to stop or delay the transmission of any cablegram or messages or deliver the same to him or his agent and generally obey all such directions with reference to the transmission and reception of cablegrams as the Minister of Militia and Defence may prescribe and the Company and its officers and agents shall obey and conform to all such directions.

(Sgd) RODOLPHE BOUDREAU,
Clerk of the Privy Council.

P. C. 2030

AT THE GOVERNMENT HOUSE AT OTTAWA

SECOND DAY OF AUGUST, 1914;

PRESENT.

HIS EXCELLENCY THE DEPUTY GOVERNOR GENERAL IN COUNCIL.

WHEREAS a grave emergency has arisen in which it is expedient for the Public Service that the Government of Canada should have control over the transmission and reception of telegraph messages by any person or persons or by any wireless telegraph company operating wireless telegraph apparatus within the Dominion of Canada or the territorial waters thereof:

Therefore the Deputy Governor General in Council is pleased to Order and it is hereby ordered as follows:—

The Minister of the Naval Service may, by warrant under his hand direct and cause so much of any such person's or company's property, offices or works as are within the Dominion of Canada or the territorial waters thereof, or any part of such works, to be taken possession of in the name and on behalf of His Majesty, and to be used for His Majesty's service and subject thereto for such ordinary service as may seem fit; and in that event, any person duly authorized by the Minister of the Naval Service may enter upon the offices and works of any such person or persons or of any wireless telegraph company and take possession thereof and use the same as aforesaid.

The Minister of the Naval Service may, should he consider it expedient instead of taking possession of the property, offices and works of any such person or persons or of any wireless telegraph company, direct and authorize such persons as he thinks

fit to assume the control of the transmission of messages by any wireless telegraph apparatus either wholly or partly and in such manner as he may direct, and such persons may accordingly enter upon the company's or other such person's premises, and the Minister of the Naval Service may direct any wireless telegraph company or other such person to submit to him or any person authorized by him, all telegrams and messages tendered for transmission by such company's or other such person's telegraphs or any class or classes of such telegrams or messages or deliver the same to him or his agent, and generally to obey all such directions with reference to the transmission and reception of telegrams as may be prescribed, and all such persons and the company and its officers and agents shall obey and conform to all such directions.

RODOLPHE BOUDREAU,
Clerk of the Privy Council.

P. C. 2032.

CERTIFIED copy of a Report of the Committee of the Privy Council, approved by His Excellency the Deputy Governor General on 3rd August, 1914.

The Committee of the Privy Council have had under consideration a Report, dated 3rd August, 1914, from the Minister of Finance, calling attention to the grave conditions now prevailing in Europe and their effect upon the financial and commercial situation in Canada.

Within a week's time and with an unexpectedness unparalleled in history hostilities have broken out among the Great Powers of Europe.

The effect of this sudden outbreak with all its portentous consequences upon the financial systems of the world has been momentous in the extreme. In the existing loss of credit-confidence the demand at all the great centres for gold by bankers and by the public has been unprecedented in its magnitude and has resulted in the sale at whatever prices could be obtained of immense volumes of domestic and international securities. Unable to sustain the burden of such selling all the great bourses and stock exchanges of the world have been closed by their governing bodies. Specie payments have for some time past been suspended on the Continent of Europe and more recently in the United Kingdom where the Bank Act has been suspended under the authority of the Imperial Government.

While the chartered banks of Canada, as shown by their official returns, are in a position of normal strength, there is a ground for belief that in view of the exceptional conditions above referred to which are likely to prevail and may become aggravated as the European war proceeds, Canadian bankers will find it necessary to restrict to a considerable degree all commercial credits. They may also experience difficulty in meeting abnormal demands upon them for gold or legal tender. Such a condition could only result in grave and lasting injury to all the great interests of the Dominion.

In view of the foregoing and after having given the matter full consideration the Minister is of opinion that valuable assistance can be afforded in this critical condition of affairs by action on the part of the Government which will enable the banks to maintain the volume of credits available to their customers and supply them with additional liquid resources. For this purpose he recommends that the Dominion Government advance to banks to be designated by him such sums as he may deem reasonable and proper to be used by the said banks in the usual course of their business.

The Minister further recommends that such advances be made to the said banks upon such high-class securities as he may approve and further that he be authorized

to appoint the President of the Canadian Bankers' Association, the General Manager of the Bank of Montreal, the General Manager of the Royal Bank, and the Manager of the Montreal branch of the Canadian Bank of Commerce, to advise him as to the said securities and that the rate of interest charged on such advances be such from time to time as the Minister may approve, but not less than five per centum per annum. Each bank to which a loan or loans are made shall agree to repay the same with interest within a period not extending beyond 1st May, 1915.

The Minister further recommends that he be authorized to engage the Royal Trust Company for the purpose of holding in trust for the Government the securities lodged by the banks availing themselve of this proposal and that such securities or part thereof may be released from time to time under the authority of the Minister as the advances are repaid in whole or part by the banks or as other approved securities are lodged in substitution.

The Minister further recommends that in view of the inadvisability of attempting at this juncture to make an issue of Dominion securitites in the London market the proposed advances be made by an issue of such amount of Dominion notes as may be necessary and that although contrary to the provisions of the Dominion Notes Act such notes be issued against the deposit by the banks of high-class securities approved by the Minister of Finance as hereinbefore provided, While the arrangement proposed is a technical departure from the terms of the Dominion Notes Act, such departure is, in the opinion of the Minister, justified by the exceptional circumstances above mentioned.

The Minister further recommends that at the next ensuing session, Parliament [illegible] a bill of indemnity confirming and sanctioning the proceedings herein recommended in so far as they require for their validity legal confirmation or sanction.

The Committee concur in the foregoing recommendation and submit the same for approval.

RODOLPHE BOUDREAU.
Clerk of the Privy Council.

P. C. 2033

CERTIFIED copy of a Report of the Committee of the Privy Council, approved by His Excellency the Deputy Governor General on the 3rd August, 1914.

The Committee of the Privy Council have had before them a Memorandum, dated 3rd August, 1914, from the Minister of Finance, recommending, having regard to the world wide financial crisis that has developed upon the outbreak of hostilities in Europe and in view of the action taken by the Imperial Government to conserve the commercial and financial interests of the United Kingdom that in case such course should in his opinion be required, he be authorized to issue Dominion notes for such an amount as may be necessary against such securities as may be deposited by the banks and approved by the Minister of Finance.

The Minister further recommends as follows:

That the Government authorize the chartered Banks of Canada to make payment in bank notes instead of in gold or Dominion notes until further official announcement in that behalf. This action will tend to preserve the Canadian gold supply against demands from foreign sources.

That the Government authorize the several chartered banks of Canada to issue from this date and until further official announcement excess circulation to amounts not exceeding fifteen per cent of the combined unimpaired capital and rest or re-

serve fund of the respective Banks as stated in their respective statutory monthly returns to the Minister of Finance for the month immediately preceding that in which the additional amount is issued.

That any necessary special legislation be obtained at the next Session of Parliament.

The Minister also recommends that the Government be prepared to give every other possible assistance in order to prevent any avoidable interruption of stable business conditions and for this purpose to use to the fullest extent all existing powers, and if necessary to ask further powers from Parliament.

The Committee submit the same for approval.

RODOLPHE BOUDREAU,
Clerk of the Privy Council.

P.C. 2047.

CERTIFIED copy of a Report of the Committee of the Privy Council, approved by His Royal Highness the Governor General on the 4th August, 1914.

The Committee of the Privy Council have had before them a joint report, dated 4th August, 1914, from the Minister of the Naval Service and the Minister of Customs, stating that section 43 of the Naval Service Act, chapter 43 of the Statutes of 1910, provides that:—

"The Governor in Council may from time to time transfer to or from the Naval "Service any vessel belonging to His Majesty."

The Committee, on the recommendation of the Minister of the Naval Service and the Minister of Customs, advise that the C.G.S. 'Canada' and the C.G.S. 'Margaret' be transferred to the Naval Service.

(Sgd.) RODOLPHE BOUDREAU,
Clerk of the Privy Council.

P.C. 2048.

CERTIFIED copy of a Report of the Committee of the Privy Council, approved by His Royal Highness the Governor General on the 4th August, 1914.

The Committee of the Privy Council, on the recommendation of the Right Honourable the Prime Minister, advise that a Proclamation do issue, dated the 4th day of August, instant, summoning the Parliament to meet for the despatch of business, on Tuesday, the 18th day of August, 1914, at the City of Ottawa.

(Sgd.) RODOLPHE BOUDREAU,
Clerk of the Privy Council.

P.C. 2049.

Certified copy of a Report of the Committee of the Privy Council, approved by His Royal Highness the Governor General on the 4th August, 1914.

The Committee of the Privy Council have had before them a Report, dated 4th August, 1914, from the Minister of the Naval Service, submitting that section 23 of the Naval Service Act, chapter 43 of the Statutes of 1910 provides that:—

> 23. In case of an emergency the Governor in Council may place at the disposal of His Majesty, for general service in the Royal Navy, the Naval Service or any part thereof, any ships or vessels of the Naval Service, and the officers and seamen serving in such ship or vessels, or any officers or seamen belonging to the Naval Service.

An emergency having arisen, the Minister recommends that H.M.C.S. 'Niobe' and H.M.C.S. 'Rainbow,' together with the officers and seamen serving in such vessels, be placed at the disposal of His Majesty for general service in the Royal Navy.

The Committee concur in the foregoing recommendation and submit the same for approval.

(Sgd.) RODOLPHE BOUDREAU.
Clerk of the Privy Council.

P. C. 2050.

AT THE GOVERNMENT HOUSE AT OTTAWA.

TUESDAY, THE 4TH DAY OF AUGUST, 1914.

PRESENT:

HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE GOVERNOR GENERAL IN COUNCIL.

Whereas Sections 22 and 31 of the Naval Service Act, Chapter 43 of the Statutes of 1910, provide that:

> 22. The Governor in Council may place the Naval Forces, or any part thereof, on active service at any time when it appears advisable so to do by reason of an emergency.
>
> 31. In an emergency the Governor in Council may order and direct that the Naval Volunteer Force, or such part thereof as may be deemed necessary, shall be called into active service, and the naval volunteers so called out shall be liable to serve under such regulations as may be prescribed.
>
> 2. If a naval volunteer's period of service expires while he is employed on active service, he shall be liable to serve for a further period of not more than six months, and for such further service he shall not be entitled to any increased remuneration, unless in the opinion of the Governor in Council, the circumstances of the case and the conduct of the person concerned merits it.

The Governor General in Council is pleased to Order and it is hereby Ordered, as an emergency exists at the present time, that the Naval Forces and the Naval Volunteer Forces be placed immediately on Active Service.

(Sgd.) RODOLPHE BOUDREAU,
Clerk of the Privy Council.

P.C. 2040.

CERTIFIED copy of a Report of the Committee of the Privy Council, approved by His Royal Highness the Governor General on the 5th August, 1914.

The Committee of the Privy Council, on the recommendation of the Minister of Militia and Defence, advise, with regard to the existing situation, that the Minister of Militia and Defence be permitted to call out units of the Active (non-permanent) Militia, as circumstances may demand, to complete the unexpired portion of the thirty (30) days' training authorized by section 52 of the Militia Act.

(Sgd.) RODOLPHE BOUDREAU,
Clerk of the Privy Council.

P.C. 2041.

CERTIFIED copy of a Report of the Committee of the Privy Council, approved by His Royal Highness the Governor General on the 5th August, 1914.

The Committee of the Privy Council, on the recommendation of the Right Honourable the Prime Minister, advise that where any Department of the Government requires or deems it desirable to have police protection for Government property or for property that may be required later on for transportation or other public purposes, such Department shall apply to the Minister of Justice, and that where military protection is required or deemed desirable such Department shall apply to the Minister of Militia and Defence.

(Signed) RODOLPHE BOUDREAU,
Clerk of the Privy Council.

P.C. 2042.

CERTIFIED copy of a Report of the Committee of the Privy Council, approved by His Royal Highness the Governor General on the 5th August, 1914.

The Committee of the Privy Council, on the recommendation of the Minister of Militia and Defence, advise that the attached draft General Order, dated 4th August, 1914, authorizing an increase in the strength of Privates of the Royal Canadian Regiment from 596 to 922 be approved. A statement of the expenditure involved is attached hereto.

(Signed) RODOLPHE BOUDREAU,
Clerk of the Privy Council.

Extract from the Canada Gazette of Saturday, August, 1914.

GENERAL ORDERS.

1914.

HEADQUARTERS, OTTAWA, 4th August, 1914.

ESTABLISHMENTS, 1914-15.

ACTIVE MILITIA, INCLUDING PERMANENT FORCE.

With reference to General Order 87, 1914, the following amendment is authorized:—

ROYAL CANADIAN REGIMENT.

Page 12, in column headed Regimental Establishment opposite total rank and file *for* "596" *read* "922."

By command,

(Signed) VICTOR A. S. WILLIAMS,
Colonel,
Adjutant-General.

G. O. of the 7th August, 1914.

MEMO. *RE* COST INVOLVED.

Amendment to G.O. 87 of 1914. Establishment R.C.R.

The increase of 326 privates in the strength of the R.C.R. will involve the following annual expenditure:—

Pay and allowances	$ 90,000
Maintenance in barracks	60,000
Clothing, transport, &c.	25,000
Total yearly cost	$175,000

There is sufficient clothing and equipment in store to outfit them on enlistment.

J. D. B.,
A. and P.M.G.

P.C. 2055.

AT THE GOVERNMENT HOUSE AT OTTAWA.

WEDNESDAY, 5TH DAY OF AUGUST, 1914.

PRESENT:

HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE GOVERNOR GENERAL IN COUNCIL.

Whereas a state of war now exists between this Country and Germany, and His Majesty, the King, being mindful of the recognition accorded to the practice of

granting "days of grace" to enemy merchant ships by the Convention relative to the Status of Enemy Merchant Ships at the Outbreak of Hostilities, signed at the Hague on the 18th October, 1907, and with the view of lessening so far as may be practicable, the injury caused by war to peaceful and unsuspecting commerce.

His Royal Highness the Governor General in Council is pleased to Order and it is ordered as follows:—

1. From and after the publication of this Order, no enemy merchant ship shall be allowed to depart, except in accordance with the provisions of this Order, from any Canadian port;

2. In the event of the Governor General being informed by His Majesty's Government that information had reached His Majesty's Government, not later than midnight on Friday the Seventh day of August that the treatment accorded to British Merchant Ships and their cargoes which, at the date of the outbreak of hostilities were in the ports of the enemy or which subsequently entered them is not less favourable than the treatment accorded to Enemy Merchant Ships by Articles 3 to 7 of this Order, the Secretary of State for External Affairs shall notify the Minister of Customs and the Minister of the Naval Service accordingly, and public notice thereof shall forthwith be given in the *Canada Gazette*, and Articles 3 to 8 of this Order shall thereupon come into full force and effect.

3. Subject to the provisions of this Order, Enemy Merchant Ships which——

(I.) At the date of the outbreak of hostilities were in any port in which this Order applies; or

(II.) Cleared from their last port before the declaration of war, and, after the outbreak of hostilities, enter a port to which this Order applies, with no knowledge of the war;

Shall be allowed up till midnight (Greenwich mean time)* on Friday the fourteenth day of August, 1914, for loading or unloading their cargoes and for departing from such port.

Provided that such vessels shall not be allowed to ship any contraband of war, and any contraband of war already shipped on such vessels must be discharged.

4. Enemy merchant ships which cleared from their last port before the declaration of war, and which with no knowledge of the war, arrive at a port to which this Order applies after the expiry of the time allowed by Article 3 for loading or unloading cargo and for departing, and are permitted to enter, may be required to depart either immediately, or within such time as may be considered necessary by the Customs Officer of the port for the unloading of such cargo as they may be required or specially permitted to discharge.

Provided that such vessels may, as a condition of being allowed to discharge cargo, be required to proceed to any other specified Canadian port, and shall there be allowed such time for discharge as the Customs Officer of that port may consider to be necessary.

Provided also that, if any cargo on board such vessel is contraband of war or is requisitioned under Article 5 of this Order, she may be required before departure to discharge such cargo within such time as the Customs Officer of the port may consider to be necessary; or she may be required to proceed, if necessary under escort, to any other port in the Dominion of Canada, and shall there discharge the contraband under the like conditions.

*At ports where Atlantic Time is kept the corresponding standard time of place is 8.0 p.m.; where Eastern Standard Time is kept it is 7.0 p.m.; where Central Time is kept it is 6.0 p.m.; where Mountain Time is kept it is 5.0 p.m.; and where Pacific Time is kept it is 4.0 p.m. of the same day, respectively.

5. The Canadian Government reserves the right recognized by the said Convention to requisition at any time, subject to payment of compensation, enemy cargo on board any vessel to which Articles 3 and 4 of this Order apply.

6. The privileges accorded by Articles 3 and 4 are not to extend to cable ships or to sea-going ships designed to carry oil fuel, or to ships whose tonnage exceeds 5,000 tons gross, or whose speed is 14 knots or over, regarding which the entries in Lloyd's Register shall be conclusive, for the purposes of this article. Such vessels will remain liable on adjudication by the Prize Court to detention during the period of the war, or to requisition, in accordance, in either case, with the Convention aforesaid. The said privileges will also not extend to merchant ships which show by their build that they are intended for conversion into war ships, as such vessels are outside the scope of the said Convention, and are liable on adjudication by the Prize Court to condemnation as prize.

7. Enemy merchant ships allowed to depart under Articles 3 and 4 will be provided with a pass indicating the port to which they are to proceed, and the route they are to follow, in which pass shall be embodied the following proviso:—

"Provided also that she keeps her colours constantly flying during her voyage, and make no attempt to evade stoppage and search by British ships of war which she may fall in with."

8. A merchant ship which, after receipt of such a pass, does not follow the course indicated therein, will be liable to capture.

9. If no information reaches His Majesty's Government within the time allowed by it for the receipt of such information to the effect that the treatment accorded to British merchant ships and their cargoes which were in the ports of the enemy at the date of the outbreak of hostilities or which subsequently entered them, is, in its opinion, not less favourable than that accorded to enemy merchant ships by Articles 3 to 8 of this Order, every enemy merchant ship which, on the outbreak of hostilities, was in any port to which this Order applies, and also every enemy ship which cleared from its last port before the declaration of war, but which, with no knowledge of the war enters a port to which this Order applies, shall together with the cargo on board thereof, be liable to capture, and shall be brought before the Prize Court forthwith for adjudication.

10. In the event of information reaching His Majesty's Government that British Merchant Ships which cleared from their last port before the declaration of war, but are met with by the enemy at sea after the outbreak of hostilities, are allowed to continue their voyage without interference with either the ship or the cargo, or after capture are released with or without proceedings in the Prize Court, or are to be detained during the war or requisitioned in lieu of condemnation as prize, the Secretary of State for External Affairs shall notify the Minister of the Naval Service accordingly, and shall publish a notification thereof in the *Canada Gazette*, and in that event, but not otherwise, enemy merchant ships which cleared from their last port before the declaration of war, and are captured after the outbreak of hostilities and brought before the Prize Court for adjudication, shall be released or detained or requisitioned in such cases and upon such terms as may be directed in the said notification in the *Canada Gazette*.

11. Neutral cargo, other than contreband of war, on board an Enemy Merchant Ship which is not allowed to depart from a port to which this Order applies, shall be released.

12. In accordance with the provisions of Chapter III of the Convention, relative to certain restrictions on the Exercise of the Right of Capture in Maritime War,

signed at the Hague on 18th October, 1907, an undertaking must, whether the Merchant Ship is allowed to depart or not, be given in writing by each of the officers and members of the crew of such vessel, who is of Enemy nationality, that he will not, after the conclusion of the voyage for which the pass is issued, engage while hostilities last in any service connected with the operation of the war. If any such officer is of neutral nationality, an undertaking must be given in writing that he will not serve, after the conclusion of the voyage for which the pass is issued, on any Enemy ship while hostilities last. No undertaking is to be required from members of the crew who are of neutral nationality, Officers or members of the crew declining to give the undertakings required by this Article will be detained as prisoners of war.

And the Ministers of each of the Government departments, and all Officers and authorities whom it may concern are to give the necessary directions herein as to them may respectively appertain.

(Sgd.) RODOLPHE BOUDREAU,
Clerk of the Privy Council.

P. C. 2067.

CERTIFIED copy of a Report of the Committee of the Privy Council, approved by His Royal Highness the Governor General on the 6th August, 1914.

The Committee of the Privy Council have had before them a report, dated 6th August, 1914, from the Minister of Militia and Defence, representing,—in view of the state of war now existing between the United Kingdom, and the Dominions, Colonies and Dependencies of the British Empire on the one side, and Germany on the other side, creating a menace to the well-being and integrity of the Empire, and having regard to the duty of the Dominion of Canada as one of those Dominions to provide for its own defence and to assist in maintaining the integrity and honour of the Empire, that it is desirable to mobilize Militia units of the various arms of the service of such effective strength as may from time to time be determined by Your Royal Highness in Council, such units to be composed of officers and men who are willing to volumteer for Over-Seas service under the British Crown; to organize and equip them for war and to make and perfect all arrangements necessary to enable them to enlist and be enrolled for service under His Majesty's Government, should that Government so desire.

The Minister recommends, in order that this purpose may be carried out, that Your Royal Highness authorize the raising and equipment of such units of such effective strength as aforesaid, the concentrating of them at some point to be selected by the Minister of Militia, with Your Royal Highness's approval, and to make and perfect all arrangements necessary to enable them to enlist and be enrolled for service under His Majesty's Government should that Government so desire, upon such terms of engagement and for such service as may be deemed advisable.

The Committee concur in the foregoing and submit the same for Your Royal Highness's approval.

(Sgd.) RODOLPHE BOUDREAU
Clerk of the Privy Council.

P.C. 2068.

AT THE GOVERNMENT HOUSE AT OTTAWA.

THURSDAY, THE 6TH DAY OF AUGUST, 1914.

PRESENT:

HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE GOVERNOR GENERAL IN COUNCIL.

WHEREAS in view of the state of war existing between the United Kingdom and the Dominions, Colonies and Dependencies of the Empire, on the one side, and Germany, on the other side; and in view of the fact that thereby the Dominion of Canada is liable to invasion and other assaults of a hostile nature, such an emergency has arisen as calls for the placing of the Militia on "active service."

THEREFORE His Royal Highness the Governor General in Council, under the authority of Section Sixty-nine of the Militia Act, is hereby pleased to order that such corps or parts of the Militia as may from time to time, with the approval of the Governor General, in Council, be named or designated in General Orders published in the *Canada Gazette*, be placed on Active service in Canada.

(Sgd.) RODOLPHE BOUDREAU,
Clerk of the Privy Council.

P.C. 2069.

CERTIFIED copy of a Report of the Committee of the Privy Council, approved by His Royal Highness the Governor General, on the 6th August, 1914.

The Committee of the Privy Council have had before them a report, dated 6th August, 1914, from the Minister of Militia and Defence, stating that in accordance with the instructions received from the British Government, a censorship of cables and wireless telegraphy has been established in Canada and for this work the following personnel has been found necessary:—

—	Chief Deputy Censors.	Censors.	Asst. Censors.	Decoders.
	Nos.	Nos.	Nos.	Nos.
Ottawa		2		4
Halifax and Camperdown		2	6	10
Canso		1	9	24
Sydney		1	9	12
Glace Bay		1	2	4
Fame Point		1	2	4
Heath Point		1	2	4
Victoria		1	3	4
Bamfield		1	3	4
Cape Lazo		1	2	4
Pachena		1	2	4
Total		13	40	78

The Committee, on the recommendation of the Minister of Militia and Defence, advise that the following rates of salary be approved, these being, approximately, the same as those paid Censors in Great Britain, viz.:—

Deputy Chief Censor	$10 00 a day.
Censor	9 00 "
Asst. Censor	7 00 "
Decoders	3 50 "

these rates to include everything except travelling expenses.

(Sgd.) RODOLPHE BOUDREAU,
Clerk of the Privy Council.

AT THE GOVERNMENT HOUSE AT OTTAWA.

THURSDAY, THE 6TH DAY OF AUGUST, 1914.

PRESENT:

HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE GOVERNOR GENERAL IN COUNCIL.

His Royal Highness the Governor General in Council is pleased to order as follows:—

The exportation of the following articles from Canada to all foreign ports in Europe and on the Mediterranean and Black Sea with the exception of those of France, Russia (except the Baltic ports), Spain and Portugal, is hereby prohibited under the provisions of sections 291 and 242 of the Customs Act:—

Aluminium; aluminium alloys; armour plating; armour quality castings and similar protective material; asbestos; cables, telegraph and telephone; camp equipment, articles of; cannon and other ordnance, and parts thereof; carbolic acid; carriages and mountings for cannon and other ordnance and for machine guns and parts thereof; coal, steam large; compasses and parts thereof, including fittings, such as binnacles; cresol; engine and boiler packings; explosives of all kinds; fuel, manufactured; implements and apparatus designed exclusively for the manufacture of munitions of war, for the manufacture or repair of arms, or of war material for use on land and sea; India-rubber sheet, vulcanized; manganese; mercury; mica; mineral jellies; mines and parts thereof; molybdenum; nitrocresol; nitrates of ammonium; nitrates of potassium; nitrates of sodium; nitratoluol; nitric acid; picric acid and its components, rangefinders and parts thereof; rope and steel wire and hawse; saltpetre; sounding machines and gear; steam vessels, lighters and barges of all descriptions; sulphur; sulphuric acid; swords, bayonets and other arms not being firearms and parts thereof; tin; tin-plates; torpedo tubes; torpedoes and parts thereof; tungsten; vanadium; four wheeled wagons capable of carrying one ton and over; two wheeled carts capable of carrying 15 cwt. and over; harness and saddlery of all kinds; brass wire for long spans, 450 lbs. per mile; horse and pony shoes; materials for telegraphs; wireless telegraphs and telephones; field glasses and telephones; field glasses and telescopes; railway materials both fixed and rolling stock; men's marching and shooting boots; heliographs, portable forges; farriers', carpenters', wheelers' and saddlers' tools and transport service sets; glycerine; alcohol as covering rectified spirits; uniform clothing and military equipment; accoutrement; walnut wood of scantling which can be made into rifle butts and fore-ends.

His Royal Highness the Governor General in Council is further pleased to order that this Order in Council be proclaimed and published in the *Canada Gazette*.

(Sgd.) RODOLPHE BOUDREAU,
Clerk of the Privy Council.

CERTIFIED copy of a Report of the Committee of the Privy Council, approved by His Royal Highness the Governor General on the 7th August, 1914.

The Committee of the Privy Council have had before them a report, dated 6th August, 1914, from the Minister of the Naval Service, submitting that, in view of the existing emergency, it is necessary to provide some additional means of Naval Defence on the Pacific Coast of Canada.

The Minister states that two submarine boats have been offered to the Dominion Government; that these boats were originally built for the Chilian Government which was unable to receive them, and that their dimensions are as follows:—

Displacement.....	313 tons,
Length.....	144 feet and 152 feet respectively,
Beam.....	15 feet,
Speed.....	13 knots.

The Technical Officers of the Department of the Naval Service report that these boats are very suitable and recommend their purchase.

The Minister concurs and recommends, therefore, that these boats be purchased for the sum of One million and fifty thousand ($1,050,000) Dollars, and that, as the necessity is urgent, a Governor General's warrant be issued covering this expenditure, the Minister of Finance having reported that there is no Parliamentary Appropriation from which this expenditure can be defrayed.

The Committee advise that a Governor General's Warrant do issue as recommended accordingly

(Signed) RODOLPHE BOUDREAU,
Clerk of the Privy Council.

P.C. 2072.

AT THE GOVERNMENT HOUSE AT OTTAWA.

FRIDAY, THE 7TH DAY OF AUGUST, 1914.

PRESENT:

HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE GOVERNOR GENERAL IN COUNCIL.

His Royal Highness the Governor General in Council, under and in pursuance of the provisions of section 23 of the Naval Service Act 1910, is pleased to Order and it is hereby Ordered as follows:—

The two submarine boats now at Esquimalt, B.C., are hereby placed at the disposal of His Majesty for general service in the Royal Navy.

(Signed) RODOLPHE BOUDREAU,
Clerk of the Privy Council.

P.C. 2076.

Certified copy of a Report of the Committee of the Privy Council, approved by His Royal Highness the Governor General on the 7th August, 1914.

The Committee of the Privy Council, on the recommendation of the Postmaster General, advise that, owing to the unsettled financial conditions now prevailing in Europe and the high rate of exchange that prevails between Canada and Great Britain, which may fluctuate from day to day, money order business between Canada and all European countries, including the United Kingdom, be suspended, and that money order business be suspended with all countries with which Canada has not a direct exchange, as the settlement with such countries has to be made through the British Office, and will be affected by the high rate of exchange in the same manner as the direct exchange on money orders between Canada and Great Britain.

(Sgd.) RODOLPHE BOUDREAU,
Clerk of the Privy Council.

P.C. 2086.

AT THE GOVERNMENT HOUSE AT OTTAWA.

FRIDAY, THE 7TH DAY OF AUGUST, 1914.

PRESENT:

HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE GOVERNOR GENERAL IN COUNCIL.

Whereas there are many immigrants of German nationality quietly pursuing their usual avocations in various parts of Canada and it is desirable that such persons should continue in such avocations without interruption;

Therefore His Royal Highness the Governor General in Council is pleased to Order and it is hereby Ordered as follows:—

(1). Such persons so long as they quietly pursue their ordinary avocations, shall not be arrested, detained or interfered with unless there is reasonable ground to believe that they are engaged in espionage, or attempting to engage in acts of a hostile nature, or to give information to the enemy or unless they otherwise contravene any law, Order in Council or proclamation;

(2) All German Officers or reservists attempting to leave Canada at any port on the Atlantic or on the Pacific shall be arrested and detained;

(3) That, while it is impossible to guard effectually the boundary line between Canada and the United States for like purposes, precautions shall be taken at important points such as Halifax, St. John, Quebec, Montreal, Kingston, Toronto, Niagara, Hamilton, London, Windsor, Sarnia, Sault Ste. Marie, Port Arthur, Fort William, Winnipeg, Regina, Moosejaw, Calgary, Lethbridge, Revelstoke, Sicamous, Mission Junction, New Westminster, Vancouver, Victoria, and any other similar points in the discretion of the Minister of Militia to prevent German Officers or reservists from leaving Canada for the purpose of entering the United States and thence proceeding to Germany and any such officers or reservists making any such attempt shall be arrested and detained;

(4) Any legislation necessary to ratify and enforce this Order in Council shall be submitted to Parliament at the next session thereof.

(Sgd.) RODOLPHE BOUDREAU,
Clerk of the Privy Council.

P.C. 2087.

AT THE GOVERNMENT HOUSE AT OTTAWA,

FRIDAY, THE 7TH DAY OF AUGUST, 1914.

PRESENT:

HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE GOVERNOR GENERAL IN COUNCIL.

His Royal Highness the Governor General in Council is pleased to order as follows:—

The exportation from Canada of the following articles is hereby prohibited, under the provisions of sections 291 and 242 of the Customs Act:—

1. Articles prohibited to be exported to any places other than the United Kingdom or any British possessions:

Arms of all kinds and their distinctive component parts;

Projectiles, charges and cartridges of all kinds and their distinctive component parts;

Powder and explosives, specially manufactured or prepared for use in war;

Gun mountings, limber boxes, limbers, military wagons, field forges and their distinctive component parts;

Petroleum and its products, used for fuel or as a lubricant;

Saddle, draught and pack animals, suitable for use in war;

Chrome and ferrochrome, cotton suitable for use in the manufacture of explosives. Cotton waste, dimithylaniline. Fulminate or mercury. Blast-furnace oil. Fuel oil shale. Mineral lubricating oil. Silkcloth, Silkbraid, silkthread, suitable for cartridge charges. Surgical dressings and bandages;

Clothing and equipment of a military character;

All kinds of harness of a military character;

Articles of military camp equipment and their component parts.

Implements and apparatus, designed for the manufacture or repair of arms or war material.

2. Articles prohibited to be exported to any places other than the United Kingdom, British Possessions, the United States, Japan, France and Russia:

Coal.

His Royal Highness the Governor General in Council is further pleased to Order that this Order in Council be proclaimed and published in the *Canada Gazette.*

(Sgd.) RODOLPHE BOUDREAU,
Clerk of the Privy Council.

P.C. 2004.

CERTIFIED copy of a Report of the Committee of the Privy Council, approved by His Royal Highness the Governor General on the 8th August, 1914.

The Committee of the Privy Council, on the recommendation of the Minister of Militia and Defence, advise that a contract be made with the Canada Tool and Specialty Company, Limited, of New Glasgow, for the conversion of 10,000 long Ross rifles, and the supply of 10,000 screw elevating sights and charger guide bridges, subject to the following conditions:

1. That the company take delivery, F.O.B. cars, New Glasgaw, of 10,000 long Ross rifles, in car load lots, packed in chests.

2. That the company remove the sight bases and hand guards, etc., from the rifles, and fit them with new screw elevating sights and new charger guide bridges, placed on the rear position, and also new hand guards of a proper pattern.

3. That the design of the sight and bridge should be the same as that approved for the long Ross Mark II, and that the components should be interchangeable therewith.

4. That the new sights, charger guide bridges and hand guards should all be manufactured by the company in their factory at New Glasgow.

5. That all the work and materials, to be done and provided under the proposed contract, be subject to inspection by the Chief Inspector of Arms and Ammunition, or other officer appointed for that purpose by the Minister; and shall be accepted only upon the report of such officer.

6. That the inspector shall have access to the company's factory during the progress of the work at all reasonable times.

7. That all necessary plans, drawings and specifications be furnished by the Minister.

8. That after the completion of the work and its acceptance by the Inspector, the company shall repack and ship the rifles to the Chief Inspector of Arms and Ammunition, Quebec; or to such other address as may be required.

9. That the company be paid $3.50 for each rifle so converted, F.O.B. cars, New Glasgow; this price to include the work of conversion and the supply of new sights, charger guide bridges and hand guards; as well as the cost of all plant, tools, jigs, fixtures, etc., necessary for the work.

10. That the work should be begun on or before October 1st, 1914, provided the rifles are available at that time; and should be completed on or before April 1, 1915. Any delay in the delivery of the rifles to the company will entitle the company to a corresponding extension of the time for completion of the contract.

11. That all payments to be made to the company under the proposed contract shall be charged against Appropriations for the then current fiscal year.

Clerk of the Privy Council.

P. C. 2076

CERTIFIED copy of a Report of the Committee of the Privy Council, approved by His Royal Highness the Governor General on the 8th August, 1914.

The Committee of the Privy Council, on the recommendation of the Minister of Militia and Defence, advise that the attached draft General Order, dated 7th August, 1914, authorizing the organization of an eight company City Corps Battalion of Infantry at Hull, P.Q., be approved.

The Minister observes that statement of the expenditure involved is attached hereto.

(Sgd.) RODOLPHE BOUDREAU,
Clerk of the Privy Council.

Extract from the Canada Gazette of Saturday, August, 1914.

GENERAL ORDERS.

1914.

HEADQUARTERS,
OTTAWA, 7th August, 1914.

ORGANIZATION.

3rd Division.—The organization of an eight company City Corps Battalion of Infantry, with headquarters at Hull, P.Q., is authorized.

(H.Q. 31-1-157)
(H.Q. 32-9-24)

By Command,

VICTOR A. S. WILLIAMS,
Colonel,
Adjutant-General.

ORGANIZATION.

The expense involved under this head is as follows:

HULL REGIMENT OF INFANTRY.

Arms and Equipment	$ 22,011
Clothing	18,418
Total initial expense	$ 40,429

In addition there will be annual expenses of training amounting, with the Regimental Allowances, to, approximately, $9,500.

P. C. 2093.

CERTIFIED copy of a Report of the Committee of the Privy Council, approved by His Royal Highness, the Governor General on the 8th August, 1914.

The Committee of the Privy Council have had before them a memorandum from the President of the Privy Council, dated 7th August, 1914, submitting the annexed report, of even date, from the Comptroller of the R. N. W. M. Police, in which he concurs.

The Minister recommends that steps be taken at the approaching session of Parliament to obtain authority for the increase of the Royal North West Mounted Police to 1,200 Non-commissioned Officers and Constables for the period of one year.

The Minister further recommends that the sum of $600,000.00 be placed in the Estimates to be submitted at the coming session of Parliament to meet the expenses of the above increase.

The Committee concur in the foregoing recommendations and submit the same for approval.

(Sgd.) RODOLPHE BOUDREAU,
Clerk of the Privy Council.

P. C. 2080.

CERTIFIED copy of a Report of the Committee of the Privy Council, approved by His Royal Highness the Governor General on the 10th August, 1914.

The Committee of the Privy Council, on the recommendation of the Minister of Militia and Defence, advice that authority be granted for the Canadian Overseas Expeditionary Force to be composed in accordance with the accompanying table.

(Sgd.) RODOLPHE BOUDREAU,
Clerk of the Privy Council.

THE CANADIAN CONTINGENT.

Statement showing by arms, etc., the strength (all ranks) of the force which it is proposed to assemble at Valcartier, P.Q., prior to the embarkation of a Division, with which a quota of L. of C. (Administrative) units.

Arms, &c.	Division.		L. of C. (administrative) units.	Total embarking strength.	Surplus to provide a margin for selection and to serve as a nucleus for reinforcements.	Total force assembling at Valcartier, P.Q.
	In the field.	Details at the oversea base.				
Commanders, staffs special appointments, police, &c	90	.....	.....	90	12	102
Cavalry	157	14	.....	171	25	196
Artillery	3,888	376	60	4,324	500	4,824
Engineers	442	42	.....	484	50	534
Signal Service	160	14	.....	174	25	199
Infantry	12,025	1,200	.....	13,225	2,000	15,225
Army Service Corps	567	50	1,161	1,778	60	1,838
Army Medical Service	698	54	692	1,444	60	1,504
Army Veterinary Service	11	.....	115	126	10	136
Ordnance Corps	18	.....	167	185	20	205
Army Pay Corps	2	.....	100	102	10	112
Postal Corps	15	.....	100	115	10	125
Total	18,073	1,750	2,395	22,218	2,782	25,000

N.B.—Chaplains and nursing sisters not included.

P.C. 2090

Certified copy of a Report of the Committee of the Privy Council, approved by His Royal Highness the Governor General on the 10th August, 1914.

The Committee of the Privy Council have had before them a report, dated 7th August, 1914, from the Right Honourable the Secretary of State for External Affairs, to whom was referred a telegraphic despatch, dated 5th August, 1914, from the Right Honourable the Secretary of State for the Colonies to Your Royal Highness.

The Committee, on the recommendation of the Secretary of State for External Affairs, advise that Your Royal Highness may be pleased to inform the Secretary of State for the Colonies, by telegraph, that the services of any Canadian Officers on duty at the present time in the United Kingdom who may be usefully employed there, are at the disposal of His Majesty's Government, also that Canadian Officers and men whose training is finished or interrupted and whose services are not required in the United Kingdom should return to Canada at once.

All which is respectfully submitted for approval.

(Sgd.) RODOLPHE BOUDREAU,
Clerk of the Privy Council.

Mr. Harcourt to the Governor General.

LONDON, August 5, 1914.

Presume your Government have no objection to Army Council approaching Canadian Officers on duty in this country with a view to utilizing services if occasion arises.

(Sd.) HARCOURT.

DEPARTMENT OF MILITIA AND DEFENCE,
OTTAWA, August 7, 1914.

SIR,—Adverting to my letter of this day's date acknowledging receipt of despatch of the 5th instant, enclosing a copy of a telegram from the Secretary of State for the Colonies respecting Canadian officers at present in England, I have the honour to inform you that an inquiry on this subject was received from the High Commissioner on the 5th instant, and a reply was sent as follows:—

> "All Canadian officers and men whose training is finished or interrupted, should return to Canada at once unless services desired by Imperial Government."

I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your obedient servant,

(Sd.) EUG. FISET,
Colonel,
Deputy Minister.

The Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs,
Ottawa.

P. C. 2096.

CERTIFIED copy of a Report of the Committee of the Privy Council, approved by His Royal Highness the Governor General on the 10th August, 1914.

The Committee of the Privy Council have had before them a Report, dated 8th August, 1914, from the Minister of Finance, submitting, with reference to the Orders in Council of the 3rd August, 1914, under which arrangements were made with a view to preserving the gold supply of the Dominion of Canada from depletion, that, in his opinion, it became desirable that steps be taken at that time to preserve intact the gold reserve held by him under the provisions of the Dominion Notes Act.

The Minister, accordingly, gave instructions on the 4th August, 1914, that, until further notice, Dominion notes would not be redeemed at the offices of the Assistant Receivers General in specie.

The Minister recommends that his action in this regard be confirmed and that at the next session of Parliament legislation be obtained to legalize the course thus taken.

The Committee concur in the foregoing and submit the same for approval.

(Sgd.) RODOLPHE BOUDREAU,
Clerk of the Privy Council.

P.C. 2097.

CERTIFIED copy of a Report of the Committee of the Privy Council, approved by His Royal Highness the Governor General on the 10th August, 1914.

The Committee of the Privy Council have had before them a Report, dated 10th August, 1914, from the Minister of Militia and Defence, recommending that an order be given to the Ross Rifle Company for 30,000 Rifles, 30,000 screw Elevating Sights therefor, and 30,000 bayonets complete with scabbards, for delivery during the calendar year 1914.

The Minister states that under the terms of the contract existing between the Government and the Ross Rifle Company it is provided that in case of war, actual or threatened, or any national emergency, the Contractor shall do his utmost to manufacture at his Factory and deliver to the Government all such rifles as may be reasonably required and shall, if need be, operate his factory at any time to twenty-four hours per day until delivery of the Rifles required is completed.

The Minister further states that this order shall be subject in all respects to the provisions of the existing contract with the Ross Rifle Company for the manufacture and supply of Rifles, and subject also to the following further conditions:—

1. That the Rifles shall be Long Ross, Mark III, Pattern, and the screw Elevating Sight shall be the Pattern which was adopted for that Rifle. Also that the said Sights shall be attached to, and delivered with, the Rifles alluded to above.

2. That the Bayonets and Scabbards shall be of the Pattern authorized for use with Mark III Rifles.

3. That in accordance with the provisions of Orders in Council dated 7th April, 1913, and 7th November, 1913, the price of the Rifles is to be $26.90 each without the Screw Elevating Sight; the price of the Sights $1.10 each; and the price of the Bayonets, each complete with Scabbard, $5.25 each.

4. That delivery will be taken by the Department of Militia and Defence at the Inspection premises of the Chief Inspector of Arms and Ammunition, Quebec, delivery of the entire lot to be completed on or before 31st December, 1914.

The Committee concur in the foregoing and submit the same for approval.

(Sgd.) RODOLPHE BOUDREAU,
Clerk of the Privy Council.

P.C. 2101.

CERTIFIED copy of a Report of the Committee of the Privy Council, approved by His Royal Highness the Governor General on the 11th August, 1914.

The Committee of the Privy Council, on the recommendation of the Minister of Justice, advise that, pursuant to the authority of Chapter 92 of the Revised Statutes of Canada, 1906, Major William McLeod, of Winnipeg, Assistant Chief of the Department of Investigation of the Canadian Pacific Railway Company, be appointed a Commissioner of Police within Canada, and that Mr. Rufus Chamberlain, Chief of the Department of Investigation of the said Company be appointed Commissioner

of Police within all Canada East of this boundary line between the Provinces of Ontario and Manitoba.

(Sgd.) RODOLPHE BOUDREAU,
Clerk of the Privy Council.

P.C. 2102.

CERTIFIED copy of a Report of the Committee of the Privy Council, approved by His Royal Highness the Governor General on the 11th August, 1914.

The Committee of the Privy Council have had before them a Report, dated 10th August, 1914, from the Right Honourable the Prime Minister, stating that since the outbreak of war a large number of persons employed in the Civil Service of Canada, who are enrolled in the active Militia, have applied for leave of absence to serve at home or abroad, and many others not so enrolled have signified a desire to volunteer for service either in Canada or abroad.

The Minister observes that,—considering the needs of the several Departments of the Government in order to maintain and carry on the public service and the necessity of retaining a sufficient number of experienced and qualified men for such purpose, and after consulting the heads of the various Departments,—he is of opinion it will not be possible or expedient to grant all applications of this character.

The Minister, therefore, recommends as follows:

Any person in the service of the Government whether the inside or the outside service who is enrolled in the active Militia shall if required by the head of his Department, with the consent of the Minister of Militia, resume his duties in the public service although he has been called out for active service as a member of the Militia.

Subject to the foregoing provision all persons in the employment of the Government of Canada who, during the present war, have been or may be called out for active service as members of the Militia, and all persons who, with the consent of the head of the Department in which they are engaged, enlist in any expeditionary force raised in Canada for service abroad during the war, shall be entitled to receive their regular salary during such period of service subject to such regulations and conditions as to the payment of such salary to the families or dependents of such persons or otherwise as may be prescribed by Order in Council or by the head of the Department in each case.

The Committee concur in the foregoing and submit the same for approval.

(Sgd.) RODOLPHE BOUDREAU,
Clerk of the Privy Council.

P.C. 2103.

CERTIFIED copy of a Report of the Committee of the Privy Council, approved by His Royal Highness the Governor General, on the 12th August, 1914.

The Committee of the Privy Council, on the recommendation of the Minister of Militia and Defence, advise that the attached draft General Order, dated 7th August, 1914, authorizing the reorganization of Earl Grey's Own Rifles as a 4-company City Corps, be approved.

The Minister observes that a statement of the expenditure involved is attached hereto.

(Sgd.) RODOLPHE BOUDREAU,
Clerk of the Privy Council.

Extract from the Canada Gazette of Saturday, August, 1914.

GENERAL ORDERS.

1914.

HEADQUARTERS,
OTTAWA, 7th August, 1914.

ORGANIZATION.

Military District No. 11—Earl Grey's Own Rifles. The reorganization of Earl Grey's Own Rifles as a 4-company City Corps is authorized.

(H.Q.-7-114-1)

BY COMMAND

(Sgd.) VICTOR A. S. WILLIAMS,
Colonel,
Adjutant General.

EARL GREY'S OWN RIFLES.

Clothing	$ 7,042
Arms and Equipment	9,749
Total initial cost	$16,791

In addition the annual cost of $6,000 for training and allowances.
Provision made in Supplementary Estimates 1914-15.

P. C. 2106.

CERTIFIED copy of a Report of the Committee of the Privy Council, approved by His Royal Highness the Governor General on the 12th August, 1914.

The Committee of the Privy Council, on the recommendation of the Minister of Militia and Defence, advise that the accompanying draft General Order, dated 10th August, 1914, calling out the troops in No. 11 Military District on Active service, be approved.

(Sgd) RODOLPHE BOUDREAU,
Clerk of the Privy Council.

Extract from the Canada Gazette.

CANADIAN MILITIA.

1914.

HEADQUARTERS, OTTAWA, August 10, 1914.

CALLING OUT TROOPS ON ACTIVE SERVICE.

In virtue of an Order by His Royal Highness the Governor General in Council, numbered P.C. 2068, dated the 6th day of August, 1914, and made under the authority of section 69 of the Militia Act, the corps and parts of corps hereinafter mentioned,

having their headquarters in Military District No. 11, are placed on Active Service at their full peace establishment for such special duties and at such points as may be ordered by the officer commanding that District, or as may hereafter from time to time be directed from Militia Headquarters:—

CAVALRY.

30th Regiment British Columbia Horse.
31st Regiment British Columbia Horse.
Victoria Independent Squadron.

ARTILLERY.

Royal Canadian Garrison Artillery (No. 5 Company).
5th Regiment Canadian Garrison Artillery.

ENGINEERS.

3rd (Fortress) Company Royal Canadian Engineers.
6th Field Company Canadian Engineers.

CORPS OF GUIDES.

No. 11 Detachment, Corps of Guides.

INFANTRY.

6th Regiment.
11th Regiment.
50th Regiment.
72nd Regiment.
88th Regiment.
102nd Regiment.
104th Regiment.
Grand Forks Isdependent Company of Rifles.
Nanaimo Independent Company.

CANADIAN SIGNAL CORPS.

No. 11 Section, Canadian Signal Corps.

CANADIAN ARMY SERVICE CORPS.

No. 19 Company, Canadian Army Service Corps.

ARMY MEDICAL SERVICES.

No. XVIII Field Ambulance.
No. 11 Detachment, Permanent Army Medical Corps.

CANADIAN ARMY VETERINARY CORPS.

No. 11 Section, Canadian Army Veterinary Corps.

CANADIAN ORDNANCE CORPS.

No. 11 Detachment, Canadian Ordnance Corps.

CANADIAN ARMY PAY CORPS.

No. 10 Detachment, Canadian Army Pay Corps.

By Command,

(Sgd.) VICTOR A. S. WILLIAMS,
Colonel,
Adjutant General.

P. C. 2108.

Certified copy of a Report of the Committee of the Privy Council, approved by His Royal Highness the Governor General on the 12th August, 1914.

The Committee of the Privy Council, on the recommendation of the Minister of Railways and Canals, advise that, in view of the present crisis in International affairs, the St. Peters Canal, Cape Breton, which by the authority of an Order in Council of the 3rd July, 1914, was closed to public traffic on the 15th of that month, be reopened and maintained in operation until further directed.

(Sgd.) RODOLPHE BOUDREAU,
Clerk of the Privy Council.

P. C. 2128

AT THE GOVERNMENT HOUSE AT OTTAWA.

THURSDAY THE 13TH OF AUGUST, 1914.

PRESENT:

HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE GOVERNOR GENERAL IN COUNCIL.

Whereas there are many immigrants of Autro-Hungarian nationality quietly pursuing their usual avocations in various parts of Canada and it is desirable that such persons should continue in such avocations without interruption.

Therefore His Royal Highness the Governor General in Council is pleased to Order and it is hereby ordered as follows:

1. Such persons so long as they quietly pursue their ordinary avocations, shall not be arrested, detained or interfered with unless there is reasonable ground to believe that they are engaged in espionage, or attempting to engage in acts of a hostile nature, or to give information to the enemy or unless they otherwise contravene any law, Order in Council or proclamation;

2. All Austro-Hungarian officers or reservists attempting to leave Canada at any port on the Atlantic or on the Pacific shall be arrested and detained;

3. That, while it is impossible to guard effectually the boundary line between Canada and the United States for like purposes, precautions shall be taken at importants points such as Halifax, St. John, Quebec, Montreal, Kingston, Toronto, Niagara, Hamilton, London, Windsor, Sarnia, Sault Ste. Marie, Port Arthur, Fort William, Winnipeg, Regina, Moosejaw, Calgary, Lethbridge, Revelstoke, Sicamous, Mission Junction, New Westminster, Vancouver, Victoria and any other similar points in the discretion of the Minister of Militia to prevent Austro-Hungarian officers or reservists from leaving Canada for the purpose of entering the United States and thence proceeding to Austria-Hungary and any such Officers or reservists making any such attempt shall be arrested and detained;

4. Any legislation necessary to ratify and enforce this Order in Council shall be submitted to Parliament at the next session thereof.

(Sgd.) RODOLPHE BOUDREAU,
Clerk of the Privy Council.

P.C. 2114.

CERTIFIED copy of a Report of the Committee of the Privy Council, approved by His Royal Highness the Governor General on the 13th August, 1914.

The Committee of the Privy Council have had before them a report, dated 11th August, 1914, from the Right Honourable the President of the Privy Council, submitting for the consideration of Council the annexed report from the Comptroller of the Royal Northwest Mounted Police, of even date, in which he concurs.

The Minister recommends that the following regulations with regard to the engagement of new men and the re-engagement of pensioners and ex-members of the Force for service during the war, be approved:—

1. Married men may be engaged or re-engaged.

2. That separation allowance at the rate of $20 per month be granted to married men, with the exception of pensioners, for the maintenance of their families.

3. That pensioners be permitted to draw their pensions for the support of their families, and that in cases where the pension is less than $20 per month, separation allowance to make up the difference be paid to them.

The Committee submit the same for approval.

(Sgd.) RODOLPHE BOUDREAU,
Clerk of the Privy Council.

ROYAL NORTHWEST MOUNTED POLICE.

OTTAWA, August 11, 1914.

MEMORANDUM *re* engagement of married men and re-engagement of pensioners and ex-members of the Force for service during the War.

Paragraph 1274 of the R.N.W.M. Police Rules and Regulations provides that married men are not eligible for engagement.

The undersigned respectfully recommends that this regulation be cancelled so far as relates to the engagement of new men or re-engagement of ex-members of the Force during the present emergency, and that married men, otherwise qualified, be accepted, and that the sum of $20 per month be allowed for the maintenance of their families, provided their husbands are separated from them.

In the cases of married pensioners re-engaging the undersigned recommends that they be allowed to continue to draw their pensions for the support of their families if separated from them and that when the pension is less than $20 per month, separation allowance to make up the difference be paid to them.

Respectfully submitted.

(Sgd.) LAWRENCE FORTESCUE,
Comptroller.

P. C. 2129.

AT THE GOVERNMENT HOUSE AT OTTAWA.

FRIDAY, THE 14TH DAY OF AUGUST, 1914.

PRESENT:

HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE GOVERNOR GENERAL IN COUNCIL.

WHEREAS a state of war now exists between this Country and Austria-Hungary, and His Majesty, The King being mindful of the recognition accorded to the practice of granting "days of grace" to enemy merchant ships by the Convention relative to the Status of Enemy Merchant Ships at the outbreak of Hostilities, signed at the Hague on the 18th October, 1907, and with a view of lessening so far as may be practicable, the injury caused by war to peaceful and unsuspecting commerce.

His Royal Highness the Governor General in Council is pleased to Order and it is hereby ordered as follows:

1. From and after publication of this Order, no enemy merchant ship shall be allowed to depart, except in accordance with the provisions of this Order, from any Canadian port;

2. In the event of the Governor General being informed by His Majesty's Government that information had reached His Majesty's Government, not later than midnight on Saturday the fifteenth day of August, 1914, that the treatment accorded to British Merchant Ships and their cargoes which, at the date of the outbreak of hostilities were in the ports of the enemy or which subsequently entered them is not less favourable than the treatment accorded to Enemy-Merchant Ships by Articles 3 to 7 of this Order, the Secretary of State for External Affairs shall notify the Minister of Customs and the Minister of Naval Service accordingly, and public notice thereof shall forthwith be given in the *Canada Gazette*, and Articles 3 to 8 of this Order shall thereupon come into full force and effect.

3. Subject to the provisions of this order, Enemy Merchant Ships which:—

(i) At the date of the outbreak of hostilities were in any port in which this Order applies; or

(ii) Cleared from their last port before the declaration of war, and, after the outbreak of hostilities, enter a port to which this Order applies, with knowledge of the war;

shall be allowed up till midnight (Greenwich mean time) on Saturday the twenty-second day of August, 1914, for loading or unloading their cargoes and for departing from such port.

Provided.—At ports where Atlantic Time is kept the corresponding standard time of place is 8.0 p.m.; where Eastern Standard Time is kept it is 7.0 p.m.; where Central Time is kept it is 6.0 p.m.; where Mountain Time is kept it is $5.0 p.m.; and where Pacific Time is kept it is 4.0 p.m. of the same day, respectively.

Provided that such vessels shall not be allowed to ship any contraband of war, and any contraband of war already shipped on such vessels must be discharged.

4. Enemy Merchant Ships which cleared from their last port before the declaration of war, and which, with no knowledge of the war, arrived at a port to which this Order applies after the expiry of the time allowed by Article 3 for loading or unload-

ing cargo and for departing, and are permitted to enter, may be required to depart either immediately, or within such time as may be considered necessary by the Customs Officer of the port for the unloading of such cargo as they may be required or specially permitted to discharge.

Provided that such vessels may, as a condition of being allowed to discharge cargo, be required to proceed to any other specified Canadian port, and shall there be allowed such time for discharge as the Custom Officer of that port may consider to be necessary.

Provided also that, if any cargo on board such vessel is contraband of war or is requisitioned under Article 5 of this Order, she may be required before departure to discharge such cargo within such time as the Customs Officer of the port may consider to be necessary; or she may be required to proceed, if necessary under escort, to any other port in the Dominion of Canada, and shall there discharge the contraband under like conditions.

5. The Canadian Government reserves the right recognized by the said convention to requisition at any time, subject to payment of compensation, enemy cargo on board any vessel to which Articles 3 and 4 of this Order apply.

6. The privileges accorded by Articles 3 and 4 are not to entend to cable ships or to sea-going ships designed to carry oil fuel, or to ships whose tonnage exceeds 5,000 tons gross, or whose speed is 14 knots or over, regarding which the entries in Lloyd's Register shall be conclusive for the purposes of this article. Such vessels will remain liable on abjudication by the Prize Court to detention during the period of the war, or to requisition, in accordance, in either case, with the Convention aforesaid. The said privileges will also not extend to Merchant Ships which show by their build that they are intended for convertion into warships, as such vessels are outside the scope of the said Convention, and are liable on adjudication by the Prize Court to condemnation as prize.

7. Enemy Merchant Ships allowed to depart under Articles 3 and 4 will be provided with a pass indicating the port to which they are to proceed, and the route they are to follow, in which pass shall be embodied the following proviso:—

"Provided also that she keeps her colours constantly flying during her "voyage, and makes no attempt to evade stoppage and search by British ships "of war which she may fall in with".

8. A Merchant ship which, after receipt of such a pass, does not follow the course indicated therein will be liable to capture.

9. If no information reaches His Majesty's Government within the time allowed by it for the receipt of such information to the effect to the treatment accorded to British Merchant Ships and their cargoes which were in the ports of the enemy at the date of the outbreak of hostilities, or which subsequently entered them, is, in its opinion, not less favourable than that accorded to Enemy Merchant Ship by Articles 3 and 8 of this Order, every Enemy Merchant Ship which, on the outbreak of hostilities, was in any port to which this Order applies, and also every Enemy ship which cleared from its last port before the declaration of war, but which, with no knowledge of the war enters a port to which this order applies, shall, together with the cargo on board thereof, be liable to capture, and shall be brought before the Prize Court forthwith for adjudication.

10. In the event of information reaching His Majesty's Government that British Merchant Ships which cleared from their last port before the declaration of war, but are met with by the enemy at sea after the outbreak of hostilities, are allowed to continue their voyage without interference with either the ship or the cargo, or after

capture are release with or without proceedings in the Prize Court, or are to be detained during the war or requisitioned in lieu of condemnation as prize, the Secretary of State for External Affairs shall notify the Minister of the Naval Service accordingly, and shall publish a notification thereof in the *Canada Gazette*, and in that event, but not otherwise, enemy merchant ships which cleared from their last port before the declaration of war, and are captured after the outbreak of hostilities and brought before the Prize Court for adjudication, shall be released or detained or requisitioned in such cases and upon such terms as may be directed in the said notification in the *Canada Gazette*.

11. Neutral cargo, other than contraband of war, on board of Enemy Merchant Ship which is not allowed to depart from a port to which this Order applies, shall be released.

12. In accordance with the provisions of Chapter III of the Convention, relative to certain restrictions on the Exercise of the Right of Capture in Maritime War, signed at the Hague on 18th October, 1907, an undertaking must, whether the Merchant Ship is allowed to depart or not, be given in writing by each of the Officers and members of the crew of such vessel, who is of Enemy nationality, that he will not, after the conclusion of the voyage for which the pass is issued, engage while hostilities last in any service connected with the operation of the war. If any such officer is of neutral nationality, an undertaking must be given in writing that he will not serve, after the conclusion of the voyage, for which the pass is issued, on any Enemy ship while hostilities last. No undertaking is to be required from members of the crew who are of neutral nationality. Officers or members of the crew declining to give the undertakings required by this article will be detained as prisoners of war.

And the Ministers of each of the Government Departments and all officers and authorities whom it may concern are to give the necessary directions herein as to them may respectively appertain.

(Sgd.) RODOLPHE BOUDREAU,
Clerk of the Privy Council.

P.C. 2112.

CERTIFIED copy of a Report of the Committee of the Privy Council, approved by His Royal Highness the Governor General on the 14th August, 1914.

The Committee of the Privy Council have had before them a Report, dated 11th August, 1914, from the Minister of Militia and Defence, recommending, with the approval of the Imperial Government, that authority be granted for the formation of a battalion under the style and title of "Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry."

The Minister states that the battalion will be organized on the lines indicated in Expeditionary Force War Establishments, 1914 (pp. 121-126); and when it embarks it will leave behind a regiment depot for recruiting purposes.

That towards arming, clothing, equipping, paying, subsisting, transporting, and towards any other expense connected with the formation, training and maintenance of the Battalion, whether in or out of Canada, the sum of one hundred thousand dollars will be contributed by Captain Hamilton Gault, of Montreal, the remainder being defrayed by the Department of Militia and Defence.

The Minister further recommends that authority be granted to the various branches of the Department of Militia and Defence to issue the arms, accoutrements, ammunition, vehicles, clothing, equipment, stationery and other articles

comprised in the 'War Outfit' of a battalion; to provide horses (riding and draught); and to issue such stores and supplies as may be required during the process of organization, at Ottawa or elsewhere.

That to enable officers, non-commissioned officers and men to join the battalion, transportation requisitions will be supplied to them by Officers Commanding Divisions and Districts; and the Quartermaster-General is hereby authorized to issue the necessary orders.

That the pay of all ranks will be at the same rate as that approved for the other battalions of the Canadian Expeditionary Force; and the Accountant and Paymaster-General is hereby authorized to issue it from the date on which each officer is gazetted and each man attested.

That the principle of the financial relations between Captain Gault and the Department of Militia and Defence is that all payments will, in the first instance, be made by the Department, and that a total sum of one hundred thousand dollars will be received, subsequently, from Captain Gault.

That the foregoing arrangements are to hold good until the discharge of the officers and men after the return of the Battalion to Canada.

The Committee concur in the foregoing recommendations and submit the same for approval.

(Sgd.) RODOLPHE BOUDREAU,
Clerk of the Privy Council.

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS that I, Hamilton Gault, of the City of Montreal, in the Dominion of Canada, Merchant, am held and firmly bound to the Government of the Dominion of Canada in the penal sum of Two Hundred Thousand Dollars of lawful money of Canada, to be paid to the said Government for which payment well and truly to be made, I bind myself, my heirs, executors and administrators, respectively, firmly by these presents.

SEALED with my Seal and dated at the said City of Montreal, this.....day of August, A.D. 1914.

WHEREAS at my request His Royal Highness the Governor General in Council, by an Order in Council dated the ..... day of August, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Fourteen, has authorized the formation of a Battalion to be styled the "Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry," and

WHEREAS the said Government, at my request, has undertaken to arm, clothe, equip, pay, subsist, train, transport and maintain the said Battalion both in and out of Canada, and

WHEREAS in consideration of such undertaking on the part of the said Government I have promised and agreed to pay to the said Government the sum of One Hundred Thousand Dollars on or before the First day of September, 1914.

Now the condition of this bond is such that if I, the above bounden Hamilton Gault, my heirs, executors or administrators, do and shall well and truly pay or cause to be paid to the said Government the said sum of One Hundred Thousand Dollars on or before said First day of September, 1914, then this obligation shall be void, otherwise to remain in full force and virtue.

Signed, Sealed and Delivered
in the presence of SEAL

P. C. 2150.

AT THE GOVERNMENT HOUSE AT OTTAWA.

SATURDAY, THE 15TH DAY OF AUGUST, 1914.

PRESENT:

HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE GOVERNOR GENERAL IN COUNCIL.

Whereas a state of war exists between Great Britain and the German Empire and between Great Britain and Austria-Hungary;

AND WHEREAS certain instructions have been received from His Majesty's Government in connection with the arrest and detention of subjects in Canada of the German Empire and of Austria-Hungary; and particularly of those who attempt to leave Canada;

AND WHEREAS there are many persons of German and Austro-Hungarian nationality quietly pursuing their usual avocations in various parts of Canada, and it is desirable that such persons should be allowed to continue in such avocations without interruption;

THEREFORE His Royal Highness the Governor General in Council is pleased to Order and it is hereby Ordered as follows:—

1. That all persons in Canada of German or Austro-Hungarian nationality, so long as they quietly pursue their ordinary avocations, be allowed to continue to enjoy the protection of the law, and be accorded the respect and consideration due to peaceful and law-abiding citizens; and that they be not arrested, detained or interfered with unless there is reasonable ground to believe that they are engaged in espionage, or engaging or attempting to engage in acts of a hostile nature, or are giving or attempting to give information to the enemy, or unless they otherwise contravene any law, Order-in-Council or proclamation.

2. That

(a) All German or Austrian or Austro-Hungarian officers, soldiers or reservists who attempt to leave Canada;

(b) All subjects of the German Empire or of Austria-Hungary in Canada who attempt to leave Canada and in regard to whom there is reasonable ground to believe that their attempted departure is with a view to assisting the enemy; and

(c) All subjects of the German Empire or of Austria-Hungary in Canada engaged or attempting to engage in espionage or acts of a hostile nature, or giving or attempting to give information to the enemy, or assisting or attempting to assist the enemy, or who are on reasonable grounds suspected of doing or attempting to do any of said acts

be arrested and detained.

3. That in addition to and without affecting the power already vested in the militia in that behalf power to effect the arrest and detention of all or any person or persons coming within any of the classes mentioned in paragraph (2) hereof be vested in the Chief Commissioner and the commissioners and constables of the Dominion Police force; the Commissioner, officers and constables of the Royal Northwest Mounted Police; and such other persons as may be authorized so to do by the Chief Commissioner of Dominion Police.

4. That such authorities and officers mentioned in paragraph 3 hereof, or the militia, be authorized to release any such person so arrested or detained as aforesaid of whose reliability they may be satisfied on his signing an undertaking in the form hereunto annexed.

5. That any such person so arrested and detained as aforesaid of whose reliability the officer or authority making the arrest is not satisfied or who refuses to sign such undertaking, or having signed same fails to abide by its terms be interned by such authorities and officers or militia according to the usages and laws of war in such places as may be provided by the militia, and that if it be deemed necessary that guards be placed on persons so interned, such guards be furnished by the active militia of Canada on the request of such authorities or officers to Officers Commanding Divisional Areas and Districts.

6. That all such authorities and officers or militia who may exercise any of the powers above mentioned be directed to report in each case to the Chief Commissioner of Dominion Police stating the name, address and occupation of the person detained or paroled, the date and place of detention and generally the circumstances of the arrest and detention, and all such information as may be necessary or useful for the purposes of record and identification.

His Royal Highness the Governor General in Council is further pleased to Order that a Proclamation do issue accordingly.

(Sgd.) RODOLPHE BOUDREAU,
Clerk of the Privy Council.

UNDERTAKING.

I,.....at present

of.....in the Province

of.....in the Dominion

of Canada, do hereby declare that I am $\frac{\text{a German}}{\text{an Austro-Hungarian}}$ subject; I now in consideration of my exemption from detention as a subject of $\frac{\text{Germany}}{\text{Austria-Hungary}}$,

do hereby undertake and promise that I will report to such official and upon such terms as the Canadian Authorities may from time to time prescribe; that I will carefully observe the laws of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of Canada and such rules as may be specially laid down for my conduct; that I will strictly abstain from taking up arms and from doing any act of hostility towards the Government of this Country, and that, except with the permission of the officer under whose surveillance I may be placed, I will strictly abstain from communicating to anyone whomsoever any information respecting the existing war or the movements of troops or the military preparations which the authorities of Canada or Great Britain may make, or as respects the resources of Canada, and that I will do no act that might be of injury to the Dominion of Canada or the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and Dominions and possessions thereof.

Dated.....day of.....1914.

WITNESS:—

....

P. C. 2152.

AT THE GOVERNMENT HOUSE AT OTTAWA,

SATURDAY, THE 15TH DAY OF AUGUST, 1914.

PRESENT:

HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE GOVERNOR GENERAL IN COUNCIL.

The Governor General in Council is pleased to Order as follows:

The Order in Council of the 7th August, 1914, prohibiting the exportation of coal from Canada to certain places is hereby amended and the exportation of such coal from Canada to Norway, Sweden and Denmark is permitted.

The Governor General in Council is further pleased to Order that this amending Order in Council be proclaimed and published in the *Canada Gazette*.

(Sgd.) RODOLPHE BOUDREAU,
Clerk of the Privy Council.

RETURN

(40a)

CORRESPONDENCE BY CABLE BETWEEN THE GOVERNOR GENERAL AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES, FROM AUGUST 1 TO AUGUST 15, 1914.

SECRET.

From the Governor General to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

OTTAWA, August 1, 1914.

In view of the impending danger of war involving the Empire my Advisers are anxiously considering the most effective means of rendering every possible aid and they will welcome any suggestions and advice which Imperial Naval and Military authorities may deem it expedient to offer. They are confident that a considerable force would be available for service abroad. A question has been mooted respecting the status of any Canadian force serving abroad as under section sixty-nine of Canadian Militia Act the active militia can only be placed on active service beyond Canada for the defence thereof. It has been suggested that regiments might enlist as Imperial troops for stated period, Canadian Government undertaking to make all necessary financial provision for their equipment, pay and maintenance. This proposal has not yet been maturely considered here and my advisers would be glad to have views of Imperial Government thereon.

ARTHUR.

From the Governor General to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

OTTAWA, August 1, 1914.

My Advisers while expressing their most earnest hope that peaceful solution of existing international difficulties may be achieved and their strong desire to co-operate in every possible way for that purpose wish me to convey to His Majesty's Government the firm assurance that if unhappily war should ensue the Canadian people will be united in a common resolve to put forth every effort and to make every sacrifice necessary to ensure the integrity and maintain the honour of our Empire.

From the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor General.

LONDON, August 2, 1914.

With reference to your telegram 1st August, His Majesty's Government gratefully welcome the assurance of your Government that in the present crisis they may rely on wholehearted co-operation of the people of Canada.

HARCOURT.

From the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor General.

LONDON, August 3, 1914.

Moratorium for one month proclaimed here yesterday for bills of exchange accepted before August 4th. Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday this week will be bank holidays in addition to usual bank holiday to-day, Monday.

HARCOURT.

From the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor General.

LONDON, August 3, 1914.

With reference to your cypher telegram 2nd August, please inform your Ministers that their patriotic readiness to render every aid is deeply appreciated by His Majesty's Government, but they would prefer postponing detailed observations on the suggestion put forward, pending further developments. As soon as situation appears to call for further measures I will telegraph you again.

HARCOURT.

From the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor General.

LONDON, August 4, 1914.

Please communicate to your Ministers following message from His Majesty the King and publish:

I desire to express to my people of the Overseas Dominions with what appreciation and pride I have received the messages from their respective Governments during the last few days. These spontaneous assurances of their fullest support recalled to me the generous self-sacrificing help given by them in the past to the Mother Country. I shall be strengthened in the discharge of the great responsibilities which rest upon me by the confident belief that in this time of trial my Empire will stand united, calm, resolute, trusting in God.

GEORGE R.I.

HARCOURT.

From the Governor General to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

OTTAWA, August 4, 1914.

Following for the King:

"In the name of the Dominion of Canada I humbly thank Your Majesty for your gracious message of approval. Canada stands united from the Pacific to the Atlantic in her determination to uphold the honour and tradition of our Empire".

ARTHUR.

From the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor General.

LONDON, August 4, 1914.

Though there seems to be no immediate necessity for any request on our part for an expeditionary force from Canada, I think, in view of their generous offer, your Ministers would be wise to take all legislative and other steps by which they would be enabled without delay to provide such a force in case it should be required later.

HARCOURT.

SESSIONAL PAPER No. 40a

From the Governor General to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

OTTAWA, August 4, 1914.

Canadian millers and food exporters find difficulty in arranging shipments to Great Britain and enquire whether any measures are being taken to secure steady shipments of food products and to protect them. Large quantities food products available here for immediate export. My Advisers would be glad to have any available information.

ARTHUR.

From the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor General.

LONDON, August 5, 1914.

With reference to your cypher telegram of yesterday, food shipments. As stated in House of Commons yesterday His Majesty's Government are inaugurating a scheme of state insurance for ships and cargoes based on report of committee, copy of which goes to you by mail. Every effort is being made to protect shipping.

HARCOURT.

From the Governor General to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

OTTAWA, August 5, 1914.

My Government anxious to know time limit that should be given German Consuls to leave country.

ARTHUR.

From the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor General.

LONDON, August 5, 1914.

With regard to your cypher telegram of to-day's date, all German Consuls should leave forthwith. They may be permitted to leave consulate clerk or other unofficial representative to arrange their personal affairs.

HARCOURT.

From the Governor General to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

OTTAWA, August 5, 1914.

My Government being desirous of putting beyond doubt status of Canadian volunteers, request that His Majesty may be pleased to issue an order bringing these volunteers under Sections 175 and 176 of the Army Act.

ARTHUR.

From the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor General.

LONDON, August 6, 1914.

With reference to my telegram of August 4th, His Majesty's Government gratefully accept offer of your Ministers to send expeditionary force to this country, and would be glad if it could be despatched as soon as possible. Suggested composition follows.

HARCOURT.

From the Governor General to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

OTTAWA, August 6, 1914.

My Advisers request me to inform you that the people of Canada through their Government desire to offer one million bags of flour of ninety-eight pounds each as a gift to the people of the United Kingdom to be placed at the disposal of His Majesty's Government and to be used for such purposes as they may deem expedient.

ARTHUR.

From the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor General.

LONDON, August 7, 1914.

On behalf of the people of the United Kingdom, His Majesty's Government accept with deep gratitude the splendid and welcome gift of flour from Canada which will be of the greatest use for the steadying of prices and relief of distress in this country. We can never forget the generosity and promptitude of this gift and the patriotism from which it springs.

HARCOURT.

From the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor General.

LONDON, August 7, 1914.

My telegram of 6th August Army Council consider one division would be suitable composition of expeditionary force.

HARCOURT.

From the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor General.

LONDON, August 7, 1914.

Following is summary of speech delivered by Prime Minister in House of Commons in proposing vote of one hundred million pounds for measures for security of country, conduct of naval military operations, assisting food supplies, promoting continuance of trade industry and business communication, and expenses arising out of existence of war. After referring to strenuous and persistent efforts to secure peace Prime Minister laid stress on communication made by German Chancellor July 29th in which he offered in return for British neutrality that Germany would not make territorial acquisition at expense of France but declined to give this assurance as regards French possessions; offered to respect neutrality of Holland but would only promise to respect Belgian integrity when war was over. Chancellor observed that English neutrality in present crisis might form basis for future understanding. This proposal in effect meant assent behind back of France to annexation by Germany of the whole of French extra European possessions and bartering away treaty obligations with regard to Belgian neautrality. The House had read the pathetic appeal of King of Belgium and when Belgians were fighting for their lives what would position of Great Britain have been if they had assented to this infamous proposal and what return would have been made for betrayal of friends and dishonour of obligations? Nothing but a promise given by a Power which at the very moment was announcing its intention of violating its treaty and inviting us to do the same. If Government had temporised they would have covered themselves with dishonour and betrayed interests of the country of which they were trustees. Prime

Minister referred to the offer of British Government if peace could be preserved and crisis passed to promote some agreement to which Germany could be a party by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by Britain, France, and Russia, jointly or separately. Earnestness and sincerity of this offer obvious. In spite of great provocation His Majesty's Government had persisted to the very last moment in efforts for peace and war had been forced upon them, but they had thought it their duty to go to war because they believed and the country believed that the cause was just. Great Britain was fighting in the first place to fulfil a solemn international obligation which in private life would have been regarded as an obligation not only of law but of honour, and, secondly, to vindicate the principle, that small nationalities were not to be crushed in defiance of international good faith by the arbitrary will of a strong and overmastering Power. No nation ever entered into a great controversy with a clearer and stronger conviction that it was fighting not for aggression, not for the maintenance of its own selfish interests, but in defence of principles the maintenance of which were vital to the civilisation of the world. It was essential that all the resources of the Empire should be thrown into the scale and for that purpose he asked for a vote of credit for one hundred millions and he announced the decision to add 500,000 men to the Army. The Government were encouraged to do this not only by their sense of necessity but by the knowledge that India was prepared to send certainly two divisions and that every one of the self-governing Dominions spontaneously and unasked had already tendered to utmost limits of their possibilities both in men and money every help they could afford the Empire in a moment of need.

HARCOURT.

From the Governor General to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

OTTAWA, August 8, 1914.

Canadian Government desire to know what action His Majesty's Government desire Canadian authorities to take regarding Army Reservists in Canada, of which there are several thousand in Canada, registered at Imperial Pension Office, Ottawa. Are they to be sent home at once? I understand officer paying Imperial Pensioners and Reservists here is in position to provide transport for these men and funds if necessary.

ARTHUR.

From the Secretary of States for the Colonies to the Governor General.

LONDON, August 8, 1914.

Referring to my telegram 6th August Army Council state that a certain proportion of army troops will be required in addition to force mentioned. You will be furnished later on with suggested numbers.

HARCOURT.

From the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor General.

LONDON, August 8, 1914.

The following is summary of war risks insurance scheme:

Firstly. Ships: Government scheme for war risks on ships is worked through war risk insurance association of ship owners already existing and every effort is

being made to bring as many ships as possible into this association. Government scheme only applies re insurance of King's enemies risks. The object of scheme is to secure as far as practicable the maintenance in time of war of oversea trade. The Government is entering into an agreement with approved association to re-insure to the extent of eighty per cent all risks assumed by the association as far as they are King's enemy risks on the following terms:

(1) On voyages current at the outbreak of war re-insurance will be without premium;

(2) On such voyages ship must comply with as far as possible the orders of the Government and directions of the committee of the association to which it belongs as to routes, port of call and stoppages;

(3) On voyages begun after the outbreak of war premium will be charged. This premium, which will not be less than one per cent nor more than five per cent upon voyage, will be fixed by Government.

(4) On such last-mentioned voyages ships must

(a) comply as far as possible with the orders of the Government and directions of committee of the association to which it belongs as to the routes, port of call and stoppages;

(b) not start on a voyage if ordered by the Government not to do so.

Associations at present approved are United Kingdom Mutual War Risks Association, Limited, 24 Saint Mary Avenue, E.C.; London and Liverpool War Risks Insurance Association, Limited, 10 Water Street, Liverpool; North of England Protecting and Indemnity Association, Collingwood Buildings, Newcastle-upon-Tyne.

Secondly. Cargo: A War Risk Insurance Office has been opened in London for insurance of cargoes other than enemies' property or goods (export of which is prohibited by proclamation) shipped for voyages commenced on or after office opened for business. Cargo in British ship at the time of outbreak of war will be treated at port of call as though that port were a port of loading. Only risks which will be covered by King's enemy risks. Cargo will be insured only if shipped or to be shipped in vessel covered for voyage against King's enemy war risks under scheme outlined above for ships. Rate of premium will be flat one irrespective of voyage or cargo insured. It is capable of variation from time to time within maximum of five guineas percentage and minimum of one guinea percentage. If sailing is delayed under order of Government assured shall have option of cancelling policy and receiving back premium paid. Value of cargo for state insurance will be values agreed to in maritime insurance policies covering same cargo which policies will be produced at War Risks Insurance Office when insurance is finally arranged.

Thirdly. This scheme was framed primarily intended for ships continuously registered in United Kingdom, but His Majesty's Government have decided that benefits may be extended to colonial registered ships which are included in one of the above mentioned approved associations.

HARCOURT.

From the Governor General to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

OTTAWA, August 8, 1914.

Canadian Government wish to place the two submarine boats now at Esquimalt at disposal of the Admiralty for general service. Please inform Admiralty.

ARTHUR.

SESSIONAL PAPER No. 40a

From the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor General.

LONDON, August 9, 1914.

Following from Admiralty in reply to your telegram of yesterday's date. Offer of submarine boats gratefully accepted by Admiralty.

HARCOURT.

From the Governor General to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

OTTAWA, August 9, 1914.

No order having been received with reference to return of Army Reservists, would War Office allow them to enlist in Canadian Expeditionary Force which they are very anxious to do?

ARTHUR.

From the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor General.

LONDON, August 9, 1914.

With reference to your telegram of August 7th His Majesty is graciously pleased to order that the troops offered by Canada shall be raised by Your Royal Highness for service as expeditionary forces. It is suggested that terms of attestation should be as follows:

(a) For a term of one year unless war lasts longer than one year, in which case they will be retained until war over. If employed with hospitals, depots of mounted units, and as clerks, etcetera, they may be retained after termination of hostilities until services can be dispensed with but such retention shall in no case exceed six months.

(b) To be attached to any arm of service should it be required of them. Men should be attested by magistrate.

HARCOURT.

From the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor General.

LONDON, August 12, 1914.

Your telegrams 8th August and 9th August.

Army Council would be glad if all Army Reservists could be sent home by first opportunity.

If transport cannot be arranged at once they should return with Canadian Expeditionary Force.

HARCOURT.

From the Governor General to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

OTTAWA, August 12, 1914.

Dominion Coal Company has received enquiries by cable from Norway, Sweden and Denmark for coal. Export to these countries has been prohibited at request of His Majesty's Government. Canadian press announces that Admiralty has given per-

mission for shipment of coal from Great Britain to Norway and Italy. My Advisers desire to know as soon as possible whether permission can be given to export Canadian coal to countries mentioned.

ARTHUR.

From the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor General.

LONDON, August 13, 1914.

Press Bureau has been established which will be responsible for issue of official war news to the press. I have ascertained that press agencies propose to supply Canadian press with all news of importance or general interest issued by Bureau. Any additional news which concerns your Government or if likely to affect their plans will, of course, be telegraphed to you by me.

HARCOURT.

From the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor General.

LONDON, August 14, 1914.

August 14th. Your telegram August 12th no objection to exportation of coal to Norway, Sweden and Denmark.

HARCOURT.

Copy to Trade and Commerce.

From the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor General.

LONDON, August 15, 1914.

August 15th. Owing to vigorous action taken here to deal with financial situation, particularly in regard to bills of exchange, conditions have become much easier and credit has greatly improved. Every hope that trade, home and foreign, will rapidly resume its normal course. Would be glad if your Ministers would make this public.

HARCOURT.

RETURN

(40b)

CORRESPONDENCE BY CABLE BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND MR. PERLEY FROM AUGUST 4th TO AUGUST 13th, 1914.

From the Prime Minister to Mr. Perley.

OTTAWA, August 4, 1914.

PERLEY,
Dominion,
London.

Please cable enacting clauses of Moratorium Act.

BORDEN.

From Mr. Perley to the Prime Minister.

LONDON, August 5, 1914.

Sir ROBERT BORDEN,
Ottawa.

Following is outline of scheme described to House of Commons by Chancellor of Exchequer for state insurance war risks. State will deal with and through existing associations, or clubs, or any others which may be formed and approved, on condition that they extend existing forms of policy to cover war risks up to arrival of vessel at final port of voyage which it is making when war breaks out, and for ten clear days afterwards. Arrangements are also to be made for issue of similar policies on vessels starting voyage after war breaks out, and for this purpose Government is to make agreement with each of the associations, principal conditions of which are:

(1) Government to re-insure eighty per cent all those risks.

(2) In respect of voyages current on outbreak war no premium to be charged, but in respect voyages begun after outbreak state is to fix insurance premium to be charged on a voyage basis and is to receive eighty per cent of such premium.

(3) State to have right to vary premiums time to time within maximum of five per cent and minimum one per cent and rate agreed on for specific voyage to hold good if vessel sails within fourteen days; if starting delayed by orders of Admiralty, the assured is to have option of cancelling policy.

(4) The associations are to assume remaining twenty per cent of risks both before and after outbreak war, receiving for voyages after outbreak twenty per cent of premiums.

(5) All expenses administration borne by clubs.

(6) Claims to be dealt with and settled by committee of associations upon which Government to be represented. Foregoing applies to hulls only.

In regard to cargoes, there being no existing mutual associations formed specially for purposes of dealing with war risks, it is necessary to set up offices for purpose

which has already been done with expert advisery board containing official element. This state office will insure cargoes in British ships insured under the scheme which start on voyages after outbreak war, rate of premium to be flat one irrespective of voyage or character of cargo, rate capable of variation from time to time within maximum five guineas minimum one guinea per cent.

Scheme not confined to voyages of ships bringing food supplies and raw materials to United Kingdom, it being considered vital that British shipping in every part of world should be protected. Scheme to come into actual effect when public notice given.

PERLEY.

From Mr. Perley to the Prime Minister.

LONDON, August 5, 1914.

Sir ROBERT BORDEN,
Ottawa.

Following is translation decrees issued by French Republic:

The President of the French Republic, on the report of the Minister of Commerce and Industry, Posts and Telegraph, Minister of Justice and Minister of Finance, in view of Law of 27th January, 1910, relating to extensions and delays of protests and acts intended to maintain recourse in the matter of negotiable values, in view of Law of 24th December, 1910, extending maturities, and in view of commercial code, the Council of Ministers, being advised, decrees that the delay within which protests and acts intended to maintain recourse in respect of all negotiable values, souscrits signed before 1st August, 1914, matured since that date, or becoming due before August 15th, 1914, are extended for thirty days free. The same extension of thirty days free to all negotiable values becoming due before 15th August, 1914.

NEW DECREE.

Art. 1. The prolongation of the delay fixed for the negotiable values fixed by decree of 31st July, 1914, will apply to the giving up of cash deposits and credit balances of current accounts in banks and credit establishments or deposits under following reserves. Any depositor or creditor whose deposit or balance in his favour will be inferior or equal to two hundred and fifty francs, will have the right to effect tis entire withdrawal; above the figure of two hundred and fifty francs depositors or creditors who have a staff of workmen or clerks in the execution of an industrial and commercial profession will have right to claim of the amounts belonging to them the total of the amount of the salaries on each payment date, they being under the obligation to justify it by production of pay-rolls of staff.

Art. 2. The prolongation of delay foreseen above applies exactly to the reimbursement of bonds or contracts insurance of capitalization or saving for period, or stipulated as repayable at the choice of the proprietor or bearer.

Art. 3. The arrangement made by the present decree is applicable in Algiers and Tunis.

Art. 4. The present decree will be immediately executed in virtue of article two of the decree of 5th November, 1870.

Art. 5. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs, etcetera, are charged, as far as concerns each of them, with the execution of the present decree.

DOMINION.

Form Mr. Perley to the Prime Minister.

LONDON, August, 5, 1914.

SIR ROBERT BORDEN,
Ottawa.

Your cable 4th instant.

Postponement of Payments Act, 1914.

(Duration six months).

1. His Majesty may by proclamation authorize the postponement of the payment of any bill of exchange, or of any negotiable instrument, or any other payment in pursuance of any contract to such extent, for such time, and subject to such conditions or other provisions, as may be specified in the proclamation.

2. No additional stamp duty shall be payable in respect of any instrument as a consequence of any postponement of payment in pursuance of a proclamation under this Act, unless the proclamation otherwise directs.

3. Any such proclamation may be varied, extended or revoked, by any subsequent proclamation, and separate proclamations may be made dealing with separate subjects.

4. The proclamation dated the 3rd (2nd) day of August, 1914, relating to the postponement of payment of certain bills of exchange is hereby confirmed and shall be deemed to have been made under this Act.

PROCLAMATION.

WHEREAS in view of the critical situation in Europe and the financial difficulties caused thereby it is expedient that the payment of certain bills of exchange be postponed as appears in this Proclamation,—

NOW THEREFORE We have thought fit by and with the advice of Our Privy Council to issue this Our Royal Proclamation, and we do hereby proclaim, direct, and ordain as follows:

If on the presentation for payment of a bill of exchange, other than a cheque or bill on demand, which has been accepted before the beginning of the 4th day of August, 1914, the accepter re-accepts the bill by a declaration on the face of the bill in the form set out hereunder, that bill shall for all purposes, including the liability of any drawer or endorser or any other party thereto, be deemed to be due and be payable on a date one calendar month after the date of its original maturity instead of on the day of its original maturity, and to be a bill for the original amount thereof increased by the amount of interest thereon calculated from the date of re-acceptance to the new date of payment at the Bank of England rate current on the date of the re-acceptance of the bill.

FORM OF RE-ACCEPTANCE.

Re-accepted under proclamation for (insert increased sum).

Signature.

PERLEY.

From the Prime Minister to Mr. Perley.

OTTAWA, August 6, 1914.

PERLEY,
Dominion,
London.

Board Trade, Montreal, seriously disturbed over inability of shippers in Canada to finance food shipments to Great Britain as under existing conditions Canadian bankers cannot secure reimbursement in London because of impossibility of getting funds out of England. As Imperial Government if they are making any arrangement to facilitate such transactions. Matter regarded as most important. Can we assist in any way.

BORDEN.

From the Prime Minister to Mr. Perley.

OTTAWA, August 6, 1914.

PERLEY
Dominion,
London.

Informed large number Canadians in United Kingdom and Europe unable to use letters credit or otherwise obtain funds for passage home. If this information correct and if you deem it advisable Government prepared to establish credit of twenty thousand pounds in London to be paid out upon such security and conditions as you may deem proper. Please cable your opinion.

BORDEN.

From the Prime Minister to Mr. Perley.

OTTAWA, August 7, 1914.

PERLEY,
Dominion,
London.

Please cable general moratorium proclamation referred to by Lloyd George yesterday. Most important.

BORDEN.

From the Prime Minister to Mr. Perley.

OTTAWA, August 7, 1914.

PERLEY,
Dominion,
London.

Most important. Cable immediately whether moratorium announced yesterday covers bank deposits and payment of interest and principal and sinking fund on bonds and other securities.

BORDEN.

SESSIONAL PAPER No. 40b

From the Prime Minister to Mr. Perley.

OTTAWA, August 7, 1914.

PERLEY.
Dominion.
London.

Please wire exact terms British vote for war credit. See my telegram August 2.

BORDEN.

From Mr. Perley to the Prime Minister.

LONDON, August 7, 1914.

SIR ROBERT BORDEN.
Ottawa.

Your cables yesterday. Following proclamations issued 3rd and 4th instant; calling out naval men and fleet reserves, and officers and men naval and naval volunteer reserves; extending service time expired navy men; authorizing Admiralty requisition any British ship within British Isles or waters adjacent; prohibiting exportation certain warlike stores; calling out army reserve and embodying territorial force; continuing soldiers in army service; recalling to active service militia reserve from Ireland and Jersey; authorizing calling into temporary active service officers on reserved and retired lists; suspending compulsory retirement from active list on account of age; assuming control wireless telegraph.

Following is substance proclamation entitled Regarding the Defence of the Realm: Subjects commanded and enjoined to obey and conform to all instructions and regulations which may be issued by King, Admiralty, Army Council, or any officer of Navy or Army, or any other person acting in their behalf, for securing public safety and defence of realm.

Proclamation dated 5th declares state of war and specifies articles to be treated as contraband

DOMINION.

From Mr. Perley to the Prime Minister.

LONDON, August 7, 1914.

SIR ROBERT BORDEN.
Ottawa.

Proclamation dated August 6th extends postponement to all payments due before this date, or payable before the 4th September, in respect of any bill of exchange being a cheque or bill on demand drawn before 4th August, or in respect of any negotiable instrument not being bill of exchange dated before that time, or in respect any contract made before that time, for one calendar month after day on which payment originally due, or to 4th September, whichever is the later date; but payments so postponed shall, if not otherwise carrying interest and if specific demand is made for payment and payment is refused, carry interest until payment as from 4th August, if they become due before that day, or as from date on which they become due, if after that day, at Bank England rate current 7th August. Proclamation does not apply to wages, amounts under five pounds, rates or taxes, maritime freight, any debt from resident outside British Islands, or whose principal place business outside British Islands, nor to dividends or interest payable in respect of

trustee stocks, nor bank liability in respect of bank notes, nor government payments, nor national insurance, nor workmen's compensation payments, nor trustee savings bank. Bills of exchange under previous proclamation not affected.

DOMINION.

From Mr. Perley to the Prime Minister.

LONDON, August 7, 1914.

Sir ROBERT BORDEN,
Ottawa.

Your cable 6th. Banks opened to-day. So far as can gather will be no great difficulty in cashing letters credit. Giving matter close attention. Intervention does not appear necessary at present. Regarding continent informed position has improved. Will cable you again if necessary.

PERLEY.

From Mr. Perley to the Prime Minister.

LONDON, August 8, 1914.

PRIME MINISTER,
Ottawa.

Difficult know exactly what effect moratorium has in all directions as interpretation naturally legal question. Have read proclamation and made inquiries. Understand moratorium covers existing bank deposits but not those made subsequent to proclamation. Moratorium does not cover payments on account securities known as trustee investments. Payments on account other bonds and securities past due or payable before September 4th are apparently postponed but not after that date. Moratorium does not in any way affect payment in respect debts due by persons resident outside British Isles. Cabled you first proclamation and also full summary one issued yesterday. Would you like text proclamation by cable?

PERLEY.

From the Prime Minister to Mr. Perley.

OTTAWA, August 8, 1914.

PERLEY,
Dominion,
London.

Cable full text yesterday's proclamation. Ascertain whether London opinion is clear that exception from moratorium of debts due by persons resident outside of British Isles might include Canadian corporations so as to exclude them from the benefits of postponement of interest and other payments upon their securities. By interpretation statutes the word person usually includes corporations.

BORDEN.

SESSIONAL PAPER No. 40b

From Mr. Perley to the Prime Minister.

LONDON, August 8, 1914.

PRIME MINISTER,
Ottawa.

Replying your cable yesterday. Motion made and question proposed in House Commons 6th instant:

That a sum not exceeding one hundred million pounds be granted to His Majesty beyond the ordinary grants of Parliament towards defraying expenses that may be incurred during the year ending March 31st, 1915, for all measures which may be taken for the security of the country, for the conduct of naval and military operations, for assisting the food supply, for promoting the continuance of trade, industry and business communications, whether by means of insurance or indemnity against risk or otherwise, for the relief of distress, and generally for all expenses arising out of the existence of a state of war.

Motion agreed to.

PERLEY.

From Mr. Perley to the Prime Minister.

LONDON, August 8, 1914.

Prime Minister,
Ottawa.

Further proclamations 5th August prohibiting trading with enemy; prohibiting British vessels carrying contraband from one port to another foreign port; prohibiting exportation from United Kingdom certain warlike stores, provisions, and victuals; notifying British subjects that contributing to German loan or contracting with German Government will be considered high treason; prohibiting exportation to all foreign ports in Europe and on Mediterranean and Black Sea with exception of those of France, Russia, (except Baltic), Spain and Portugal, of arms, ammunition, military or naval stores, and any articles which may be useful in increasing such stores; an order authorizing general or field officers to issue requisitions of emergency and billeting requisitions; revoking two proclamations which prohibited importation arms, ammunition into Ireland.

DOMINION.

From Mr. Perley to the Prime Minister.

LONDON, August 8, 1914.

Prime Minister,
Ottawa.

Have brought to attention Government difficulty financing food shipments from Canada. Will also discuss same with Bank England directors Monday. Financial conditions here much easier. New issue small bank notes well received. All banks open yesterday doing business in ordinary way after four successive bank holidays. Am informed in many cases deposits yesterday larger than withdrawals.

PERLEY.

From Mr. Perley to the Prime Minister.

LONDON, August 10, 1914.

Prime Minister,
Ottawa.

Second proclamation dated 6th instant for extending the postponement of payments allowed to be made by the Proclamation of 2nd instant to certain other payments:

Whereas under the Postponement of Payments Act, 1914, His Majesty has power by proclamation to authorize the postponement of the payment of any bill of exchange, or any negociable instrument, or of any other payment in pursuance of any contract to such extent, for such time, and subject to such conditions, or other provisions, as may be specified in the Proclamation:

And Whereas it is expedient that provision should be made for the purpose of such postponement of payment, in addition to the provision already made by Our Proclamation dated the 2nd day of August, 1914, relating to postponement of payment of certain bills of exchange,—

Now, Therefore, We have thought fit by and with the advice of Our Privy Council to issue this Our Royal Proclamation and we do hereby proclaim, direct and ordain as follow:

Save as hereinafter provided all payments which have become due and payable before the date of this Proclamation, or which will become due and payable on any day before the beginning of the 4th day of September, 1914, in respect of any bill of exchange being a cheque or bill on demand, which was drawn before the beginning of the 4th day of August, 1914, or in respect of any negotiable instrument not being a bill of exchange dated before that time, or in respect of any contract made before that time, shall be deemed to be due and payable on a day one calendar month after the day on which the payment originally became due and payable, or on the 4th day of September, 1914, whichever is the later date, instead of on the day on which the payment originally became due; but payments so postponed shall, if not otherwise carrying interest and if specific demand is made for payment and payment is refused, carry interest until payment as from the 4th day of August, 1914, if they became due and payable before that day, and as from the date on which they become due and payable if they become due and payable on and after that day, at the Bank of England rate current on the 7th day of August, 1914; but nothing in this Proclamation shall prevent payments being made before the expiration of the month for which they are so postponed.

This proclamation shall not apply to:—

(1) Any payment in respect of wages or salary;

(2) Any payment in respect of a liability which when incurred did not exceed five pounds in amount;

(3) Any payment in respect of rates or taxes;

(4) Any payment in respect of maritime freight;

(5) Any payment in respect of any debt from a person resident outside the British Islands, or from any firm, company or institution whose principal place of business is outside the British Islands not being a debt incurred in the British Islands by a person, firm, company or institution having a business establishment or branch business establishment in the British Islands;

(6) Any payment in respect of any dividend or interest payable in respect of any stocks, funds or securities other than real or heritable securities in which trustees are, under section one of the Trustee Act, 1893, or any other Act for the time being in force, authorized to invest;

SESSIONAL PAPER No. 40b

(7) Any liability of a Bank of issue in respect of Bank notes issued by that Bank;

(8) Any payment to be made by or on behalf of His Majesty, or any government department, including the payment of old age pensions;

(9) Any payment to be made by any person or society in pursuance of the National Insurance Act, 1911, or any Act amending that Act, whether in the nature of contribution, benefits or otherwise;

(10) Any payment under the Workman's Compensation Act, 1906, or any Act amending the same;

(11) Any payment in respect of the withdrawal of a deposit by a depositor in a trustee savings bank.

Nothing in this Proclamation shall affect any bills of exchange to which our Proclamation dated 2nd day of August, 1914, relating to the Postponement of Payment of Certain Bills of Exchange, applies.

(Sgd.) PERLEY.

From Mr. Perley to the Prime Minister.

LONDON, August 10, 1914.

Prime Minister,
Ottawa.

Have cabled you full text moratorium proclamation. Fifth exception explains about persons, firms, companies, and institutions outside the British Islands who do not get benefits of postponement. Moratorium apparently intended to postpone debts here but none from abroad. Will discuss matter further with Bank of England directors to-day.

(Signed) PERLEY.

From Mr. Perley to the Prime Minister.

LONDON, August 10, 1914.

Prime Minister,
Ottawa.

Directors Bank England think my interpretation moratorium correct. No debt due from outside British Isles is postponed unless incurred here by person, firm, company, or institution having business establishment or branch business in British Isles. No doubt further alterations in moratorium may come later on. Subject hurriedly discussed and arranged, and it is really wonderful how quiet everything is here, and how much financial situation has improved. Bank directors say arrangements finance food shipments from Canada and United States are being considered and no doubt satisfactory way will be found. &

(Signed) PERLEY.

From Mr. Perley to the Prime Minister.

LONDON, August 10, 1914.

Prime Minister,
Ottawa.

Proclamation of the 5th prohibited export of forage and feed of all kinds for animals, provisions and victuals of all sorts which may be used as food for men.

Bill to enable Board of Trade, during present war, to take possession of foodstuffs unreasonably withheld reads, after usual preamble, as follows:

1. If the Board of Trade are of opinion that any foodstuff is being unreasonably withheld from the market they may, if so authorized by His Majesty's proclamation made generally, or, as respects any particular kind of foodstuff, in the manner provided by the proclamation, take possession of any supplies of foodstuff to which the proclamation relates, paying to the owners of the supplies such price as may in default of agreement be decided to be reasonable, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, by the arbitration of a judge of the High Court selected by the Lord Chief Justice of England.

2. (1) This Act may be cited as the Unreasonable Withholding of Food supplies Act, 1914.

(2) This Act shall have effect only while a state of war exists between His Majesty and any foreign power.

(Signed) PERLEY.

From Mr. Perley to the Prime Minister.

LONDON, August 13, 1914.

PRIME MINISTER,
Ottawa.

Proclamation dated 12th August extends to Austria-Hungary the scope of proclamations and Orders in Council previously applying to state of war with Germany prohibiting dealings of any kind and classifying Austro-Hungarian ships as belonging to enemy.

(Sgd.) PERLEY.

From Mr. Perley to the Prime Minister.

LONDON, August 13, 1914.

PRIME MINISTER,
Ottawa.

Further proclamation dated August 12th for postponement of payments:—

Whereas it is expedient to extend Our Proclamation dated the 6th day of August, 1914, relating to the postponement of payments, so as to cover bills of exchange under certain circumstances and also payments in respect of any debt from any bank whose principal place of business is in any part of His Majesty's Dominions or any British Protectorate,—

Now, Therefore, We have thought fit by and with the advice of Our Privy Council to issue this Our Royal Proclamation and we do hereby proclaim, direct, and ordain as follows:—

Notwithstanding anything contained in the said Proclamation dated the 6th day of August, 1914, relating to the postponement of payments that Proclamation shall apply and shall be deemed always to have applied:—

(1) To any bill of exchange which has not been reaccepted under our proclamation dated the 2nd day of August, 1914, as it applies to a bill of exchange being a cheque or bill on demand, unless on the presentation of the bill the acceptor has expressly refused

reacceptance thereof, but with the substitution as respects rate of interest of the date of the presentation of the bill for the 7th day of August, 1914, and;

(2) Also to payments in respect of any debt from any bank whose principal place of business is in any part of His Majesty's Dominions or any British Protectorate although the debt was not incurred in the British Islands and the bank had not a business establishment or branch business establishment in the British Islands.

(Sgd.) PERLEY.

From Mr. Perley to the Prime Minister.

LONDON, August 13, 1914.

PRIME MINISTER,
Ottawa.

Following announcement made this morning.

The Bank of England are prepared on the application of the holder of any approved bill of exchange accepted before August 4th, 1914, to discount at any time before its due date at bank rate without recourse to such holder, and upon its maturity the Bank of England will in order to assist the resumption of normal business operation give the acceptor the opportunity until further notice of postponing payment, interest being payable in the meantime at two per cent over bank rate varying.

Arrangements will be made to carry this scheme into effect so as to preserve all existing obligations. The Bank of England will be prepared for this purpose to approve such bills of exchange as are customarily discounted by them and also good trade bills and the acceptances of such foreign and colonial firms and bank agencies as are established in Great Britain.

(Sgd.) PERLEY.

RETURN

CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING THE EUROPEAN CRISIS.

No. 1.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

FOREIGN OFFICE, July 20, 1914.

SIR,—

I asked the German Ambassador to-day if he had any news of what was going on in Vienna with regard to Servia.

He said that he had not, but Austria was certainly going to take some step, and he regarded the situation as very uncomfortable.

I said that I had not heard anything recently, except that Count Berchtold, in speaking to the Italian Ambassador in Vienna, had deprecated the suggestion that the situation was grave, but had said that it should be cleared up.

The German Ambassador said that it would be a very desirable thing if Russia could act as a médiator with regard to Servia.

I said that I assumed that the Austrian Government would not do anything until they had first disclosed to the public their case against Servia, founded presumably upon what they had discovered at the trial.

The Ambassador said that he certainly assumed that they would act upon some case that would be made known.

I said that this would make it easier for others, such as Russia, to counsel moderation in Belgrade. In fact, the more Austria could keep her demand within reasonable limits, and the stronger the justification she could produce for making any demand, the more chance there would be of smoothing things over. I hated the idea of a war between any of the Great Powers, and that any of them should be dragged into a war by Servia would be detestable.

The Ambassador agreed wholeheartedly in this sentiment.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

No. 2.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 22.)

(Telegraphic.)

BERLIN, July 22, 1914.

Last night I met Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and the forthcoming Austrian *démarche* at Belgrade was alluded to by His Excellency in the conversation that ensued. His excellency was evidently of opinion that this step on Austria's part would have been made ere this. He insisted that question at issue was one for settlement between Servia and Austria alone, and that there should be no interference from

outside in the discussions between those two countries. He had therefore considered it inadvisable that the Austro-Hungarian Government should be approached by the German Government on the matter. He had, however, on several occasions, in conversation with the Servian Minister, emphasized the extreme importance that Austro-Servian relations should be put on a proper footing.

Finally, his Excellency observed to me that for a long time past the attitude adopted towards Servia by Austria had, in his opinion, been one of great forbearance.

No. 3.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

FOREIGN OFFICE, July 23, 1914.

SIR,—

Count Mensdorff told me to-day that he would be able to-morrow morning to let me have officially the communication that he understood was being made to Servia to-day by Austria. He then explained privately what the nature of the demand would be. As he told me that the facts would all be set out in the paper that he would give me to-morrow, it is unnecessary to record them now. I gathered that they would include proof of the complicity of some Servian officials in the plot to murder the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and a long list of demands consequently made by Austria on Servia.

As regards all this, I said that it was not a matter on which I would make any comment until I received an official communication, and it seemed to me probably a matter on which I should not be able to make any comment at first sight.

But, when Count Mensdorff told me that he supposed there would be something in the nature of a time-limit, which was in effect akin to an ultimatum, I said that I regretted this very much. To begin with a time-limit might inflame opinion in Russia, and it would make it difficult, if not impossible, to give more time, even if after a few days it appeared that by giving more time there would be a prospect of securing a peaceful settlement and getting a satisfactory reply from Servia. I admitted that, if there was no time-limit, the proceedings might be unduly protracted, but I urged that a time-limit could always be introduced afterwards; that, if the demands were made without a time-limit in the first instance, Russian public opinion might be less excited, after a week it would have cooled down, and if the Austrian case was very strong it might be apparent that the Russian Government would be in a positon to use their influence in favour of a satisfactory reply from Servia. A time-limit was generally a thing to be used only in the last resort, after other means had been tried and failed.

Count Mensdorff said that if Servia, in the interval that had elapsed since the murder of the Archduke, had voluntarily instituted an enquiry on her own territory, all this might have been avoided. In 1909, Servia had said in a note that she intended to live on terms of good neighbourhood with Austria; but she had never kept her promise, she had stirred up agitation the object of which was to disintegrate Austria, and it was absolutely necessary for Austria to protect herself.

I said that I would not comment upon or criticise what Count Mensdorff had told me this afternoon, but I could not help dwelling upon the awful consequences involved in the situation. Great apprehension had been expressed to me, not specially by M. Cambon and Count Benckendorff, but also by others, as to what might happen, and it had been represented to me that it would be very desirable that those who had influence in St. Petersburg should use it on behalf of patience and moderation. I had replied that the amount of influence that could be used in this sense would depend upon how reasonable were the Austrian demands and how strong the justification that

Austria might have discovered for making her demands. The possible consequences of the present situation were terrible. If as many as four Great Powers of Europe—let us say Austria, France, Russia, and Germany—were engaged in war, it seemed to me that it must involve the expenditure of so vast a sum of money, and such an interference with trade, that a war would be accompanied or followed by a complete collapse of European credit and industry. In these days, in great industrial States, this would mean a state of things worse than that of 1848, and, irrespective of who were victors in the war, many things might be completely swept away.

Count Mensdorff did not demur to this statement of the possible consequences of the present situation, but he said that all would depend on Russia.

I made the remark that, in a time of difficulties such as this, it was just as true to say that it required two to keep the peace as it was to say, ordinarily, that it took two to make a quarrel. I had hoped very much that, if there were difficulties, Austria and Russia would be able in the first instance to discuss them directly with each other.

Count Mensdorff said that he hoped this would be possible, but he was under the impression that the attitude in St. Petersburg had not been very favourable recently.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

No. 4.

Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff.—(Communicated by Count Mensdorff, July 24, 1914.)

(Translation.)

LE Gouvernement Impérial et Royal s'est vu obligé d'adresser jeudi le 23 de ce mois, par l'entremise du Ministre Impérial et Royal à Belgrade, la note suivante au Gouvernement Royal de Serbie:

"Le 31 mars 1909 le Ministre de Serbie à Vienne a fait, d'ordre de son Gouvernement, au Gouvernement Impérial et Royal la déclaration suivante:

"La Serbie reconnaît qu'elle n'a pas été atteinte dans ses droits par le fait accompli créé en Bosnie-Herzégovine et qu'elle se conformera par conséquent à telle décision que les Puissances prendront par rapport à l'article 25 du Traité de Berlin. Se rendant aux conseils des Grandes Puissances, la Serbie s'engage dès à présent à abandonner l'attitude de protestation et d'opposition qu'elle a observée à l'égard de l'annexion depuis l'automne dernier, et elle s'engage, en outre, à changer le cours de sa politique actuelle envers l'Autriche-Hongrie pour vivre désormais avec cette dernière sur le pied d'un bon voisinage."

THE Austro-Hungarian Government felt compelled to address the following note to the Servian Government on the 23rd July, through the medium of the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade:

"On the 31st March, 1909, the Servian Minister in Vienna, on the instructions of the Servian Government, made the following declaration to the Imperial and Royal Government:—

"'Servia recognizes that the *fait accompli* regarding Bosnia has not affected her rights, and consequently she will conform to the decisions that the Powers may take in conformity with article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin. In deference to the advice of the Great Powers Servia undertakes to renounce from now onwards the attitude of protest and opposition which she has adopted with regard to the annexation since last autumn. She undertakes, moreover, to modify the direction of her policy with regard to Austro-Hungary and to live in future on good and neighbourly terms with the latter.'"

Or, l'histoire des dernières années, et notamment les événements douloureux du 28 juin, ont démontré l'existence en Serbie d'un mouvement subversif dont le but est de détacher de la Monarchie austro-hongroise certaines parties de ses territoires. Ce mouvement, qui a pris jour sous les yeux du Gouvernement serbe, est arrivé à se manifester au delà du territoire du royaume par des actes de terrorisme, par une série d'attentats et par des meurtres.

Le Gouvernement Royal serbe, loin de satisfaire aux engagements formels contenus dans la déclaration du 31 mars, 1909, n'a rien fait pour supprimer ce mouvement: il a toléré l'activité criminelle des différentes sociétés et affiliations dirigées contre la Monarchie, le langage effréné de la presse, la glorification des auteurs d'attentats, la participation d'officiers et de fonctionnaires dans les agissements subversifs, une propagande malsaine dans l'instruction publique, toléré enfin toutes les manifestations qui pouvaient induire la population serbe à la haine de la Monarchie et au mépris de ses institutions.

Cette tolérance coupable du Gouvernement Royal de Serbie n'avait pas cessé au moment où les événements du 28 juin dernier en ont démontré au monde entier les conséquences funestes.

Il résulte des dépositions et aveux des auteurs criminels de l'attentat du 28 juin que le meurtre de Sarajevo a été tramé à Belgrade, que les armes et explosifs dont les meurtriers se trouvaient être munis leur ont été donnés par des officiers et fonctionnaires serbes faisant partie de la "Narodna Odbrana" et enfin, que le passage en Bosnie des criminels et de leurs armes a été organisé et effectué par des chef du service-frontière serbe.

Les résultats mentionnés de l'instruction ne permettent pas au Gouvernement Impérial et Royal de poursuivre plus longtemps l'attitude de longanimité expectative qu'il avait observée pendant des années vis-à-vis des agissements concentrés à Belgrade et propagés de là sur les

The history of recent years, and in particular the painful events of the 28th June last, have shown the existence of a subversive movement with the object of detaching a part of the territories of Austria-Hungary from the Monarchy. The movement, which had its birth under the eye of the Servian Government, has gone so far as to make itself manifest on both sides of the Servian frontier in the shape of acts of terrorism and a series of outrages and murders.

Far from carrying out the formal undertakings contained in the declaration of the 31st March, 1909, the Royal Servian Government has done nothing to repress these movements. It has permitted the criminal machinations of various societies and associations directed against the Monarchy, and has tolerated unrestrained language on the part of the press, the glorification of the perpetrators of outrages, and the participation of officers and functionaries in subversive agitation. It has permitted an unwholesome propaganda in public instruction. In short, it has permitted all manifestations of a nature to incite the Servian population to hatred of the Monarchy and contempt of its institutions.

This culpable tolerance of the Royal Servian Government had not ceased at the moment when the events of the 28th June last proved its fatal consequences to the whole world.

Its results from the depositions and confessions of the criminal perpetrators of the outrage of the 28th June that the Serajevo assassinations were planned in Belgrade, that the arms and explosives with which the murderers were provided had been given to them by Servian officers and functionaries belonging to the Narodna Odbrana, and finally, that the passage into Bosina of the criminals and their arms was organized and effected by the chiefs of the Servian frontier service.

The above-mentioned results of the magisterial investigation do not permit the Austro-Hungarian Government to pursue any longer the attitude of expectant forebearance which it has maintained for years in face of the machinations hatched in Belgrade, and thence

territoires de la Monarchie; ces résultats lui imposent au contraire le devoir de mettre fin à des menées qui forment une menace perpétuelle pour la tranquillité de la Monarchie.

C'est pour atteindre ce but que le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal se voit obligé de demander au Gouvernement serbe l'énonciation officielle qu'il condamne la propagande dirigée contre la Monarchie austro-hongroise, c'est-à-dire l'ensemble des tendances qui aspirent en dernier lieu à détacher de la Monarchie des territoires qui en font partie, et qu'il s'engage à supprimer, par tous les moyens, cette propagande criminelle et terroriste.

Afin de donner un caractère solonnel à cet engagement, le Gouvernement Royal de Serbe fera publier à la première page du "Journal officiel" en date du 26 juin (13 juillet) l'énonciation suivante:—

"Le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie condamne la propagande dirigée contre l'Autriche-Hongrie, c'est-à-dire l'ensemble des tendances qui aspirent en dernier lieu à détacher de la Monarchie austro-hongroise des territoires qui en font partie, et il déplore sincèrement les conséquences funestes de ces agissements criminels.

"Le Gouvernement Royal regrette que des officiers et fonctionnaires serbes aient participé à la propagande susmentionnée et compromis par là les relations de bon voisinage auquel le Gouvernement Royal s'était solennellement engagé par sa déclaration du 31 mars 1909.

"Le Gouvernement Royal, qui désapprouve et répudie toute idée ou tentative d'immixtion dans les destinées des habitants de quelque partie de l'Autriche-Hongrie que ce soit, considère de son devoir d'avertir formellement les officiers, les fonctionnaires et toute la population du royaume que dorénavant il procédera avec la dernière rigueur contre les personnes qui se rendraient coupables de pareils agissements qu'il mettra tous ses efforts à prévenir et à réprimer."

Cette énonciation sera portée simultanément à la connaissance de l'Armée

propagated in the territories of the Monarchy. The results, on the contrary, impose on it the duty of putting an end to the intrigues which form a perpetual menace to the tranquility of the Monarchy.

To achieve this end the Imperial and Royal Government sees itself compelled to demand from the Royal Servian Government a formal assurance that it condemns this dangerous propaganda against the Monarchy; in other words, the whole series of tendencies, the ultimate aim of which is to detach from the Monarchy territories belonging to it, and that it undertakes to suppress by every means this criminal and terrorist propaganda.

In order to give a formal character to this undertaking the Royal Servian Government shall publish on the front page of its "Official Journal" of the 26th June (13th July) the following declaration:—

"The Royal Government of Servia condemns the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary—*i.e.*, the general tendency of which the final aim is to detach from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy territories belonging to it, and it sincerely deplores the fatal consequences of these criminal proceedings.

The Royal Government regrets that Servian officers and functionaries participated in the above-mentioned propaganda and thus compromised the good neighbourly relations to which the Royal Government was solemnly [illegible] by its declaration of the 31st March, 1909.

The Royal Government, which disaproves and repudiates all idea of interfering or attempting to interfere with the destinies of the inhabitants of any part whatsoever of Austria-Hungary, considers in its duty formally to warn officers and functionaries, and the whole population of the kingdom, that henceforward it will proceed with the utmost rigour against persons who may be guilty of such machinations, which it will use all its efforts to anticipate and suppress.

This declaration shall simultaneously be communicated to the Royal army as an

Roy, le par un ordre du jour de Sa Majesté le Roi et sera publiée dans le "Bulletin Officiel" de l'armée.

Le Gouvernement Royal serbe s'engage en outre:

1° à supprimer toute publication qui excite à la haine et au mépris de la Monarchie et dont la tendance générale est dirigée contre son intégrité territoriale,

2° à dissoudre immédiatement la société dite "Narodna Odbrana," à confisquer tous ses moyens de propagande, et à procéder de la même manière contre les autres sociétés et affiliations en Serbie qui s'adonnent à la propagande contre la Monarchie austro-hongroise; le Gouvernement Royal prendra les mesures nécessaires pour que les sociétés dissoutes ne puissent pas continuer leur activité sous un autre nom et sous une autre forme,

3° à éliminer sans délai de l'instruction publique en Serbie, tant en ce qui concerne le corps enseignant que les moyens d'instruction, tout ce qui sert ou pourrait servir à fomenter la propagande contre l'Autriche-Hongrie,

4° à éloigner du service militaire et de l'administration en général tous les officiers et fonctionnaires coupables de la propagande contre la Monarchie austro-hongroise et dont le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal se réserve de communiquer les noms et les faits au Gouvernement Royal,

5° à accepter la collaboration en Serbie des organes du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal dans la suppression du mouvement subversif dirigé contre l'intégrité territoriale de la Monarchie,

6° à ouvrir une enquête judiciaire contre les partisans du complot du 28 juin se trouvant sur territorie serbe,

des organes, délégués par le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal, prendront part aux recherches y relatives,

7° à procéder d'urgence à l'arrestation du Commandant Voija Tankosic et du nommé Milan Ciganovic, employé de l'Etat serbe, compromis par les résultats de l'instruction de Sarajevo,

8° à empêcher, par des mesures efficaces, le concours des autorités serbes dans

order of the day by His Majesty the King and shall be published in the "Official Bulletin" of the Army.

The Royal Servian Government further undertakes:

1. To suppress any publication which incites to hatred and contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the general tendency of which is directed against its territorial integrity;

2. To dissolve immediately the society styled Narodna Odbrana, to confiscate all its means of propaganda, and to proceed in the same manner against other societies and their branches in Servia which engage in propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The Royal Government shall take the necessary measures to prevent the societies dissolved from continuing their activity under another name and form;

3. To eliminate without delay from public instruction in Servia, both as regards the teaching body and also as regards the methods of instrution, everything that serves, or might serve, to foment the propaganda against Austria-Hungary;

4. To remove from the military service, and from the administration in general, all officers and functionaries guilty of propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy whose names and deeds the Austro-Hungarian Government reserves to itself the right of communicating to the Royal Government;

5. To accept the collaboration in Servia of representatives of the Ausero-Hungarian Government in the suppression of the subversive movement directed against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy;

6. To take judicial proceedings against accessories to the plot of the 28th June who are on Servian territory. Delegates of the Austro-Hungarian Government will take part in the investigation relating thereto;

7. To proceed without delay to the arrest of Major Voija Tankositch and of the individual named Milan Ciganvitch, a Servian State employee, who have been compromised by the results of the magisterial enquiry at Serajevo;

8. To prevent by effective measures the co-operation of the Servian authorities

le trafic illicite d'armes et d'explosifs à travers la frontière;

à licencier et punir sévèrement les fonctionnaires du service-frontière de Schabatz et de Loznica coupables d'avoir aidé les auteurs du crime de Sarajevo en leur facilitant le passage de la frontière,

9° à donner au Gouvernement Impérial et Royal des explications sur les propos injustifiables de hauts fonctionnaires serbes tant en Serbie qu'à l'étranger, qui, malgré leur position officielle, nont pas hésité après l'attentat du 28 juin de s'exprimer dans des interviews d'une manière hostile envers la Monarchie austro-hongroise, enfin

10° d'avertir, sans retard, le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal de l'exécution des mesures comprises dans les points précédents.

Le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal attend la réponse du Gouvernement Royal au plus tard jusqu'au samedi, 25 de ce mois, à 6 heures du soir.

Un mémoire concernant les résultats de l'instruction de Sarajevo à l'égard des fonctionnaires mentionnés aux points 7 et 8 est annexé à cette note.

J'ai l'honneur d'inviter votre Excellence de vouloir porter le contenu de cette note à la connaissance du Gouvernement auprès du quel vous êtes accrédité, en accompagnant cette communication du commentaire que voici:

Le 31 mars, 1909, le Gouvernement Royal serbe a adressé à l'Autriche-Hongrie la déclaration dont le texte est reproduit ci-dessus.

Le lendemain même de cette déclaration la Serbie sest engagée dans une politique tendant à inspirer des idées subversives aux ressortissants serbes de la Monarchie austro-hongroise et à préparer ainsi la séparation des territoires austro-hongrois, limitrophes à la Serbie.

La Serbie devint le foyer d'une agitation criminelle.

Des sociétés et affiliations ne tardèrent pas à se former qui, soit ouvertement, soit clandestinement, étaient destinées à créer des désordres sur le territoire austro-hongrois. Ces sociétés et affiliations comptent parmi leurs membres des gé-

in the illicit traffic in arms and explosives across the frontier, to dismiss and punish severely the officials of the frontier service at Schabatz and Loznica guilty of having assisted the perpetrators of the Serajevo crime by facilitating their passage across the frontier;

9. To furnish the Imperial and Royal Government with explanations regarding the unjustifiable utterances of high Servian officials, both in Servia and abroad, who, notwithstanding their official position did not hesitate after the crime of the 28th June to express themselves in interviews in terms of hostility to the Austro-Hungarian Government; and, finally,

10. To notify the Imperial and Royal Government without delay of the execution of the measures comprised under the preceding heads.

The Austro-Hungarian Government expects the reply of the Royal Government at the latest by 6 o'clock on Saturday evening, the 25th July.

A memorandum dealing with the results of the magisterial enquiry at Servjevo with regard to the officials mentioned under heads (7) and (8) is attached to this note.

I have the honour to request your Excellency to bring the contents of this note to the knowledge of the Government to which you are accredited, accompanying your communication with the following observations:—

On the 31st March, 1909, the Royal Servian Government addressed to Austria-Hungary the declaration of which the text is reproduced above.

On the very day after this declaration Servia embarked on a policy of instilling revolutionary ideas into the Serb subjects of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and so preparing the separation of the Austro-Hungarian territory on the Servian frontier.

Servia became the centre of a criminal agitation.

No time was lost in the formation of societies and groups, whose object, either avowed or secret, was the creation of disorders on Austro-Hungarian territory. These societies and groups count among their members generals and diplomatists,

néraux et des diplomates, des fonctionnaires d'Etat et des juges, bref les sommités du monde officiel et inofficiel du royaume.

Le journalisme serbe est presque entièrement au service de cette propagande, dirigée contre l'Autriche-Hongrie, et pas un jour se passe sans que les organes de la presse serbe n'excitent leurs lectures à la haine et au mépris de la Monarchie voisine ou à des attentats dirigé plus ou moins ouvertement contre sa sûreté et son intégrité.

Un grand nombre d'agents est appelé à soutenir par tous les moyens l'agitation contre l'Autriche-Hongrie et à corrompre dans les provinces limitrophes la jeunesse de ces pays.

L'esprit conspirateur des politiciens serbes, esprit dont les annales du royaume portent les sanglantes empreintes, a subi une recrudescence depuis la dernière crise balkanique; des individus ayant fait partie des bandes jusque-là occupées en Macédoine sont venus se mettre à la disposition de la propagande terroriste contre l'Autriche-Hongrie.

En présence de ces agissements, auxquels l'Autriche-Hongrie est exposée depuis des années, le Gouvernement de la Serbie n'a pas cru devoir prendre la moindre mesure. C'est ainsi que le Gouvernement serbe a manqué au devoir que lui imposait la déclaration solennelle du 31 mars 1909, et c'est ainsi qu'il s'est mis en contradiction avec la volonté de l'Europe et avec l'engagement qu'il avait pris vis-à-vis de l'Autriche-Hongrie.

La longanimité du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal à l'égard de l'attitude provocatrice de la Serbie était inspirée du désintéressement territorial de la Monarchie austro-hongroise et de l'espoir que le Gouvernement serbe finirait tout de même par apprécier à sa juste valeur l'amitié de l'Autriche-Hongrie. En observant une attitude bienveillante pour les intérêts politiques de la Serbie, le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal espérait que le royaume se déciderait finalement à suivre de son côté une ligne de conduite analogue. L'Autriche-Hongrie s'attendait surtout à une pareille évolution dans les idées politiques en Serbie, lorsque,

Government officials and judges—in short, men at the top of official and unofficial society in the kingdom.

Servian journalism is almost entirely at the service of this propaganda, which is directed against Austria-Hungary, and not a day passes without the organs of the Servian press stirring up their readers to hatred or contempt for the neighbouring Monarchy, or to outrages directed more or less openly against its security and integrity.

A large number of agents are employed in carrying on by every means the agitation against Austria-Hungary and corrupting the youth in the frontier provinces.

Since the recent Balkan crisis there has been a recrudescence of the spirit of conspiracy inherent in Servian politicians, which has left such sanguinary imprints on the history of the kingdom. Individuals belonging formerly to bands employed in Macedonia have come to place themselves at the disposal of the terrorist propaganda against Austria-Hungary.

In the presence of these doings, to which Austria-Hungary has been exposed for years, the Servian Government has not thought it incumbent on it to take the slightest step. The Servian Government has thus failed in the duty imposed on it by the solemn declaration of the 31st March, 1909, and acted in opposition to the will of Europe and the undertaking given to Austria-Hungary.

The patience of the Imperial and Royal Government in the face of the provocative attitude of Servia was inspired by the territorial disinterestedness of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the hope that the Servian Government would end in spite of everything by appreciating Austria-Hungary's friendship at its true value. By observing a benevolent attitude towards the politicial interests of Servia, the Imperial and Royal Government hoped that the kingdom would finally decide to follow an analogous line of conduct on its own side. In particular Austria-Hungary expected a development of this kind in the politicial ideas of

après les événements de l'année 1912, le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal rendit possible, par une attitude désintéressée et sans rancune, l'agrandissement si considérable de la Serbie.

Cette bienveillance manifestée par l'Autriche-Hongrie à l'égard de l'Etat voisin n'a cependant aucunement modifié les procédés du royaume, qui a continué à tolérer sur son territoire une propagande, dont les funestes consquences se sont manifestées au monde entier le 28 juin dernier, jour où l'héritier présomptif de la Monarchie et son illustre épouse devinrent les victimes d'un complot tramé à Belgrade.

En présence de cet état de choses le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal a dû se décider à entreprendre de nouvelles et pressantes démarches à Belgrade afin d'amener le Gouvernement serbe à arrêter le mouvement incendiaire menaçant la sureté et l'intégrité de la Monarchie austro-hongroise.

Le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal est persuadé qu'en entreprenant cette démarche il se trouve en plein accord avec les sentiments de toutes les nations civilisées, qui ne sauraient admettre que le régicide devint une arme dont on puisse se servir impunément dans la lutte politique, et que la paix européenne fût continuellement troublée par les agissements partant de Belgrade.

C'est à l'appui de ce qui précède que le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal tient à la disposition du Gouvernement Royal de Grande-Bretagne un dossier élucidant les menées serbes et les rapports existant entre ces menées et le meurtre du 28 juin.

Une communication identique est adressée aux représentants Impériaux et Royaux auprès des autres Puissances signataires.

Vous êtes autorisé de laisser une copie de cette dépêche entre les mains de M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.

Vienne, le 24 juillet, 1914.

ANNEXE.

L'instruction criminelle ouverte par le Tribunal de Sarajevo contre Gavrilo Princip et consorts du chef d'assassinat

Servia, when, after the events of 1912, the Imperial and Royal Government, by its disinterested and ungrudging attitude, made such a considerable aggrandisement of Servia possible.

The benevolence which Austria-Hungary showed toward the neighbouring State had no restraining effort on the proceedings of the kingdom, which continued to tolerate on its territory a propaganda of which the fatal consequences were demonstrated to the whole world on the 28th June last, when the Heir Presumptive to the Monarchy and his illustrious consort fell victims to a plot hatched at Belgrade.

In the presence of this state of things the Imperial and Royal Government has felt compelled to take new and urgent steps at Belgrade with a view to inducing the Servian Government to stop the incendiary movement that is threatening the security and integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

The Imperial and Royal Government is convinced that in taking this step it will find itself in full agreement with the sentiments of all civilized nations, who cannot permit regicide to become a weapon that can be employed with impunity in politicial strife, and the peace of Europe to be continually disturbed by movements emanating from Belgrade.

In support of the above the Imperial and Royal Government holds at the disposal of the British Government a *dossier* elucidating the Servian intrigues and the connection between these intrigues and the murder of the 28th June.

An identical communication has been addressed to the Imperial and Royal representatives accredited to the other signatory Powers.

You are authorized to leave a copy of this despatch in the hands of the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, July, 24, 1914.

ANNEX.

The criminal enquiry opened by the Court of Serajevo against Gavrilo Princip and his accessories in and before the act

et de complicité y relative—crime commis par eux le 28 juin dernier—a jusqu'ici abouti aux constatations suivantes:

1°. Le complot ayant pour but d'assassiner, lors de son séjour à Sarajevo, l'Archidus François-Ferdinand fut formé à Belgrade par Gavrilo Princip, Nedeljko Cabrinovic, le nommé Milan Ciganovic et Trifko Grabez avec le concours du commandant Voija Tankosic.

2°. Les 6 bombes et les 4 pistolets Browning avec munition, moyennant lesquels les malfaiteurs ont commis l'attentat, furent livrés à Belgrade à Princip, Cabrinovic et Grabez par le nommé Milan Ciganovic et le commandant Voija Tankosic.

3°. Les bombes sont des grenades à la main provenant du dépôt d'armes de l'armée serbe à Kragujevac.

4°. Pour assurer la réussite de l'attentat, Ciganovic enseigna à Princip, Cabrinovic et Grabez la manière de se servir des grenades et donna, dans un forêt près du champ de tir à Topschider, des leçons de tir avec pistolets Browning à Princip et Grabez.

5°. Pour rendre possible à Princip, Cabrinovic et Grabez de passer la frontière de Bosnie-Herzégovine et d'y introduire clandestinement leur contrebande d'armes, un système de transport secret fut organisé par Ciganovic.

D'après cette organisation l'introduction en Bosnie-Herzégovine des malfaiteurs et de leurs armes fut opérée par les capitaines-frontières de Chabac (Rade Popovic) et de Loznica ainsi que par le douanier Rudivoj Grbic de Loznica avec le concours de divers particuliers.

of assassination committed by them on the 28th June last, has up to the present led to the following conclusions:—

1. The plot, having as its object the assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand at the time of his visit to Serajevo, was formed at Belgrade, by Gavrilo Princip, Nedeljko Cabrinovic, one Milan Ciganovic, and Trifko Grabez, with the assistance of Commander Voija Tankosic.

2. The six bombs and the four Browning pistols and ammunition with which the guilty parties committed the act were delivered to Princip, Cabrinovic, and Grabez by the man Milan Ciganovic and Commander Voija Tankosic at Belgrade.

3. The bombs are hand-grenades coming from the arms of the Servian army at Kragujevac.

4. In order to ensure the success of the act, Ciganovic taught Princip, Cabrinovic, and Grabez how to use the bombs, and gave lessons in firing Browning pistols to Princip and Gabez in a forest near the shooting ground at Topschider.

5. To enable Princip, Cabrinovic, and Grabez to cross the frontier of Bosnia-Herzegovina and smuggle in their contraband of arms secretly, a secret system of transport was organized by Ciganovic.

By this arrangement the introduction into Bosnia-Herzegovina of criminals and their arms was effected by the officials controlling the frontiers at Chabac (Rade Popovc) and Loznica, as well as by the customs officer Rudivoj Grbic, of Loznica, with the assistance of various individuals.

No. 5.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(Telegraphic.)

FOREIGN OFFICE, July 24, 1914.

Note addressed to Servia, together with an explanation of the reasons leading up to it, has been communicated to me by Count Mensdorff.

In the ensuing conversation with his Excellency I remarked that it seemed to me a matter for great regret that a time limit, and such a short one at that, had been insisted upon at this stage of the proceedings. The murder of the Archduke and some of the circumstances respecting Servia quoted in the note aroused sympathy

with Austria, as was but natural, but at the same time I had never before seen one State address to another independent State a document of so formidable a character Demand No. 5 would be hardly consistent with the maintenance of Servia's independent sovereignty if it were to mean, as it seemed that it might, that Austria-Hungary was to be invested with a right to appoint officials who would have authority within the frontiers of Servia.

I added that I felt great apprehension, and that I should concern myself with the matter simply and solely from the point of view of the peace of Europe. The merits of the dispute between Austria and Servia were not the concern of His Majesty's Government, and such comments as I had made above were not made in order to discuss those merits.

I ended by saying that doubtless we should enter into an exchange of views with other powers, and that I must await their views as to what could be done to mitigate the difficulties of the situation.

Count Mensdorff replied that the present situation might never have arisen if Servia had held out a hand after the murder of the Archduke; Servia had, however, shown no sign of sympathy or help, though some weeks had already elapsed since the murder; a time limit, said his Excellency, was essential, owing to the procrastination on Servia's part.

I said that if Servia had procrastinated in replying, a time limit could have been introduced later; but, as things now stood, the terms of the Servian reply had been dictated by Austria, who had not been content to limit herself to a demand for a reply within a limit of forty-eight hours from its presentation.

No. 6.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey. (Received July 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

ST. PETERSBURGH, July 24, 1914.

I had a telephone message this morning from M. Sazonof to the effect that the text of the Austrian ultimatum had just reached him.

His excellency added that a reply within forty-eight hours was demanded, and he begged me to meet him at the French Embassy to discuss matters, as Austrian step clearly meant that war was imminent.

Minister of Foreign Affairs said that Austria's conduct was both provocative and immoral; she would never have taken such action unless Germany had first been consulted; some of her demands were quite impossible of acceptance. He hoped that His Majesty's Government would not fail to proclaim their solidarity with Russia and France.

The French Ambassador gave me to understand that France would fulfil all the obligations entailed by her alliance with Russia, if necessity arose, besides supporting Russia strongly in any diplomatic negotiations.

I had said I would telegraph a full report to you of what their Excellencies had just said to me. I could not, of course, speak in the name of His Majesty's Government, but personally I saw no reason to expect any declaration of solidarity from His Majesty's Government that would entail an unconditional engagement on their part to support Russia and France by force of arms. Direct British interests in Servia were nil, and a war on behalf of that country would never be sanctioned by British public opinion. To this M. Sazonof replied that we must not forget that the general European question was involved, the Servian question being but a part of the former, and that Great Britain could not afford to efface herself from the problems now at issue.

In reply to these remarks I observed that I gathered from what he said that his Excellency was suggesting that Great Britain should join in making a communication to Austria to the effect that active intervention by her in the internal affairs of Servia could not be tolerated. But supposing Austria nevertheless proceeded to embark on military measures against Servia in spite of our representations, was it the intention of the Russian Government forthwith to declare war on Austria?

M. Sazonof said that he himself thought the Russian mobilization would at any rate have to be carried out; but a council of Ministers was being held this afternoon to consider the whole question. A further council would be held, probably to-morrow, at which the Emperor would preside, when a decision would be come to.

I said that it seemed to me that the important point was to induce Austria to extend the time limit, and that the first thing to do was to bring an influence to bear on Austria with that end in view; French Ambassador, however, thought that either Austria had made up her mind to act at once or that she was bluffing. Whichever it might be, our only chance of averting war was for us to adopt a firm and united attitude. He did not think there was time to carry out my suggestion. Thereupon I said that it seemed to me desirable that we should know just how far Servia was prepared to go to meet the demands formulated by Austria in her note. M. Sazonof replied that he must first consult his colleagues on this point, but that doubtless some of the Austrian demands could be accepted by Servia.

French Ambassador and M. Sazonof both continued to press me for a declaration of complete solidarity of His Majesty's Government with French and Russian Governments, and I therefore said that it seemed to me possible that you might perhaps be willing to make strong representations to both German and Austrian Governments, urging upon them that an attack upon Austria by Servia would endanger the whole peace of Europe. Perhaps you might see your way to saying to them that such action on the part of Austria would probably mean Russian intervention, which would involve France and Germany, and that it would be difficult for Great Britain to keep out if the war were to become general. M. Sazonof answered that we would sooner or later be dragged into war if it did break out; we should have rendered war more likely if we did not from the outset make common cause with his country and with France; at any rate, he hoped His Majesty's Government would express strong reprobation of action taken by Austria.

President of French Republic and President of the Council cannot reach France, on their return from Russia, for four or five days, and it looks as though Austria purposely chose this moment to present their ultimatum.

It seems to me, from the language held by French Ambassador, that, even if we decline to join them, France and Russia are determined to make a strong stand.

No. 7.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 24.)

(Telegraphic.) VIENNA, July 24, 1914.

Before departing on leave of absence, I was assured by Russian Ambassador that any action taken by Austria to humiliate Servia could not leave Russia indifferent.

Russian Chargé d'Affaires was received this morning by Minister for Foreign Affairs, and said to him, as his own personal view, that Austrian note was drawn up in a form rendering it impossible of acceptance as it stood, and that it was both unusual and peremptory in its terms. Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that Austrian Minister was under instructions to leave Belgrade unless Austrian demands were accepted integrally by 4 p.m. to-morrow. His Excellency added that Dual Monarchy felt that its very existence was at stake; and that the step taken had caused great

satisfaction throughout the country. He did not think that objections to what had been done could be raised by any Power.

No. 8.

Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey. (*Received July 24.*)

(Telegraphic.) BELGRADE, July 24, 1914.

Austrian demands are considered absolutely unacceptable by Servian Government, who earnestly trust that His Majesty's Government may see their way to induce Austrian Government to moderate them.

This request was conveyed to me by Servian Prime Minister, who returned early this morning to Belgrade. His Excellency is dejected, and is clearly very anxious as to developments that may arise.

No. 9.

Note communicated by German Ambassador, July 24, 1914.

The publications of the Austro-Hungarian Government concerning the circumstances under which the assassination of the Austrian heir presumptive and his consort has taken place disclose unmistakably the aims which the Great Servian propaganda has set itself, and the means it employs to realise them. The facts now made known must also do away with the last doubts that the centre of activity of all those tendencies which are directed towards the detachment of the Southern Slav provinces from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and their incorporation into the Servian Kingdom is to be found in Belgrade, and is at work there with at least the connivance of members of Government and army.

The Servian intrigues have been going on for many years. In an especially marked form the Great Servian chauvinism manifested itself during the Bosnian crisis. It was only owing to the far-reaching self-restraint and moderation of the Austro-Hungarian Government and to the energetic interference of the Great Powers that the Servian provocations to which Austria-Hungary was then exposed did not lead to a conflict. The assurance of good conduct in future which was given by the Servian Government at that time has not been kept. Under the eyes, at least with the tacit permission of official Servia, the Great Servian propaganda has continuously increased in extension and intensity; to its account must be set the recent crime, the threads of which lead to Belgrade. It has become clearly evident that it would not be consistent either with the dignity or with the self-preservation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy still longer to remain inactive in face of this movement on the other side of the frontier, by which the security and the integrity of her territories are constantly menaced. Under these circumstances, the course of procedure and demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government can only be regarded as equitable and moderate. In spite of that, the attitude which public opinion as well as the Government in Servia have recently adopted does not exclude the apprehenson that the Servian Government might refuse to comply with those demands and might allow themselves to be carried away into a provocative attitude against Austria-Hungary. The Austro-Hungarian Government, if it does not wish definitely to abandon Austria's position as a Great Power, would then have no choice but to obtain the fulfilment of their demands from the Servian Government by strong pressure and, if necessary, by using military measures, the choice of the means having to be left to them.

The Imperial Government want to emphasise their opinion that in the present case there is only question of a matter to be settled exclusively between Austria-Hungary and Servia, and that the Great Powers ought seriously to endeavour to reserve it to those two immediately concerned. The Imperial Government desire urgently the

localisation of the conflict, because every interference of another Power would, owing to the different treaty obligations, be followed by incalculable consequences.

No. 10.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

FOREIGN OFFICE, July 24, 1914.

SIR,—After telling M. Cambon to-day of the Austrian communication to Servia, which I had received this morning, and of the comment I had made to Count Mensdorff upon it yesterday, I told M. Cambon that this afternoon I was to see the German Ambassador, who some days ago had asked me privately to exercise moderating influence in St. Petersburgh. I would say to the Ambassador that, of course, if the presentation of this ultimatum to Servia did not lead to trouble between Austria and Russia, we need not concern ourselves about it; but, if Russia took the view of the Austrian ultimatum, which it seemed to me that any Power interested in Servia would take, I should be quite powerless, in face of the terms of the ultimatum, to exercise any moderating influence. I would say that I thought the only chance of any mediating or moderating influence being exercised was that Germany, France, Italy, and ourselves, who had not direct interests in Servia, should act together for the sake of peace, simultaneously in Vienna and St. Petersburgh.

M. Cambon said that, if there was a chance of mediation by the four Powers, he had no doubt that his Government would be glad to join in it; but he pointed out that we could not say anything in St. Petersburgh till Russia had expressed some opinion or taken some action. But, when two days were over, Austria would march into Servia, for the Servians could not possibly accept the Austrian demand. Russia would be compelled by her public opinion to take action as soon as Austria attacked Servia, and therefore, once the Austrians had attacked Servia, it would be too late for any mediation.

I said that I had not contemplated anything being said in St. Petersburgh until after it was clear that there must be trouble between Austria and Russia. I had thought that if Austria did move into Servia, and Russia then mobilised, it would be possible for the four Powers to urge Austria to stop her advance, and Russia also to stop hers, pending mediation. But it would be essential for any chance of success for such a step that Germany should participate in it.

M. Cambon said that it would be too late after Austria had once moved against Servia. The important thing was to gain time by mediation in Vienna. The best chance of this being accepted would be that Germany should propose it to the other Powers.

I said that by this he meant a mediation between Austria and Servia.

He replied that it was so.

I said that I would talk to the German Ambassador this afternoon on the subject.

I am, &c.

E. GREY

No. 11.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Rumbold.

(Telegraphic.) FOREIGN OFFICE, July 24, 1914.

German Ambassador has communicated to me the view of the German Government about the Austrian demand in Servia. I understand the German Government is making the same communication to the Powers.

I said that if the Austrian ultimatum to Servia did not lead to trouble between Austria and Russia I had no concern with it; I had heard nothing yet from St. Petersburgh, but I was very apprehensive of the view Russia would take of the situation. I reminded the German Ambassador that some days ago he had expressed a personal hope that if need arose I would endeavour to exercise moderating influence at St. Petersburgh, but now I said that, in view of the extraordinary stiff character of the Austrian note, the shortness of the time allowed, and the wide scope of the demands upon Servia, I felt quite helpless as far as Russia was concerned, and I did not believe any Power could exercise influence alone.

The only chance I could see of mediating or moderating influence being effective, was that the four Powers, Germany, Italy, France, and ourselves, should work together simultaneously at Vienna and St. Petersburgh in favour of moderation in the event of the relations between Austria and Russia becoming threatening.

The immediate danger was that in a few hours Austria might march into Servia and Russian Slav opinion demand that Russia should march to help Servia; it would be very desirable to get Austria not to precipitate military action and so to gain more time. But none of us could influence Austria in this direction unless Germany would propose and participate in such action at Vienna. You should inform Secretary of State.

Prince Lichnowsky said that Austria might be expected to move when the time limit expired unless Servia could give unconditional acceptance of Austrian demands *in toto*. Speaking privately, His Excellency suggested that a negative reply must in no case be returned by Servia, a reply favourable on some points must be sent at once, so that an excuse against immediate action might be afforded to Austria.

No. 12.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Crackanthorpe.

(Telegraphic.) FOREIGN OFFICE, July 24, 1914.

SERVIA ought to promise that, if it is proved that Servian officials, however subordinate they may be, were accomplices in the murder of the Archduke at Serajevo, she will give Austria the fullest satisfaction. She certainly ought to express concern and regret. For the rest, Servian Government must reply to Austrian demands as they consider best in Servian interests.

It is impossible to say whether military action by Austria when time limit expires can be averted by anything but unconditional acceptance of her demands, but only chance appears to lie in avoiding an absolute refusal and replying favourably to as many points as the time limit allows.

Servian Minister here has begged that His Majesty's Government will express their views, but I cannot undertake responsibilty of saying more than I have said above, and I do not like to say even that without knowing what is being said at Belgrade by French and Russian Governments. You should therefore consult your French and Russian colleagues as to repeating what my views are, as expressed above, to Servian Government.

I have urged upon German Ambassador that Austria should not precipitate military action.

No. 13.

Note communicated by Russian Ambassador, July 25.

M. SAZONOF télégraphie au Chargé d'Affaires de Russie à Vienne en date du 11 (24) juillet, 1914:

"La communication du Gouvernement austro-hongrois aux Puissances le lendemain de la présentation de l'ultimatum à Belgrade ne laisse aux Puissances qu'un délai tout à fait insuffisant pour entreprendre quoi qu'il soit d'utile pour l'aplanissement des complications surgies.

"Pour prévenir les conséquences incalculables et également néfastes pour toutes les Puissances qui peuvent suivre le mode d'action du Gouvernement austro-hongrois, il nous paraît indispensable qu'avant tout le délai donné à la Serbie pour répondre soit prolongé. L'Autriche-Hongrie se déclarant disposée à informer les Puissances des données de l'enquête sur lesquelles le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal base ses accusations, devrait leur donner également le temps de s'en rendre compte.

"En ce cas, si les Puissances se convainquaient du bien-fondé de certaines des exigences autrichiennes, elles se trouveraient en mesure de faire parvenir au Gouvernement serbe des conseils en conséquence.

"Un refus de prolonger le terme de l'ultimatum priverait de toute portée la démarche du Gouvernement austro-hongrois auprès des Puissances et se trouverait en contradiction avec les bases même des relations internationales.

"Le Prince Koudachef est chargé de communiquer ce qui précède au Cabinet de Vienne.

"M. Sazonof espère que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique adhérera au point de vue exposé, et il exprime l'espoir que Sir Edward Grey voudra bien munir l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre à Vienne d'instructions conformes."

(Translation)

M. SAZONOF telegraphs to the Russian Chargé d'affaires at Vienna on the 11th (24th) July, 1914:

"The communication made by Austria-Hungary to the Powers the day after the presentation of the ultimatium at Belgrade leaves a period to the Powers which is quite insufficient to enable them to take any steps which might help to smooth away the difficulties that have arisen.

"In order to prevent the consequences equally incalculable and fatal to all the Powers, which may result from the course of action followed by the Austro-Hungarian Government, it seems to us to be above all essential that the period allowed for the Servian reply should be extended. Austria-Hungary, having declared her readiness to inform the Powers of the results of the enquiry upon which the Imperial and Royal Government base their accusations, should equally allow them sufficient time to study them.

"In this case, if the Powers, were convinced that certain of the Austrian demands were well founded, they would be in a position to offer advice to the Servian Government.

"A refusal to prolong the term of the ultimatum would render nugatory the proposals made by the Austro-Hungarian Government to the Powers, and would be in contradiction to the very bases of international relations.

"Prince Kudachef is instructed to communicate the above to the Cabinet at Vienna.

"M. Sazonof hopes that His Britannic Majesty's Government will share to the point of view set forth above, and he trusts that Sir E. Grey will see his way to furnish similar instructions to the British Ambassador at Vienna.."

No. 14.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie and to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.) FOREIGN OFFICE, July 25, 1914.

AUSTRIAN Ambassador has been authorised to explain to me that the step taken at Belgrade was not an ultimatum, but a *démarche* with a time limit, and that if the Austrian demands were not complied with within the time limit the Austro-Hungarian Government would break off diplomatic relations and begin military preparations, not operations.

In case Austro-Hungarian Government have not given the same information at Paris (St. Petersburgh), you should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs as soon as possible; it makes the immediate situation rather less acute.

No. 15.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.) PARIS, July 25, 1914.

I LEARN from the Acting Political Director that the French Government have not yet received the explanation from the Austrian Government contained in your telegram of to-day.* They have, however, through the Servian Minister here, given similar advice to Servia as was contained in your telegram to Belgrade of yesterday.†

* See No. 14.
† See No. 12.

No. 16.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

PARIS, July 25, 1914.

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs has no suggestions to make except that moderating advice might be given at Vienna as well as at Belgrade. He hopes that the Servian Government's answer to the Austrian ultimatum will be sufficiently favourable to obviate extreme measures being taken by the Austrian Government. He says, however, that there would be a revolution in Servia if she were to accept the Austrian demands in their entirety.

No. 17.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

ST. PETERSBURGH, July 25, 1914.

I saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning, and communicated to his Excellency the substance of your telegram of to-day to Paris,* and this afternoon I discussed with him the communication which the French Ambassador suggested should be made to the Servian Government, as recorded in your telegram of yesterday to Belgrade.†

* See No. 14.
† See No. 12.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs said, as regards the former, that the explanations of the Austrian Ambassador did not quite correspond with the information which had reached him from German quarters. As regards the latter, both his Excellency and the French Ambassador agreed that it is too late to make such a communication, as the time expires this evening.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Servia was quite ready to do as you had suggested and to punish those proved to be guilty, but that no independent State could be expected to accept the political demands which had been put forward. The Minister for Foreign Affairs thought, from a conversation which he had with the Servian Minister yesterday, that, in the event of the Austrians attacking Servia, the Servian Government would abandon Belgrade, and withdraw their forces into the interior, while they would at the same time appeal to the Powers to help them. His Excellency was in favour of their making this appeal. He would like to see the question placed on an international footing, as the obligations taken by Servia in 1908, to which reference is made in the Austrian ultimatum, were given not to Austria, but to the Powers.

If Servia should appeal to the Powers, Russia would be quite ready to stand aside and leave the question in the hands of England, France, Germany, and Italy. It was possible, in his opinion, that Servia might propose to submit the question to arbitration.

On my expressing the earnest hope that Russia would not precipitate war by mobilising until you had had time to use your influence in favour of peace, his Excellency assured me that Russia had no aggressive intentions, and she would take no action until it was forced on her. Austria's action was in reality directed against Russia. She aimed at overthrowing the present *status quo* in the Balkans, and establishing her own hegemony there. He did not believe that Germany really wanted war, but her attitude was decided by ours. If we took our stand firmly with France and Russia there would be no war. If we failed them now, rivers of blood would flow, and we would in the end be dragged into war.

I said that England could play the rôle of mediator at Berlin and Vienna to better purpose as friend who, if her counsels of moderation were disregarded, might one day be converted into an ally, than if she were to declare herself Russia's ally at once. His Excellency said that unfortunately Germany was convinced that she could count upon our neutrality.

I said all I could to impress prudence on the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and warned him that if Russia mobilised, Germany would not be content with mere mobilisation, or give Russia time to carry out hers, but would probably declare war at once. His Excellency replied that Russia could not allow Austria to crush Servia and become the predominant Power in the Balkans, and, if she feels secure of the support of France, she will face all the risks of war. He assured me once more that he did not wish to precipitate a conflict, but that unless Germany could restrain Austria I could regard the situation as desperate.

No. 18.

Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

BERLIN, July 25, 1914.

Your telegram of the 24th July* acted on.

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs says that on receipt of a telegram at 10 this morning from German Ambassador at London, he immediately instructed German

* See No. 11.

Ambassador at Vienna to pass on to Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs your suggestion for an extension of time limit, and to speak to his Excellency about it. Unfortunately it appeared from press that Count Berchtold is at Ischl, and Secretary of State thought that in these circumstances there would be delay and difficulty in getting time limit extended. Secretary of State said that he did not know what Austria-Hungary had ready on the spot, but he admitted quite freely that Austro-Hungarian Government wished to give the Servians a lesson, and that they meant to take military action. He also admitted that Servian Government could not swallow certain of the Austro-Hungarian demands.

Secretary of State said that a reassuring feature of situation was that Count Berchtold had sent for Russian representative at Vienna and had told him that Austria-Hungary had no intention of seizing Servian territory. This step should, in his opinion, exercise a calming influence at St. Petersburgh. I asked whether it was not to be feared that, in taking military action against Servia, Austria would dangerously excite public opinion in Russia. He said he thought not. He remained of opinion that crisis could be localised. I said that telegrams from Russia in this morning's papers did not look very reassuring, but he maintained his optimistic view with regard to Russia. He said that he had given the Russian Government to understand that last thing Germany wanted was a general war, and he would do all in his power to prevent such a calamity. If the relations between Austria and Russia became threatening, he was quite ready to fall in with your suggestion as to the four Powers working in favour of moderation at Vienna and St. Petersburgh.

Secretary of State confessed privately that he thought the note left much to be desired as a diplomatic document. He repeated very earnestly that, though he had been accused of knowing all about the contents of that note, he had in fact had no such knowledge.

No. 19.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

ROME, July 25, 1914.

I saw the Secretary-General this morning and found that he knew of the suggestion that France, Italy, Germany, and ourselves should work at Vienna and St. Petersburgh in favour of moderation, if the relations between Austria and Servia become menacing.

In his opinion Austria will only be restrained by the unconditional acceptance by the Servian Government of her note. There is reliable information that Austria intends to seize the Salonica Railway.

No. 20.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey,—(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

VIENNA, July 25, 1914.

Language of press this morning leaves the impression that the surrender of Servia is neither expected nor really desired. It is officially announced that the Austrian Minister is instructed to leave Belgrade with staff of legation failing unconditional acceptance of note at 6 p.m. to-day.

Minister for Foreign Affairs goes to Ischl to-day to communicate personally to the Emperor Servian reply when it comes.

No. 21.

Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey. (Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.) BELGRADE, July 25, 1914.

The Council of Ministers is now drawing up their reply to the Austrian note. I am informed by the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that it will be most conciliatory and will meet the Austrian demands in as large a measure as is possible.

The following is a brief summary of the projected reply:—

The Servian Government consent to the publication of a declaration in the 'Official Gazette.' The ten points are accepted with reservations. Servian Government declare themselves ready to agree to a mixed commission of enquiry so long as the appointment of a commission can be shown to be in accordance with international usage. They consent to dismiss and prosecute those officers who can be clearly proved to be guilty, and they have already arrested the officer referred to in the Austrian note. They are prepared to suppress the Narodno Odbrana.

The Servian Government consider that, unless the Austrian Government want war at any cost, they cannot but be content with the full satisfaction offered in the Servian reply.

No. 22.

Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey. (Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.) BELGRADE, July 25, 1914.

I have seen the new French Minister, who has just arrived from Constantinople, and my Russian colleague, and informed them of your views.

They have not yet received instructions from their Governments, and in view of this and of the proposed conciliatory terms of the Servian reply, I have up to now abstained from offering advice to the Servian Government.

I think it is highly probable that the Russian Government have already urged the utmost moderation on the Servian Government.

No. 23.

Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey. (Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.) BELGRADE, July 25, 1914.

The Austrian Minister left at 6.30.

The Government has left for Nisch, where the Skuptchina will meet on Monday. I am leaving with my other colleagues, but the vice-consul is remaining in charge of the archives.

No. 24.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.) FOREIGN OFFICE, July 25, 1914.

You spoke quite rightly in very difficult circumstances as to the attitude of His Majesty's Government. I entirely approve what you said, as reported in your telegram of yesterday,* and I cannot promise more on behalf of the Government.

* See No. 7.

I do not consider that public opinion here would or ought to sanction our going to war over a Servian quarrel. If, however, war does take place, the development of other issues may draw us into it, and I am therefore anxious to prevent it.

The sudden brusque, and peremptory character of the Austrian *démarche* makes it almost inevitable that in a very short time both Russia and Austria will have mobilized against each other. In this event, the only chance of peace, in my opinion, is for the other four Powers to join in asking the Austrian and Russian Governments not to cross the frontier, and to give time for the four Powers acting at Vienna and St. Petersburgh to try and arrange matters. If Germany will adopt this view, I feel strongly that France and ourselves should act upon it. Italy would no doubt gladly co-operate.

No diplomatic intervention or mediation would be tolerated by either Russia or Austria unless it was clearly impartial and included the allies or friends of both. The co-operation of Germany would, therefore, be essential.

No. 25.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Rumbold.

(Telegraphic.) FOREIGN OFFICE, July 25, 1914.

The Austrian Ambassador has been authorized to inform me that the Austrian method of procedure on expiry of the time limit would be to break off diplomatic relations and commence military preparations, but not military operations. In informing the German Ambassador of this, I said that it interposed a stage of mobilisation before the frontier was actually crossed, which I had urged yesterday should be delayed.

Apparently we should now soon be face to face with the mobilisation of Austria and Russia. The only chance of peace, if this did happen, would be for Germany, France, Russia and ourselves to keep together, and to join in asking Austria and Russia not to cross the frontier till we had had time to try and arrange matters between them.

The German Ambassador read me a telegram from the German Foreign Office saying that his Government had not known beforehand, and had had no more than other Powers to do with the stiff terms of the Austrian note to Servia, but that once she had launched that note, Austria could not draw back. Prince Lichnowsky said, however, that if what I contemplated, was mediation between Austria and Russia, Austria might be able with dignity to accept it. He expressed himself as personally favourable to this suggestion.

I concurred in his observation, and said that I felt I had no title to intervene between Austria and Servia, but as soon as the question became one as between Austria and Russia, the peace of Europe was affected, in which we must all take a hand.

I impressed upon the Ambassador that, in the event of Russian and Austrian mobilisation, the participation of Germany would be essential to any diplomatic action for peace. Alone we could do nothing. The French Government were travelling at the moment, and I had had no time to consult them, and could not therefore be sure of their views, but I was prepared, if the German Government agreed with my suggestion, to tell the French Government that I thought it the right thing to act upon it.

No. 26.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(Telegraphic.)

FOREIGN OFFICE, July 25, 1914.

The Russian Ambassador has communicated to me the following telegram which his Government have sent to the Russian Ambassador at Vienna, with instruction to communicate it to the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs:—

"The delay given to Servia for a reply is so limited that the Powers are prevented from taking any steps to avert the complications which are threatening. The Russian Government trust that the Austrian Government will prolong the time limit, and as the latter have declared their willingness to inform the Powers of the data on which they have based their demands on Servia, the Russian Government hope that these particulars will be furnished in order that the Powers may examine the matter. If they found that some of the Austrian requests were well founded, they would be in a position to advise the Servian Government accordingly. If the Austrian Government were indisposed to prolong the time limit, not only would they be acting against international ethics, but they would deprive their communication to the Powers of any practical meaning."

You may support in general terms the step taken by your Russian colleague.

Since the telegram to the Russian Ambassador at Vienna was sent, it has been a relief to hear that the steps which the Austrian Government were taking were to be limited for the moment to the rupture of relations and to military preparations, and not operations. I trust, therefore, that if the Austro-Hungarian Government consider it too late to prolong the time limit, they will at any rate give time in the sense and for the reasons desired by Russia before taking any irretrievable steps.

No. 27.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, Sir H. Rumbold and Sir G. Buchannan.

(Telegraphic.)

FOREIGN OFFICE, July 25, 1914.

I have communicated to German Ambassador the forecast of the Servian reply contained in Mr. Crackanthorpe's telegram of to-day.* I have said that, if Servian reply, when received at Vienna, corresponds to this forecast, I hope the German Government will feel able to influence the Austrian Government to take a favourable view of it.

* See No. 21.

No. 28.

[Nil.]

No. 29.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

FOREIGN OFFICE, July 25, 1914.

Sir,

The Italian Ambassador came to see me to-day. I told him in general terms what I had said to the German Ambassador this morning.

The Italian Ambassador cordially approved of this. He made no secret of the fact that Italy was most desirous to see war avoided.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

No. 30.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Crackanthorpe.

FOREIGN OFFICE, July 25, 1914.

Sir,

The Servian Minister called on the 23rd instant and spoke to Sir A. Nicolson on the present strained relations between Servia and Austria-Hungary.

He said that his Government were most anxious and disquieted. They were perfectly ready to meet any reasonable demands of Austria-Hungary so long as such demands were kept on the "terrain juridique". If the results of the enquiry at Sarajevo—an enquiry conducted with so much mystery and secrecy—disclosed the fact that there were any individuals conspiring or organising plots on Servian territory, the Servian Government would be quite ready to take the necessary steps to give satisfaction; but if Austria transported the question on to the political ground, and said that Servian policy, being inconvenient to her, must undergo a radical change, and that Servia must abandon certain political ideals, no independent State would, or could, submit to such dictation.

He mentioned that both the assassins of the Archduke were Austrian subjects—Bosniaks; that one of them had been in Servia, and that the Servian authorities, considering him suspect and dangerous, had desired to expel him, but on applying to the Austrian authorities found that the latter protected him, and said that he was an innocent and harmless individual.

Sir A. Nicolson, on being asked by M. Boschkovitch his opinion on the whole question, observed that there were no data on which to base one, though it was to be hoped that the Servian Government would endeavour to meet the Austrian demands in a conciliatory and moderate spirit.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

No. 31.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 26.)

(Telegraphic.)

VIENNA, July 25, 1914.

Servian reply to the Austro-Hungarian demands is not considered satisfactory, and the Austro-Hungarian Minister has left Belgrade. War is thought to be imminent.

No. 32.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 26.)

(Telegraphic.) VIENNA, July 26, 1914.

According to confident belief of German Ambassador, Russia will keep quiet during chastisement of Servia, which Austria-Hungary is resolved to inflict, having received

assurances that no Servian territory will be annexed by Austria-Hungary. In reply to my question whether Russian Government might not be compelled by public opinion to intervene on behalf of kindred nationality, he said that everything depended on the personality of the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who could resist easily, if he chose, the pressure of a few newspapers. He pointed out that the days of Pan-Slav agitation in Russia were over, and that Moscow was perfectly quiet. The Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs would not, his Excellency thought, be so imprudent as to take a step which would probably result in many frontier questions in which Russia is interested, such as Swedish, Polish, Ruthenian, Roumanian, and Persian questions being brought into the melting-pot. France, too, was not at all in a condition for facing a war.

I replied that matters had, I thought, been made a little difficult for other Powers by the tone of Austro-Hungarian Government's ultimatum to Servia. One naturally sympathised with many of the requirements of the ultimatum, if only the manner of expressing them had been more temperate. It was, however, impossible, according to the German Ambassador, to speak effectively in any other way to Servia. Servia was about to receive a lesson which she required; the quarrel, however, ought not to be extended in any way to foreign countries. He doubted Russia, who had no right to assume a protectorate over Servia, acting as if she made any such claim. As for Germany she knew very well what she was about in backing up Austria-Hungary in this matter.

The German Ambassador had heard of a letter addressed by you yesterday to the German Ambassador in London in which you expressed the hope that the Servian concessions would be regarded as satisfactory. He asked whether I had been informed that a pretence of giving way at the last moment had been made by the Servian Government. I had, I said, heard that on practically every point Servia had been willing to give in. His Excellency replied that Servian concessions were all a sham. Servia proved that she well knew that they were insufficient to satisfy the legitimate demands of Austria-Hungary by the fact that before making her offer she had ordered mobilisation and retirement of Government from Belgrade.

No. 33.

Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 26.)

(Telegraphic.) BERLIN, July 26, 1914.

Emperor returns suddenly to-night, and Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs says that Foreign Office regret this step, which was taken on His Majesty's own initiative. They fear that His Majesty's sudden return may cause speculation and excitement. Under-Secretary of State likewise told me that German Ambassador at St. Petersburgh had reported that, in conversation with Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, latter had said that if Austria annexed bits of Servian territory Russia would not remain indifferent. Under-Secretary of State drew conclusion that Russia would not act if Austria did not annex territory.

No. 34.

Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 26.)

(Telegraphic.) BERLIN, July 26, 1914.

Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has just telephoned to me to say that German Ambassador at Vienna has been instructed to pass on to Austro-Hungarian

Government your hopes that they may take a favourable view of Servian reply if it corresponds to the forecast contained in Belgrade telegram No. 52 of 25th July.

Under-Secretary of State considers very fact of their making this communication to Austro-Hungarian Government implies that they associate themselves to a certain extent with your hopes. German Government do not see their way to going beyond this

No. 35.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey. (Received July 26.)

(Telegraphic.) ROME, July 26, 1914.

Minister for Foreign Affairs welcomes your proposal for a conference, and will instruct Italian Ambassador to-night accordingly.

Austrian Ambassador has informed Italian Government this evening that Minister in Belgrade had been re-called, but that this did not imply declaration of war.

No. 36.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, Sir H. Rumbold, and Sir R. Rodd.

(Telegraphic.) FOREIGN OFFICE, July 26, 1914.

Would Minister for Foreign Affairs be disposed to instruct Ambassador here to join with representatives of France, Italy and Germany, and myself to meet here in conference immediately for the purpose of discovering an issue which would prevent complications? You should ask Minister for Foreign Affairs whether he would do this. If so, when bringing the above suggestion to the notice of the Governments to which they are accredited, representatives at Belgrade, Vienna and St. Petersburgh should be authorized to request that all active military operations should be suspended pending results of conference.

No. 37.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(Telegraphic.) FOREIGN OFFICE, July 26, 1914.

Berlin telegram of 25th July.*

It is important to know if France will agree to suggested action by the four Powers if necessary.

* See No. 18.

No. 38.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey. (Received July 27.)

SIR, ROME, July 23, 1914.

I gather that the Italian Government have bee nmade cognisant of the terms of the communication which will be addressed to Servia. Secretary-General, whom I saw this morning at the Italian Foreign Office, took the view that the gravity of the situation lay in the conviction of the Austro-Hungarian Government that it was absolutely necessary for their prestige, after the many disillusions which the turn of events in the Balkans has occasioned, to score a definite success.

I have, &c.

RENNELL RODD

No. 39.

Reply of Servian Government to Austro-Hungarian Noté.—(Communicated by the Servian Minister, July 27.)

Le Gouvernement Royal serbe a reçu la communication du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal du 10 de ce mois et il est persuadé que sa réponse éloignera tout le malentendu qui menace de gâter les bons rapports de voisinage entre la Monarchie austro-hongroise et le Royaume de Serbie.

Le Gouvernement Royal conscient que les protestations qui ont apparu tant de la tribune de la Skoupchtina nationale que dans les déclarations et les actes des représentants responsables de l'Etat, protestations qui furent coupées court par les déclarations du Gouvernement serbe, faites le 18 mars 1909, ne se sont plus renouvelées vis-à-vis de la grande Monarchie voisine en aucune occasion et que, depuis ce temps, autant de la part des Gouvernements Royaux qui se sont succédé que de la part de leurs organes, aucune tentative n'a été faite dans le but de changer l'état de choses politique et juridique créé en Bosnie et Herzégovine, le Gouvernement Royal constate que sous ce rapport le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal n'a fait aucune représentation, sauf en ce qui concerne un livre scolaire, et au sujet de laquelle le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal a reçu une explication entièrement satisfaisante. La Serbie a de nombreuses fois donné des preuves de sa politique modérée et modérée pendant la durée de la crise balkanique, et c'est grâce à la Serbie et au sacrifice qu'elle a fait dans l'intérêt exclusif de la paix européenne que cette paix a été préservée. Le Gouvernement Royal ne peut pas être rendu responsable pour les manifestations d'un caractère privé, telles que les articles des journaux et le travail paisible des sociétés, manifestations qui se produisent dans presque tous les pays comme une chose ordinaire et qui échappe, en règle générale, au contrôle officiel, d'autant moins que le Gouvernement Royal, lors de la solution de toute une

(Translation.)

The Royal Servian Government have received from the communication of the Imperial and Royal Government of the 10th instant, and are convinced that their reply will remove any misunderstanding which may threaten to impair the good neighbourly relations between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Kingdom of Servia.

Conscious of the fact that the protests which were made both from the tribune of the national Skuptchina and in the declarations and actions of the responsible representatives of the State—protests which were cut short by the declarations made by the Servian Government on the 18th March, 1909—have not been renewed on any occasion as regards the great neighbouring Monarchy, and that no attempt has been made since that time, either by the successive Royal Governments or by their organs, to change the political and legal state of affairs created in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Royal Government draw attention to the fact that in this connection the Imperial and Royal Government have made no representation except one concerning a school book, and that on that occasion the Imperial and Royal Government received on entirely satisfactory explanation. Servia has several times given proofs of her pacific and moderate policy during the Balkan crisis, and it is thanks to Servia and to the sacrifice that she has made in the exclusive interest of European peace that that peace has been preserved. The Royal Government cannot be held responsible for manifestations of a private character, such as articles in the press and the peaceable work of societies—manifestations which take place in nearly all countries in the ordinary course of events, and which as a general rule escape official control. The Royal Government are all the less responsible in view of the fact that at the time of the solution of a series of questions which arose between Servia and Austria-

série de questions qui se sont présentées entre la Serbie et l'Autriche-Hongrie, a montré une grande prévenance et a réussi, de cette façon à en régler le plus grand nombre au profit du progrès des deux pays voisins.

C'est pourquoi le Gouvernement Royal a été péniblement surpris par les affirmations, d'après lesquelles des personnes du Royaume de Serbie auraient participé à la préparation de l'attentat commis à Sarajevo; il s'attendait à ce qu'il soit invité à collaborer à la recherche de tout ce qui se rapporte à ce crime, et il était prêt, pour prouver son entière correction, à agir contre toutes les personnes à l'égard desquelles des communications lui seraient faites, se rendant donc au désir du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal est disposé à remettre au Tribunal tout sujet serbe, sans égard à sa situation et à son rang, pour la complicité duquel, dans le crime de Sarajevo, de preuves lui seraient fournies, et spécialement, il s'engage à faire publier à la première page du "Journal officiel" en date du 13 (26) juillet, l'énonciation suivante:

"Le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie condamne toute propagande qui serait dirigé contre l'Autriche-Hongrie, c'est-à-dire l'ensemble des tendances qui aspirent en dernier lieu à détacher de la Monarchie austro-hongroise des territoires qui en font partie, et il déplore sincèrement les conséquences funestes de ces agissements criminels. Le Gouvernement Royal regrette que certains officiers et fonctionnaires serbes aient participé, d'après la communication du Gouvernement Royal et Impérial, à la propagande susmentionnée, et compromis par là les relations de bon voisinage auxquelles le Gouvernement Royal serbe était solennellement engagé par sa déclaration du 31 mars 1909, qui désapprouve et répudie toute idée ou tentative d'une immixtion dans les destinées des habitants de quelque partie de l'Autriche-Hongrie que se soit, considère de son devoir d'avertir formellement les officiers et fonctionnaires et toute la population du royaume que, dorénavant, il pro-

Hungary they gave proof of a great readiness to oblige, and thus succeeded in settling the majority of these questions to the advantage of the two neighbouring countries.

For these reasons the Royal Government have been pained and surprised at the statements according to which members of the Kingdom of Servia are supposed to have participated in the preparations for the crime committed at Serajevo; the Royal Government expected to be invited to collaborate in an investigation of all that concerns this crime, and they were ready, in order to prove their attitude, to take measures against any persons concerning whom representations were made to them. Falling in, therefore, with the desire of the Imperial and Royal Government, they are prepared to hand over for trial any Servian subject, without regard to his situation or rank, of whose complicity in the crime of Serajevo proofs are forthcoming, and more especially they undertake to cause to be published on the first page of the "Journal officiel," on the date of the 13th (26th) July, the following declaration:—

"The Royal Government of Servia condemn all propaganda which may be directed against Austria-Hungary, that is to say, all such tendencies as aim at ultimately detaching from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy territories which form part thereof, and they sincerely deplore the baneful consequences of these criminal movements. The Royal Government regret that, according to the communication from the Imperial and Royal Government, certain Servian officers and officials should have taken part in the abovementioned propaganda, and thus compromised the good neighbourly relations to which the Royal Servian Government was solemnly engaged by the declaration of the 31st March, 1909, which declaration disapproves and repudiates all idea or attempt at interference with the destiny of the inhabitants of any part of Austria-Hungary, and they consider it their duty formally to warn the officers, officials, and entire population of the kingdom that

cédera avec la dernière rigueur contre les personnes qui se rendraient coupables de pareils agissements, qu'il mettra tous ses efforts à prévenir et à réprimer."

Cette énonciation sera portée à la connaissance de l'armée Royale par un ordre du jour, au nom de Sa Majesté le Roi, par Son Altesse Royale le Prince héritier Alexandre, et sera publié dans le prochain bulletin officiel de l'armée.

Le Gouvernement Royal s'engage en outre:

1. D'introduire dans la première convocation régulière de la Skoupchtina une disposition dans la loi de la presse, par laquelle sera punie de la manière la plus sévère la provocation à la haine et au mépris de la Monarchie austro-hongroise, ainsi que contre toute publication dont la tendance générale serait dirigée contre l'intégrité territoriale de l'Autriche-Hongrie. Il se charge, lors de la révision de la Constitution, qui est prochaine, à faire introduire dans l'article 22 de la Constitution un amendement de telle sorte que les publications ci-dessus puissent être confisquées, ce qui actuellement aux termes catégoriques de l'article 22 de la Constitution est impossible.

2. Le Gouvernement ne possède aucune preuve et la note du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal ne lui en fournit non plus aucune que la société "Narodna Odbrana" et autres sociétés similaires aient commis, jusqu'à ce jour quelques actes criminels de ce genre, par le fait d'un de leurs membres. Néanmoins, le Gouvernement Royal acceptera la demande du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal et dissoudra la société "Narodna Odbrana" et toute autre société qui agirait contre l'Autriche-Hongrie.

3. Le Gouvernement Royal serbe s'engage à éliminer sans délais de l'instruction publique en Serbie dans ce qui sert ou pourrait servir à fomenter la propagande contre l'Autriche-Hongrie, quand le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal lui fournira des faits et des preuves de cette propagande.

henceforth they will take the most rigorous steps against all such persons as are guilty of such acts, to prevent and to repress which they will use their utmost endeavour."

This declaration will be brought to the knowledge of the Royal Army in an order of the day, in the name of His Majesty the King, by His Royal Highness the Crown Prince Alexander, and will be published in the next official army bulletin.

The Royal Government further undertake: —

1. To introduce at the first regular convocation of the Skuptchina a provision into the press law providing for the most severe punishment of incitement to hatred or contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and for taking action against any publication the general tendency of which is directed against the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary. The Government engage at the approaching revision of the Constitution to cause an amendment to be introduced into article 22 of the Constitution of such a nature that such publication may be confiscated, a proceeding at present impossible under the categorical terms of article 22 of the Constitution.

2. The Government possess no proof, nor does the note of the Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with any, that the "Narodna Odbrana" and other similar societies have committed up to the present any criminal act of this nature through the proceedings of any of their members. Nevertheless, the Royal Government will accept the demand of the Imperial and Royal Government, and will dissolve the "Narodna Odbrana" Society and every other society which may be directing its efforts against Austria-Hungary.

3. The Royal Servian Government undertake to remove without delay from their public educational establishments in Serva all that serves or could serve to foment propaganda against Austria-Hungary, whenever the Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with facts and proofs of this propaganda.

4. Le Gouvernement Royal accepte de même à éloigner du service militaire ceux pour qui l'enquête judiciaire aura prouvé qu'ils sont coupables d'actes dirigés contre l'intégrité du territoire de la Monarchie austro-hongroise, et il attend que le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal lui communique ultérieurement les noms et les faits de ces officiers et fonctionnaires aux fins de la procédure qui doit s'ensuivre.

5. Le Gouvernement Royal doit avouer qu'il ne se rend pas clairement compte du sens et de la portée de la demande du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal que la Serbie s'engage à accepter sur son territoire la collaboration des organes du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal, mais il déclare qu'il admettra la collaboration qui répondrait aux principes du droit international et à la procédure criminelle ainsi qu'aux bons rapports de voisinage.

6. Le Gouvernement Royal, cela va de soi, considère de son devoir d'ouvrir une enquête contre tous ceux qui sont ou qui, éventuellement, auraient été mêlés au complot du 15 juin, et qui se trouveraient sur le territoire du royaume. Quant à la participation à cette enquête des agents ou autorités austro-hongrois qui seraient délégués à cet effet par le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal, le Gouvernement Royal ne peut pas l'accepter, car ce serait une violation de la Constitution et de la loi sur la procédure criminelle; cependant dans des cas concrets des communications sur les résultats de l'instruction en question pourraient être données aux agents austro-hongrois.

7. Le Gouvernement Royal a fait procéder, dès le soir même de la remise de la note, à l'arrestation du Commandant Voïslav Tankossitch. Quant à Milan Ziganovitch, qui est sujet de la Monarchie austro-hongroise et qui jusqu'au 15 juin était employé (comme aspirant) à la direction des chemins de fer, il n'a pas pu encore être arrêté.

Le Gouvernement austro-hongrois est prié de vouloir bien, dans la forme accoutumée, faire connaître le plus tôt possible, les présomptions de culpabilité ainsi que les preuves éventuelles de leur culpa-

4. The Royal Government also agree to remove from military service all such persons as the judicial enquiry may have proved to be guilty of acts directed against the integrity of the territory of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and they expect the Imperial and Royal Government to communicate to them at a later date the names and the acts of these officers and officials for the purposes of the proceedings which are to be taken against them.

5. The Royal Government must confess that they do not clearly grasp the meaning or the scope of the demand made by the Imperial and Royal Government that Servia shall undertake to accept the collaboration of the organs of the Imperial and Royal Government upon their territory, but they declare that they will admit such collaboration as agrees with the principle of international law, with criminal procedure, and with good neighbourly relations.

6. It goes without saying that the Royal Government consider it their duty to open an enquiry against all such persons as are, or eventually may be, implicated in the plot of the 15th June, and who happen to be within territory of the kingdom. As regards the participation in this enquiry of Austro-Hungarian agents or authorities appointed for this purpose by the Imperial and Royal Government, the Royal Government cannot accept such an agreement, as it would be a violation of the Constitution and of the law of criminal procedure; nevertheless, in concrete cases communications as to the results of the investigation in question might be given to the Austro-Hungarian agents.

7. The Royal Government proceeded on the very evening of the delivery of the note, to arrest Commandant Voislav Tankossitch. As regards Milan Ziganovitch, who is a subject of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and who up to the 15th June was employed (on probation) by the directorate of railways, it has not yet been possible to arrest him.

The Austro-Hungarian Government are requested to be so good as to supply as soon as possible, in the customary form, the presumptive evidence of guilt, as well as the eventual proofs of guilt which have

bilité qui ont été recueillies jusqu'à ce jour par l'enquête à Sarajevo, aux fins d'enquête ultérieure.

8. Le Gouvernement serbe renforcera et étendra les mesures prises pour empêcher le trafic illicite d'armes et d'explosifs à travers la frontière. Il va de soi qu'il ordonnera de suite une enquête et punira sévèrement les fonctionnaires des frontières sur la ligne Schabatz-Loznitza qui ont manqué à leurs devoirs et laissé passé les auteurs du crime de Sarajevo.

9. Le Gouvernement Royal donnera volontiers des explications sur les propos que ses fonctionnaires, tant en Serbie qu'à l'étranger, ont eu après l'attentat dans des entrevues et qui, d'après l'affirmation du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal, ont été hostiles envers la Monarchie, dès que le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal lui aura communiqué les passages en question de ces propos, et dès qu'il aura démontré que les propos employés ont, en effet, été tenus par lesdits fonctionnaires, quoique le Gouvernement Royal lui-même aura soin de recueillir des preuves et convictions.

10. Le Gouvernement Royal informera le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal de l'exécution des mesures comprises dans les points précédents en tant que cela n'a pas été déjà fait par la présente note, aussitôt que chaque mesure aura été ordonnée et exécutée.

Dans le cas où le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal ne serait pas satisfait de cette réponse, le Gouvernement serbe, considérant qu'il est de l'intérêt commun de ne pas précipiter la solution de cette question, est prêt comme toujours d'accepter une entente pacifique, soit en remettant cette question à la décision du Tribunal international de la Haye, soit aux Grandes Puissances qui ont pris part à l'élaboration de la déclaration que le Gouvernement serbe a faite le 18 (31) mars 1909.

Belgrade, July 12 (25), 1914.

been collected up to the present, at the enquiry at Serajevo for the purpose of the later enquiry.

8. The Servian Government will reinforce and extend the measures which have been taken for preventing the illicit traffic of arms and explosives across the frontier. It goes without saying that they will immediately order an enquiry and will severely punish the frontier officials on the Schabatz-Loznitza line who have failed in their duty and allowed the authors of the crime of Serajevo to pass.

9. The Royal Government will gladly give explanations of the remarks made by their officials, whether in Servia or abroad, in interviews after the crime and which acording to the statement of the Imperial and Royal Government were hostile towards the Monarchy, as soon as the Imperial and Royal Government have communicated to them the passages in question in these remarks, and as soon as they have shown that the remarks were actually made by the said officials although the Royal Government will itself take steps to collect evidence and proofs.

10. The Royal Government will inform the Imperial and Royal Government of the execution of the measures comprised under the above heads, in so far as this has not already been done by the present note, as soon as each measure has been ordered and carried out.

If the Imperial and Royal Government are not satisfied with this reply, the Servian Government, considering that it is not to the common interest to precipitate the solution of this question, are ready, as always, to accept a pacific understanding either by referring this question to the decision of the International Tribunal of The Hague, or to the Great Powers which took part in the drawing up of the declaration made by the Servian Government on the 18th (31st) March, 1909.

Belgrade, July 19 (25), 1914.

No. 40.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 27.)

(Telegraphic.) VIENNA, July 26, 1914.

Russian Ambassador just returned from leave thinks that Austro-Hungarian Government are determined on war, and that it is impossible for Russia to remain indifferent. He does not propose to press for more time in the sense of your telegram of the 25th instant* (last paragraph).

When the repetition of your telegram of the 26th instant to Paris† arrived, I had the French and Russian Ambassadors both with me. They expressed great satisfaction with its contents, which I communicated to them. They doubted, however, whether the principle of Russia being an interested party entitled to have a say in the settlement of a purely Austro-Servian dispute would be accepted by either the Austro-Hungarian or the German Government.

Instructions were also given to the Italian Ambassador to support the request of the Russian Government that the time limit should be postponed. They arrived, however, too late for any useful action to be taken.

* See No. 26 † See No. 36

No. 41.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 27.)

(Telegraphic.) VIENNA, July 27, 1914.

I have had conversations with all my colleagues representing the Great Powers. The impression left on my mind is that the Austro-Hungarian note was so drawn up as to make war inevitable; that the Austro-Hungarian Government are fully resolved to have war with Servia; that they consider their position as a Great Power to be at stake; and that until punishment has been administered to Servia it is unlikely that they will listen to proposals of mediation. This country has gone wild with joy at the prospect of war with Servia, and its postponement or prevention would undoubtedly be a great disappointment.

I propose, subject to any special directions you desire to send me, to express to the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs the hope of His Majesty's Government that it may yet be possible to avoid war, and to ask his Excellency whether he cannot suggest a way out even now.

No. 42.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

PARIS, July 27, 1914.

Your proposal, as stated in your two telegrams of yesterday,* is accepted by the French Government. French Ambassador in London, who returns there this evening, has been instructed accordingly. Instructions have been sent to the French Ambassador at Berlin to concert with his British colleague as to the advisability of their speaking jointly to the German Government. Necessary instructions have also been sent to the French representatives at Belgrade, Vienna, and St. Petersburgh, but until it is known that the Germans have spoken at Vienna with some success, it would, in the opinion of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, be dangerous for the French, Russian, and British Ambassadors to do so.

* Nos. 36 and 37.

No. 43.

Sir F. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

BERLIN, July 27, 1914.

Your telegram of 26th July.*

Secretary of State says that conference you suggest would practically amount to a court of arbitration and could not, in his opinion, be called together except at the request of Austria and Russia. He could not therefore fall in with your suggestion, desirous though he was to co-operate for the maintenance of peace. I said I was sure that your idea had nothing to do with arbitration, but meant that representatives of the four nations not directly interested should discuss and suggest means for avoiding a dangerous situation. He maintained, however, that such a conference as you proposed was not practicable. He added that news he had just received from St. Petersburgh showed that there was an intention on the part of M. de Sazanof to exchange views with Count Berchtold. He thought that this method of procedure might lead to a satisfactory result, and that it would be best, before doing anything else, to await outcome of the exchange of views between the Austrian and Russian Governments.

In the course of a short conversation Secretary of State said that as yet Austria was only partially mobilising, but that if Russia mobilised against Germany latter would have to follow suit. I asked him what he meant by "mobilising against Germany." He said that if Russia only mobilised in south, Germany would not mobilise, but if she mobilise in north, Germany would have to do so too, and Russian system of mobilisation was so complicated that it might be difficult exactly to locate her mobilisation. Germany would therefore have to be very careful not to be taken by surprise.

Finally, Secretary of State said that news from St. Petersburgh had caused him to take more hopeful view of the general situation.

* See No. 36.

No. 44.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

ST. PETERSBURGH, July 27, 1914.

Austrian Ambassador tried, in a long conversation which he had yesterday with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, to explain away objectionable features of the recent action taken by the Austro-Hungarian Government. Minister for Foreign Affairs pointed out that, although he perfectly understood Austria's motives, the ultimatum had been so drafted that it could not possibly be accepted as a whole by the Servian Government. Although the demands were reasonable enough in some cases, others not only could not possibly be put into immediate execution seeing that they entailed revision of existing Servian laws, but were, moreover, incompatible with Servia's dignity as an independent State. It would be useless for Russia to offer her good offices at Belgrade, in view of the fact that she was the object of such suspicion in Austria. In order, however, to put an end to the present tension, he thought that England and Italy might be willing to collaborate with Austria. The Austrian Ambassador undertook to communicate his Excellency's remarks to his Government.

On the Minister of Foreign Affairs questioning me, I told him that I had correctly defined the attitude of His Majesty's Government in my conversation with

him, which I reported in my telegram of the 24th instant.* I added that you could not promise to do anything more, and that his Excellency was mistaken if he believed that the cause of peace could be promoted by our telling the German Government that they would have to deal with us as well as with Russia and France if they supported Austria by force of arms. Their attitude would merely be stiffened by such a menace, and we could only induce her to use her influence at Vienna to avert war by approaching her in the capacity of a friend who was anxious to preserve peace. His Excellency must not, if our efforts were to be successful, do anything to precipitate a conflict. In these circumstances I trusted that the Russian Government would defer mobilisation ukase for as long as possible, and that troops would not be allowed to cross the frontier even when it was issued.

In reply the Minister for Foreign Affairs told me that until the issue of the Imperial ukase no effective steps towards mobilisation could be taken, and the Austro-Hungarian Government would profit by delay in order to complete her military preparations if it was deferred too long.

* See No. 6.

No. 45.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 27.)

(Telegraphic.) ST. PETERSBURGH, July 27, 1914.

Since my conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, as reported in my telegram of to-day,* I understand that his Excellency has proposed that the modifications to be introduced into Austrian demands should be the subject of direct conversation between Vienna and St. Petersburgh.

* See No. 44

No. 46.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(Telegraphic.) FOREIGN OFFICE, July 27, 1914.

German Ambassador has informed me that German Government accept in principle mediation between Austria and Russia by the four Powers, reserving, of course ,their right as an ally to help Austria if attacked. He has also instructed to request me to use influence in St. Petersburgh to localise the war and to keep up the peace of Europe.

I have replied that the Servian reply went farther than could have been expected to meet the Austrian demands. German Secretary of State has himself said that there were some things in the Austrian note that Servia could hardly be expected to accept. I assumed that Servian reply could not have gone as far at it did unless Russia had exercised conciliatory influence at Belgrade, and it was really at Vienna that moderating influence was now required. If Austria put the Servian reply aside as being worth nothing and marched into Servia, it meant that she was determined to crush Servia at all costs, being reckless of the consequences that might be involved. Servian reply should at least be treated as a basis for discussion and pause. I said German Government should urge this at Vienna.

I recalled what German Government had said as to the gravity of the situation if the war could not be localised, and observed that if Germany assisted Austria against Russia it would be because, without any reference to the merits of the dis-

pute, Germany could not afford to see Austria crushed. Just so other issues might be raised that would supersede the dispute between Austria and Servia, and would bring other Powers in, and the war would be the biggest ever known; but as long as Germany would work to keep the peace I would keep closely in touch. I repeated that after the Servian reply it was at Vienna that some moderation must be urged.

No. 47.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.) FOREIGN OFFICE, July 27, 1914.

See my telegram of to-day to Sir E. Goschen*

I have been told by the Russian Ambassador that in German and Austrian circles impression prevails that in any event we would stand aside. His Excellency deplored the effect that such an impression must produce.

This impression ought, as I have pointed out, to be dispelled by the orders we have given to the First Fleet, which is concentrated, as it happens, at Portland, not to disperse for manoeuvre leave. But I explained to the Russian Ambassador that my reference to it must not be taken to mean that anything more than diplomatic action was promised.

We hear from German and Austrian sources that they believe Russia will take no action so long as Austria agrees not to take Servian territory. I pointed this out, and added that it should be absurd if we were to appear more Servian than the Russians in our dealings with the German and Austrian Governments.

* See No. 37.

No. 48.

Sir E. Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

FOREIGN OFFICE, July 27, 1914.

SIR,—Count Mensdorff told me by instruction to-day that the Servian Government had not accepted the demands which the Austrian Government were obliged to address to them in order to secure permanently the most vital Austrian interests. Servia showed that she did not intend to abandon her subversive aims, tending towards continuous disorder in the Austrian frontier territories and their final disruption from the Austrian Monarchy. Very reluctantly, and against their wish, the Austrian Government were compelled to take more severe measures to enforce a fundamental change of the attitude of enmity pursued up to now by Servia. As the British Government knew, the Austrian Government had for many years endeavoured to find a way to get on with their turbulent neighbour, though this had been made very difficult for them by the continuous provocations of Servia. The Serajevo murder had made clear to everyone what appalling consequences the Servian propaganda had already produced, and what a permanent threat to Austria it involved. We would understand that the Austrian Government must consider that the moment had arrived to obtain, by means of the strongest pressure, guarantees for the definite suppression of the Servian aspirations and for the security of peace and order on the south-eastern frontier of Austria. As the peaceable means to this effect were exhausted the Austrian Government must at last appeal to force. They had not taken this decision without reluctance. Their action which had no sort of aggressive tendency could not be represented otherwise than as an act of self-defence. Also they thought that they would serve a European interest if they prevented Servia

from being henceforth an element of general unrest such as she had been for the last ten years. The high sense of justice of the British nation and of British statesmen could not blame the Austrian Government if the latter defended by the sword what was theirs and cleared up their position with a country whose hostile policy had forced upon them for years measures so costly as to have gravely injured Austrian national prosperity. Finally the Austrian Government confiding in their amicable relations with us felt that they could count on our sympathy in a fight that was forced on them and on our assistance in localizing the fight if necessary.

Count Mensdorff added on his own account that as long as Servia was confronted with Turkey, Austria never took very severe measures because of her adherence to the policy of the free development of the Balkan States. Now that Servia had doubled her territory and population without any Austrian interference, the repression of Servian subversive aims was a matter of self-defence and self-preservation on Austria's part. He reiterated that Austria had no intention of taking Servian territory or aggressive designs against Servian territory.

I said that I could not understand the construction put by the Austrian Government upon the Servian reply, and I told Count Mensdorff the substance of the conversation that I had had with the German Ambassador this morning about that reply.

Count Mensdorff admitted that, on paper, the Servian reply might seem to be satisfactory; but the Servians had refused the one thing—the co-operation of Austrian officials and police—which would be a real guarantee that in practice the Servians would not carry on their subversive campaign against Austria.

I said that it seemed to me as if the Austrian Government believed that, even after the Servian reply, they could make war upon Servia anyhow, without risk of bringing Russia into the dispute. If they could make war on Servia and at the same time satisfy Russia, well and good; but, if not, the consequences would be incalculable. I pointed out to him that I quoted this phrase from an expression of the views of the German Government. I feared that it would be expected in St. Petersburgh that the Servian reply would diminish the tension, and now, when Russia found that there was increased tension, the situation would become increasingly serious. Already the effect on Europe was one of anxiety. I pointed out that our fleet was to have dispersed to-day, but we had felt unable to let it disperse. We should not think of calling up reserves at this moment, and there was no menace in what we had done about our fleet; but, owing to the possibility of a European conflagration, it was impossible for us to disperse our forces at this moment. I gave this as an illustration of the anxiety that was felt. It seemed to me that the Servian reply already involved the greatest humiliation to Servia that I had ever seen a country undergo, and it was very disappointing to me that the reply was treated by the Austrian Government as if it were as unsatisfactory as a blank negative.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

No. 49.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

FOREIGN OFFICE, July 27, 1914.

SIR,—The Italian Ambassador informed Sir A. Nicolson to-day that the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs agreed entirely with my proposal for a conference of four to be held in London.

As regards the question of asking Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Servia to suspend military operations pending the result of the conference, the Marquis di San Giuliano

would recommend the suggestion warmly to the German Government, and would enquire what procedure they would propose should be followed at Vienna.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

No. 50.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 31.)

VIENNA, July 28, 1914.

SIR,—I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of the Austro-Hungarian note announcing the declaration of war against Servia.

I have, &c.,

MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

(Enclosure in No. 50.)

Copy of Note verbale, dated Vienna, July 28, 1914.

Pour mettre fin aux menées subversives partant de Belgrade et dirigées contre l'intégrité territoriale de la Monarchie austro-hongroise, le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal a fait parvenir à la date du 23 juillet 1914, au Gouvernement Royal de Serbie une note dans laquelle se trouvait formulée une série de demandes pour l'acceptation desquelles un délai de quarante-huit heures a été accordé au Gouvernement Royal. Le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie n'ayant pas répondu à cette note d'une manière satisfaisante, le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal se trouve dans la nécessité de pourvoir lui-même à la sauvegarde de ses droits et intérêts et de recourir à cet effet à la force des armes.

L'Autriche-Hongrie, qui vient d'adresser à la Serbie une déclaration formelle conformément à l'article 1er de la convention du 18 octobre 1907, relative à l'ouverture des hostilités, se considère dès lors en état de guerre avec la Serbie.

En portant ce qui précède à la connaissance de l'Ambassade Royale de Grande-Bretagne le Ministère des Affaires Etrangères a l'honneur de déclarer que l'Autriche-Hongrie se conformera au cours des hostilités, sous la réserve d'un procédé analogue de la part de la Serbie, aux sti-

(Translation.)

In order to bring to an end the subversive intrigues originating from Belgrade and aimed at the territorial integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the Imperial and Royal Government has delivered to the Royal Servian Government a note in which a series of demands were formulated, for the acceptance of which a delay of forty-eight hours has been granted to the Royal Government. The Royal Servian Government not having answered this note in a satisfactory manner, the Imperial and Royal Government are themselves compelled to see to the safeguarding of their rights and interests, and, with this object, to have recourse to force of arms.

Austria-Hungary, who has just addressed to Servia a formal declaration, in conformity with article 1 of the convention of the 18th October, 1907, relative to the opening of hostilities, considers herself henceforward in a state of war with Servia.

In bringing the above to notice of His Britannic Majesty's Embassy, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs has the honour to declare that Austria-Hungary will act during the hostilities in conformity with the terms of the Conventions of the Hague of the 18th October, 1907, as also

pulations des conventions de La Haye du 18 octobre 1907, ainsi qu'à celles de la Déclaration de Londres du 26 février 1909.

L'Ambassade est priée de vouloir bien communiquer, d'urgence, la présente notification à son Gouvernement.

with those of the Declaration of London of the 26th February, 1909, provided an analogous procedure is adopted by Servia.

The embassy is requested to be so good as to communicate the present notification as soon as possible to the British Government.

No. 51.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey. (Received July 28.)

PARIS, July 27, 1914.

SIR,—I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a memorandum from the acting Minister for Foreign Affairs as to the steps to be taken to prevent an outbreak of hostilities between Austria-Hungary and Servia.

I have, &c.,

FRANCIS BERTIE.

(Enclosure in No. 51.)

Note communicated to Sir F. Bertie by M. Bienvenu-Martin.

Par une note en date du 25 de ce mois, son Excellence l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre a fait connaître au Gouvernement de la République que, d'après sir Edward Grey, la seule manière d'assurer, si c'était possible, le maintien de la paix dans le cas où les rapports entre la Russie et l'Autriche deviendraient plus tendus serait une démarche commune à Vienne et à Saint-Pétersbourg des représentants de l'Angleterre, de la France, de l'Allemagne et de l'Italie en Autriche et en Russie; et il a exprimé le désir de savoir si le Gouvernement de la République était disposé à accueillir favorablement cette suggestion.

Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères par intérim a l'honneur de faire connaître à Son Excellence Sir Francis Bertie qu'il a invité M. Jules Cambon à se concerter avec l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre en Allemagne et à appuyer la démarche qu'ils jugeront opportune de faire auprès du Cabinet de Berlin.

Le Gouvernement de la République a, d'autre part, conformément au désir exprimé par le Gouvernement britannique

(Translation.)

In a note of the 25th of this month, His Excellency the British Ambassador informed the Government of the Republic that, in Sir E. Grey's opinion, the only possible way of assuring the maintenance of peace in case of the relations between Russia and Austria becoming more strained would be if the representatives of Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy in Austria and Russia were to take joint action; and he expressed the wish to know if the Government of the Republic were prepared to welcome favourably suggestion.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs *ad interim* has the honour to inform his Excellency Sir. F. Bertie that he has requested M. Jules Cambon to concert with the British Ambassador in Germany and to support any representation which they may consider it advisable to make to the Berlin Cabinet.

In accordance with the desire expressed by the British Government and conveyed to them by Sir F. Bertie in his note of

et que son Excellence Sir Francis Bertie lui a transmis par une note en date du 26 de ce mois, autorisé M. Paul Cambon à prendre part à la réunion proposée par Sir Edward Grey pour rechercher avec lui et les Ambassadeurs d'Allemagne et d'Italie à Londres, les moyens de résoudre les difficultés actuelles.

Le Gouvernement de la République est prêt également à donner aux agents français à Saint-Pétersbourg, à Vienne et à Belgrade des instructions pour qu'ils obtiennent des Gouvernements russe, autrichien et serbe de s'abstenir de toute opération militaire active en attendant les résultats de cette conférence. Il estime toutefois que les chances de succès de la proposition de Sir Edward Grey reposent essentiellement sur l'action que Berlin serait disposée à Vienne (*sic*). Une démarche auprès du Gouvernement austro-hongrois pour amener la suspension des opérations militaires paraît vouée à l'échec si l'influence de l'Allemagne ne s'est pas exercée au préalable sur le Cabinet de Vienne.

Le Garde des Sceaux, Président du Conseil et Ministre des Affaires Etrangères par intérim, saisit cette occasion de renouveler, &c.

PARIS, le 27 juillet 1914.

the 26th of this month, the Government of the Republic have also authorized M. Paul Cambon to take part in the conference which Sir E. Grey has proposed with a view to discovering a means of settling the present difficulties.

The Government of the Republic is likewise ready to instruct the representatives at St. Petersburgh, Vienna, and Belgrade to induce the Russian, Austrian, and Servian Governments to abstain from all active military operations pending the results of this conference. He considers, however, that the chance of Sir E. Grey's proposal being successful depends essentially on the action which the Berlin Government would be willing to take at Vienna. Representations made to the Austrian-Hungarian Government for the purpose of bringing about a suspension of military operations would seem bound to fail unless the German Government do not beforehand exercise their influence on the Vienna Cabinet.

The President of the Council *ad interim* takes the opportunity, &c.

PARIS, July 27, 1914.

No. 52.

Note communicated by French Embassy, July 28, 1914.

Le Gouvernement de la République accepte la proposition de Sir Edward Grey relative à une intervention de la Grande-Bretagne, de la France, de l'Allemagne et de l'Italie en vue d'éviter les opérations militaires actives sur les frontières autrichiennes, russes et serbes; il a autorisé M. P. Cambon à prendre part aux délibérations de la réunion à quatre, qui doit se tenir à Londres.

L'Ambassadeur de France à Berlin a reçu pour instructions, après s'être concerté avec l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre à Berlin, d'appuyer la démarche de ce dernier dans la forme et la mesure qui seraient jugées opportunes.

(Translation.)

The Government of the Republic accepts Sir Edward Grey's proposal in regard to intervention by Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy with a view to avoiding active military operations on the frontiers of Austria, Russia, and Servia; and they have authorized M. P. Cambon to take part in the deliberations of the four representatives at the meeting which is to be held in London.

The French Ambassador in Berlin has received instructions to consult first the British Ambassador in Berlin, and then to support the action taken by the latter in such manner and degree as may be considered appropriate.

M. Viviani est prêt à envoyer aux représentants français à Vienne, Saint-Pétersbourg et Belgrade des instructions dans le sens suggéré par le Gouvernement britannique.

M. Viviani is ready to send to the representatives of France in Vienna, St. Petersburgh, and Belgrade instructions in the same sense suggested by the British Government.

No. 53.

M. Sazonof to Count Benckendorff.—(Communicated by Count Benckendorff, July 28.)

(Translation.)

SAINT-PÉTERSBOURG.

(Télégraphique.) le 14 (27) juillet 1914.

L'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre est venu s'informer si nous jugeons utile que l'Angleterre prenne l'initiative de convoquer à Londres une conférence des représentants de l'Angleterre, la France, l'Allemagne et l'Italie, pour étudier une issue à la situation actuelle.

J'ai répondu à l'Ambassadeur que j'ai entamé des pourparlers avec l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie, en conditions que j'espère favorables. Pourtant je n'ai pas encore reçu de réponse à la proposition que j'ai faite d'une revision de la note entre les deux Cabinets.

Si des explications directes avec le Cabinet de Vienne se trouvaient irréalisables, je suis prêt à accepter la proposition anglaise, ou toute autre de nature à résoudre favorablement le conflit.

Je voudrais pourtant écarter dès aujourd'hui un malentendu qui pourrait surgir de la réponse donnée par le Ministre de la Justice français à l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, concernant des conseils de modération à donner au Cabinet Impérial.

ST. PETERSBURGH, July 27, 1914.

(Telegraphic.)

The British Ambassador came to ascertain whether we think it desirable that Great Britain should take the initiative in convoking a conference in London of the representatives of England, France, Germany, and Italy to examine the possibility of a way out of the present situation.

I replied to the Ambassador that I have begun conversations with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador under conditions which, I hope, may be favourable. I have not, however, received as yet any reply to the proposal made by me for revising the note between the two Cabinets.

If direct explanations with the Vienna Cabinet were to prove impossible, I am ready to accept the British proposal, or any other proposal of a kind that would bring about a favourable solution of the conflict.

I wish, however, to put an end from this day forth to a misunderstanding which might arise from the answer given by the French Minister of Justice to the German Ambassador, regarding counsels of moderation to be given to the Imperial Cabinet.

No. 54.

M. Sazonof to Count Benckendorff. (Communicated by Count Benckendorff, July 28, 1914.)

(Translation.)

Saint-Pétersbourg,
(Télégraphique.) le 15 (28) juillet 1914.

Mes entretiens avec l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne confirment mon impression que l'Allemagne est plutôt favorable à l'intransigeance de l'Autriche.

Le Cabinet de Berlin, qui aurait pu arrêter tout le développement de la crise, paraît n'exercer aucune action sur son alliée.

L'Ambassadeur trouve insuffisante la réponse de la Serbie.

Cette attitude allemande est tout particulièrement alarmante.

Il me semble que mieux que toute autre Puissance l'Angleterre serait en mesure de tenter encore d'agir à Berlin pour engager le Gouvernement allemand à l'action nécessaire. C'est à Berlin qu'indubitablement se trouve la clef de la situation.

St. Petersburgh,
July 15 (28), 1914.

(Telegraphic.)

My interviews with the German Ambassador confirm my impression that Germany is, if anything, in favour of the uncomprimising attitude adopted by Austria.

The Berlin Cabinet, who could have prevented the whole of this crisis developing, appear to be exerting no influence on their ally.

The Ambassador considers that the Servian reply is insufficient.

This attitude of the German Government is most alarming.

It seems to me that England is in a better position than any other Power to make another attempt at Berlin to induce the German Government to take the necessary action. There is no doubt that the key of the situation is to be found at Berlin.

No. 55.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey. (Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburgh, July 27, 1914.

With reference to my telegram of yesterday,* I saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon and found him very conciliatory and more optimistic.

He would, he said, use all his influence at Belgrade to induce the Servian Government to go as far as possible in giving satisfaction to Austria, but her territorial integrity must be guaranteed and her rights as a sovereign State respected, so that she should not become Austria's vassal. He did not know whether Austria would accept friendly exchange of views which he had proposed, but, if she did, he wished to keep in close contact with the other Powers throughout the conversations that would ensue.

He again referred to the fact that the obligations undertaken by Servia in 1908, alluded to in the Austrian ultimatum, were given to the Powers.

I asked if he had heard of your proposal with regard to conference of the four Powers, and on his replying in the affirmative, I told him confidentially of your instructions to me, and enquired whether instead of such a conference he would prefer a direct exchange of views, which he had proposed. The German Ambassador, to whom I had just spoken, had expressed his personal opinion that a direct exchange of views would be more agreeable to Austria-Hungary.

* No. 41

His Excellency said he was perfectly ready to stand aside if the Powers accepted the proposal for a conference, but he trusted that you would keep in touch with the Russian Ambassador in the event of its taking place.

No. 56.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)

VIENNA, July 27, 1914.

(Telegraphic.)

The Russian Ambassador had to-day a long and earnest conversation with Baron Macchio, the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. He told him that having just come back from St. Petersburgh, he was well acquainted with the views of the Russian Government and the state of Russian public opinion. He could assure him that if actual war broke out with Servia it would be impossible to locate it, for Russia was not prepared to give way again, as she had done on previous occasions, and especially during the annexation crisis of 1909. He earnestly hoped that something would be done before Servia was actually invaded. Baron Macchio replied that this would now be difficult, as a skirmish had already taken place on the Danube, in which the Servians had been the aggressors. The Russian Ambassador said that he would do all he could to keep the Servians quiet pending any discussions that might yet take place, and he told me that would advise his Government to induce the Servian Government to avoid any conflict as long as possible, and to fall back before an Austrian advance. Time so gained should suffice to enable a settlement to be reached. He had just heard of a satisfactory conversation which the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had yesterday with the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh. The former had agreed that much of the Austro-Hungarian note to Servia had been perfectly reasonable, and in fact they had practically reached an understanding as to the guarantees which Servia might reasonably be asked to give to Austria-Hungary for her future good behaviour. The Russian Ambassador urged that the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh should be furnished with full powers to continue discussion with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was very willing to advise Servia to yield all that could be fairly asked of her as an independent Power. Baron Macchio promised to submit this suggestion to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

No. 57.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)

ROME, July 27, 1914.

(Telegraphic.)

Minister for Foreign Affairs greatly doubts whether Germany will be willing to invite Austria to suspend military action pending the conference, but he had hopes that military action may be practically deferred by the fact of the conference meeting at once. As at present informed, he sees no possibility of Austria receding from any point laid down in her note to Servia, but he believes that if Servia will even now accept it Austria will be satisfied, and if she had reason to think that such will be the advice of the Powers, Austria may defer action. Servia may be induced to accept note in its entirety on the advice of the four Powers invited to the conference, and this would enable her to say that she had yielded to Europe and not to Austria-Hungary alone.

Telegrams from Vienna to the press here stating that Austria is favourably impressed with the declarations of the Italian Government have, the Minister for Foreign Affairs assures me, no foundation. He said he has expressed no opinion to Austria with regard to the note. He assured me both before and after communication of the note, and again to-day, that Austrian Government have given him assurances that they demand no territorial sacrifices from Servia.

No. 58.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)

PARIS, July 28, 1914.

(Telegraphic.)

I communicated to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon the substance of your conversation with the German Ambassador, recorded in your telegram* to Berlin of the 27th July.

His Excellency is grateful for the communication. He said that it confirms what he had heard of your attitude, and he feels confident that your observations to the German Ambassador will have a good effect in the interest of peace.

*See No. 16.

No. 59.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)

PARIS, July 28, 1914.

(Telegraphic.)

I informed the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day of your conversation with the Russian Ambassador, as recorded in your telegram of yesterday* to St. Petersburgh.

He is grateful for the communication, and quite appreciates the impossibility for His Majesty's Government to declare themselves "solidaires" with Russia on a question between Austria and Servia, which in its present condition is not one affecting England. He also sees that you cannot take up an attitude at Berlin and Vienna more Servian than that attributed in German and Austrian sources to the Russian Government.

German Ambassador has stated that Austria would respect the integrity of Servia, but when asked whether her independence also would be respected, he gave no assurance.

*See No. 17.

No. 60.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.) BERLIN, July 28, 1914.

Secretary of State spoke yesterday in the same sense as that reported in my telegram of yesterday* to my French and Italian colleagues respecting your proposal. I discussed with my two colleagues this morning his reply, and we found that, while

* See No. 43.

refusing the proposed conference, he had said to all of us that nevertheless he desired to work with us for the maintenance of general peace. We therefore deduced that if he is sincere in this wish he can only be objecting to the form of your proposal. Perhaps he himself could be induced to suggest lines on which he would find it possible to work with us.

No. 61.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.) VIENNA, July 28, 1914.

I saw Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning.

His Excellency declared that Austria-Hungary cannot delay warlike proceedings against Servia, and would have to decline any suggestion of negotiations on basis of Servian reply.

Prestige of Dual Monarchy was engaged, and nothing could now prevent conflict.

No. 62.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.) VIENNA, July 28, 1914.

I spoke to Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day in the sense of your telegram of 27th July* to Berlin. I avoided the word "mediation," but said that, as mentioned in your speech,† which he had just read to me, you had hopes that conversations in London between the four Powers less interested might yet lead to an arrangement which Austro-Hungarian Government would accept as satisfactory and as rendering actual hostilities unnecessary. I added that you had regarded Servian reply as having gone far to meet just demands of Austria-Hungary; that you thought it constituted a fair basis of discussion during which warlike operations might remain in abeyance, and that Austrian Ambassador in Berlin was speaking in this sense. Minister for Foreign Affairs said quietly, but firmly, that no discussion could be accepted on basis of Servian note; that war would be declared to-day, and that well-known pacific character of Emperor, as well as, he might add, his own, might be accepted as a guarantee that war was both just and inevitable. This was a matter that must be settled directly between the two parties immediately concerned. I said that you would hear with regret that hostilities could not now be arrested, as you feared that they might lead to complications threatening the peace of Europe.

In taking leave of his Excellency, I begged him to believe that, if in the course of present grave crisis our point of view should sometimes differ from his, this would arise, not from want of sympathy with the many just complaints which Austria-Hungary had against Servia, but from the fact that, whereas Austria-Hungary put first her quarrel with Servia, you were anxious in the first instance for peace of Europe. I trusted this larger aspect of the question would appeal with equal force to his Excellency. He said he had it also in mind, but thought that Russia ought not to oppose operations like those impending, which did not aim at territorial aggrandisement and which could no longer be postponed.

* See No. 46.

† *Hansard*, Vol. 65, No. 107, Columns 931, 932, 933.

No. 63.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.) ROME, July 28, 1914.

Your telegram of 25th July to Paris.*

I have communicated substance to Minister for Foreign Affairs, who immediately telegraphed in precisely similar terms to Berlin and Vienna.

* See No. 27.

No. 64.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.) ROME, July 28, 1914.

At the request of the Minister for Foreign Affairs I submit the following to you:—

In a long conversation this morning Servian Chargé d'Affaires had said he thought that if some explanations were given regarding mode in which Austrian agents would require to intervene under article 5 and article 6, Servia might still accept the whole Austrian note.

As it was not to be anticipated that Austria would give such explanations to Servia, they might be given to Powers engaged in discussions, who might then advise Servia to accept without conditions.

The Austro-Hungarian Government had in the meantime published a long official explanation of grounds on which Servian reply was considered inadequate. Minister for Foreign Affairs considered many points besides explanation—such as slight verbal difference in sentence regarding renunciation of propaganda—quite childish, but there was a passage which might prove useful in facilitating such a course as was considered practicable by the Servian Chargé d'Affaires. It was stated that co-operation of Austrian agents in Servia was to be only in investigation, not in judicial or administrative measures. Servia was said to have wilfully misrepresented this. He thought, therefore, that ground might be cleared here.

I only reproduce from memory, as I had not yet received text of Austrian declaration.

Minister impressed upon me, above all, his anxiety for the immediate beginning of discussion. A wide general latitude to accept at once every point or suggestion on which he could be in agreement with ourselves and Germany had been given to Italian Ambassador.

No. 65.

Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.) NISH, July 28, 1914.

I have urged on the Servian Government the greatest moderation pending efforts being made towards a peaceful solution.

Two Servian steamers fired on and damaged, and two Servian merchant-vessels have been captured by a Hungarian monitor at Orsova.

No. 66.

Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.) NISH, July 28, 1914.

Telegram received here that war declared by Austria.

No. 67.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(Telegraphic.)

FOREIGN OFFICE, July 28, 1914.

Explanation given in your telegram of the 27th July* of what was my idea in proposing a conference is quite right. It would not be an arbitration, but a private and informal discussion to ascertain what suggestion could be made for a settlement. No suggestion would be put forward that had not previously been ascertained to be acceptable to Austria and Russia, with whom the mediating Powers could easily keep in touch through their respective allies.

But as long as there is a prospect of a direct exchange of views between Austria and Russia, I would suspend every other suggestion, as I entirely agree that it is the most preferable method of all.

I understand that the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs has proposed a friendly exchange of views to the Austrian Government, and, if the latter accepts, it will no doubt relieve the tension and make the situation less critical.

It is very satisfactory to hear from the German Ambassador here that the German Government have taken action at Vienna in the sense of the conversation recorded in my telegram of yesterday to you.†

* See No. 43. † See No. 46.

No. 68.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(Telegraphic.)

FOREIGN OFFICE, July 28, 1914.

German Government, having accepted principle of mediation between Austria and Russia by the four Powers, if necessary, I am ready to propose that the German Secretary of State should suggest the lines on which this principle should be applied. I will, however, keep the idea in reserve until we see how the conversations between Austria and Russia progress.

No. 69.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

FOREIGN OFFICE, July 28, 1914.

It is most satisfactory that there is a prospect of direct exchange of views between the Russian and Austrian Governments, as reported in your telegram of the 27th July.*

* See No. 55.

I am ready to put forward any practical proposal that would facilitate this, but I am not quite clear as to what the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs proposes the Ministers at Belgrade should do. Could he not first mention in an exchange of views with Austria his willingness to co-operate in some such scheme? It might then take more concrete shape.

No. 70.

Telegrams communicated by Count Benckendorff, July 29, 1914.

(1.) Telegram from M. Sazonof to Russian Ambassador at Berlin, dated July 28, 1914.

In consequence of the declaration of war by Austria against Servia, the Imperial Government will announce to-morrow (29th) the mobilisation in the military circonscriptions of Odessa, Kieff, Moscow, and Kazan. Please inform German Government, confirming the absence in Russia of any aggressive intention against Germany.

The Russian Ambassador at Vienna has not been recalled from his post.

(2.) Telegram to Count Benckendorff.

The Austrian declaration of war clearly puts an end to the idea of direct communications between Austria and Russia. Action by London Cabinet in order to set on foot mediation with a view to suspension of military operations of Austria against Servia is now most urgent.

Unless military operations are stopped, mediation would only allow matters to drag on and give Austria time to crush Servia.

No. 71.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 28, 1914.

At invitation of Imperial Chancellor, I called upon his Excellency this evening. He said that he wished me to tell you that he was most anxious that Germany should work together with England for maintenance of general peace, as they had done successfully in the last European crisis. He had not been able to accept your proposal for a conference of representatives of the Great Powers, because he did not think that it would be effective, and because such a conference would in his opinion have had appearance of an "Areopagus" consisting of two Powers of each group sitting in judgment upon the two remaining Powers; but his inability to accept proposed conference must not be regarded as militating against his strong desire for effective co-operation. You could be assured that he was doing his very best both at Vienna and St. Petersburgh to get the two Governments to discuss the situation directly with each other and in a friendly way. He had great hopes that such discussions would take place and lead to a satisfactory result, but if the news were true which he had just read in the papers, that Russia had mobilised fourteen army corps in the south, he thought situation was very serious, and he himself would be in a very difficult position, as in these circumstances it would be out of his power to continue to preach moderation at Vienna. He added that Austria, who as yet was only partially mobilising, would take similar measures, and if war were to result, Russia would be entirely responsible. I ventured to say that if Austria refused to take any notice of Servian note, which, to my mind, gave way in nearly every point demanded by Austria, and

which in any case offered a basis for discussion, surely a certain portion of responsibility would rest with her. His Excellency said that he did not wish to discuss Servian note, but that Austria's standpoint, and in this he agreed, was that her quarrel with Servia was a purely Austrian concern with which Russia had nothing to do. He reiterated his desire to co-operate with England and his intention to do his utmost to maintain general peace. "A war between the Great Powers must be avoided" were his last words.

Austrian colleague said to me to-day that a general war was most unlikely, as Russia neither wanted nor was in a position to make war. I think that that opinion is shared by many people here.

No. 72.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.) ST. PETERSBURG, July 28, 1914.

Minister for Foreign Affairs begged me to thank you for the language you had held to the German Ambassador, as reported in your telegram* to Berlin, substance of which I communicated to his Excellency. He took a pessimistic view of the situation, having received the same disquieting news from Vienna as had reached His Majesty's Government. I said it was important that we should know the real intentions of the Imperial Government, and asked him whether he would be satisfied with the assurances which the Austrian Ambassador had, I understood, been instructed to give in respect of Servia's integrity and independence. I added that I was sure any arrangement for averting a European war would be welcomed by His Majesty's Government. In reply his Excellency stated that if Servia were attacked Russia would not be satisfied with any engagement which Austria might take on these two points, and that order for mobilisation against Austria would be issued on the day that Austria crossed Servian frontier.

I told the German Ambassador, who appealed to me to give moderating counsels to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, that from the beginning I had not ceased to do so, and that the German Ambassador at Vienna should now in his turn use his restraining influence. I made it clear to his Excellency that, Russia being thoroughly in earnest, a general war could not be averted if Servia were attacked by Austria.

As regards the suggestion of conference, the Ambassador had received no instructions, and before acting with me the French and Italian Ambassadors are still waiting for their final instructions.

* See No. 46.

No. 73.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.) VIENNA, July 28, 1914.

I have received *note verbale* from Ministry for Foreign Affairs, stating that, the Servian Government not having replied to note of 23rd July* in a satisfactory manner, Imperial and Royal Government is compelled itself to provide for protection of its rights, and to have recourse for that object to force of arms. Austria-Hungary has addressed to Servia formal declaration according to article 1 of convention of 18th October, 1907, relative to opening of hostilities, and considers herself from to-day in state of war with Servia. Austria-Hungary will conform, provided Servia does so, to stipulations of Hague conventions of 18th October, 1907, and to Declaration of London of 26th February, 1909.

* See No. 4.

No. 74.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.) VIENNA, July 28, 1914.

I am informed by the Russian Ambassador that the Russian Government's suggestion has been declined by the Austro-Hungarian Government. The suggestion was to the effect that the means of settling the Austro-Servian conflict should be discussed directly between Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg, who should be authorized accordingly.

The Russian Ambassador thinks that a conference in London of the less interested Powers, such as you have proposed, offers now the only prospect of preserving peace of Europe, and he is sure that the Russian Government will acquiesce willingly in your proposal. So long as opposing armies have not actually come in contact, all hope need not be abandoned.

No. 75.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.) BERLIN, July 29, 1914.

I was sent for again to-day by the Imperial Chancellor, who told me that he regretted to state that the Austro-Hungarian Government, to whom he had at once communicated your opinion, had answered that events had marched too rapidly and that it was therefore too late to act upon your suggestion that the Servian reply might form the basis of discussion. His Excellency had, on receiving their reply, despatched a message to Vienna, in which he explained that, although a certain desire had, in his opinion, been shown in the Servian reply to meet the demands of Austria, he understood entirely that, without some sure guarantees that Servia would carry out in their entirety the demands made upon her, the Austro-Hungarian Government could not rest satisfied in view of their past experience. He had then gone on to say that hostilities which were about to be undertaken against Servia had presumably the exclusive object of securing such guarantees, seeing that the Austrian Government already assured the Russian Government that they had no territorial designs.

He advised the Austro-Hungarian Government, should this view be correct, to speak openly in this sense. The holding of such language would, he hoped, eliminate all possible misunderstandings.

As yet, he told me, he had not received a reply from Vienna.

From the fact that he had gone so far in the matter of giving advice at Vienna, his Excellency hoped that you would realise that he was sincerely doing all in his power to prevent danger of European complications.

The fact of his communicating this information to you was a proof of the confidence which he felt in you and evidence of his anxiety that you should know he was doing his best to support your efforts in the cause of general peace, efforts which he sincerely appreciated.

No. 76.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.) BERLIN, July 29, 1914.

I found Secretary of State very depressed to-day. He reminded me that he had told me the other day that he had to be very careful in giving advice to Austria, as

any idea that they were being pressed would be likely to cause them to precipitate matters and present a *fait accompli*. That had, in fact, now happened, and he was not sure that his communication of your suggestion that Servia's reply offered a basis for discussion had not hastened declaration of war. He was much troubled by reports of mobiliation in Russia, and of certain military measures, which he did not specify, being taken in France. He subsequently spoke of these measures to my French colleague, who informed him that French Government had done nothing more than the German Government had done, namely, recalled officers on leave. His Excellency denied German Government had done this, but as a matter of fact it is true. My French colleague said to Under-Secretary of State, in course of conversation, that it seemed to him that when Austria had entered Servia, and so satisfied her military prestige, the moment might then be favourable for four disinterested Powers to discuss situation and come forward with suggestions for preventing graver complications. Under-Secretary of State seemed to think idea worthy of consideration, as he replied that would be a different matter from confrence proposed by you.

Russian Ambassador returned to-day, and has informed Imperial Government that Russia is mobilising in four southern governments.

No. 77.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(Telegraphic.) FOREIGN OFFICE, July 29, 1914.

I much appreciate the language of Chancellor, as reported in your telegram of to-day.* His Excellency may rely upon it that this country will continue, as heretofore, to strain every effort to secure peace and to avert the calamity we all fear. If he can induce Austria to satisfy Russia and to abstain from going so far as to come into collision with her, we shall all join in deep gratitude to his Excellency for having saved the peace of Europe.

* See No. 75.

No. 78.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.) ST. PETERSBURG, July 29, 1914.

Partial mobilisation was ordered to-day.

I communicated the substance of your telegram of the 28th instant* to Berlin to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in accordance with your instructions, and informed him confidentially of remarks as to mobilisation which the German Secretary of State had made to the British Ambassador at Berlin. This had already reached his Excellency from another source. The mobilisation, he explained, would only be directed against Austria.

Austrian Government had now definitely declined direct conversation between Vienna and St. Petersburgh. The Minister for Foreign Affairs said he had proposed such an exchange of views on advice of German Ambassador. He proposed, when informing German Ambassador of this refusal of Austria's, to urge that a return should be made to your proposal for a conference of four Ambassadors, or, at all events, for an exchange of views between the three Ambassadors less directly interested, yourself, and also the Austrian Ambassador if you thought it advisable. Any arrangement approved by France and England would be acceptable to him, and he did not care what form such conversations took. No time was to be lost,

...d the only way to avert war was for you to succeed in arriving, by means of conversations with Ambassadors either collectively or individually, at some formula which Austria could be induced to accept. Throughout Russian Government had been perfectly frank and conciliatory, and had done all in their power to maintain peace. If their efforts to maintain peace failed, he trusted that it would be realized by the British public that it was not the fault of the Russian Government.

I asked him whether he would raise objections if the suggestion made in Rome telegram of the 27th July,† which I mentioned to him, were carried out. In reply his Excellency said that he would agree to anything arranged by the four Powers provided it was acceptable to Servia; he could not, he said, be more Servian than Servia. Some supplementary statement or explanations would, however, have to be made in order to tone down the sharpness of the ultimatum.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said that proposal referred to in your telegram of the 28th instant‡ was one of secondary importance. Under altered circumstances of situation he did not attach weight to it. Further, the German Ambassador had informed his Excellency, so the latter told me, that his Government were continuing at Vienna to exert friendly influence. I fear that the German Ambassador will not help to smooth matters over, if he uses to his own Government the same language as he did to me to-day. He accused the Russian Government of endangering the peace of Europe by their mobilisation, and said, when I referred to all that had been recently done by Austria, that he could not discuss such matters. I called his attention to the fact that Austrian consuls had warned all Austrian subjects liable to military service to join the colours, that Austria had already partially mobilised, and had now declared war on Servia. From what had passed during the Balkan crisis she knew that this act was one which it was impossible without humiliation for Russia to submit to. Had not Russia by mobilising shown that she was in earnest, Austria would have traded on Russia's desire for peace, and would have believed that she could go to any lengths. Minister for Foreign Affairs had given me to understand that Russia would not precipitate war by crossing frontier immediately, and a week or more would, in any case, elapse before mobilisation was completed. In order to find an issue out of a dangerous situation it was necessary that we should in the meanwhile all work together.

† See No. 67. ‡ See No. 57. ‡ See No. 69.

No. 79.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey. (*Received July 29.*)

(Telegraphic.) VIENNA, July 29, 1914.

There is at present no step which we could usefully take to stop war with Servia, to which Austro-Hungarian Government are now fully committed by the Emperor's appeal to his people which has been published this morning, and by the declaration of war. French and Italian Ambassadors agree with me in this view. If the Austro-Hungarian Government would convert into a binding engagement to Europe the declaration which has been made at St. Petersburgh to the effect that she desires neither to destroy the independence of Servia nor to acquire Servian territory, the Italian Ambassador thinks that Russia might be induced to remain quiet. This however, the Italian Ambassador is convinced the Austrian Government would refuse to do.

No. 80.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.) ROME, July 29, 1914.

In your telegram of the 27th instant* to Berlin, German Ambassador was reported to have accepted in principle the idea of a conference. This is in contradiction with the telegram of the 27th instant† from Berlin.

Information received by the Italian Government from Berlin shows that German view is correctly represented in Sir E. Goschen's telegram of the 27th July,† but what creates difficulty is rather the "conference," so the Minister for Foreign Affairs understands, than the principle. He is going to urge, in a telegram which he is sending to Berlin to-night, adherence to the idea of an exchange of views in London. He suggest that the German Secretary of State might propose a formula acceptable to his Government. Minister for Foreign Affairs is of opinion that this exchange of views would keep the door open if direct communication between Vienna and St. Petersburgh fails to have any result. He thinks that this exchange of views might be concomitant with such direct communication.

The German Government are also being informed that the Italian Government would not be pardoned by public opinion here unless they had taken every possible step so as to avoid war. He is urging that the German Government must lend their co-operation in this.

He added that there seemed to be a difficulty in making Germany believe that Russia was in earnest. As Germany, however, was really anxious for good relations with ourselves, if she believed that Great Britain would act with Russia and France he thought it would have a great effect.

Even should it prove impossible to induce Germany to take part, he would still advocate that England and Italy, each as representing one group, should continue to exchange views.

* See No. 16. † See No. 43.

No. 81.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

(Telegraphic.) FOREIGN OFFICE, July 29, 1914.

With reference to your telegram of yesterday.*

It is impossible for me to initiate discussions with Ambassadors here, as I understand from Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs that Austria will not accept any discussion on basis of Servian note, and the inference of all I have heard from Vienna and Berlin is that Austria will not accept any form of mediation by the Powers as between Austria and Servia. Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs must therefore speak at Berlin and Vienna. I shall be glad if a favourable reception is given to any suggestions he can make there.

* See No. 64.

No. 82.

Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey. (Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.) CONSTANTINOPLE, July 29, 1914.

I understand that the designs of Austria may extend considerably beyond the [illegible] occupation of Servian territory. I gathered this from a remark

I had talk to the Austrian Ambassador here, who spoke of the deplorable economic situation of Salonica under Greek administration and of the assistance on which the Austrian army could count from Mussulman population discontented with Servian rule.

No. 83.

Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.) Nish, July 29, 1914.

I have been requested by Prime Minister to convey to you expression of his deep gratitude for the statement which you made on the 27th instant in the House of Commons.

No. 84.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.

The German Ambassador has been instructed by the German Chancellor to inform me that he is endeavouring to mediate between Vienna and St. Petersburgh, and he hopes with good success. Austria and Russia seem to be in constant touch, and he is endeavouring to make Vienna explain in a satisfactory form at St. Petersburgh the scope and extension of Austrian proceedings in Servia. I told the German Ambassador that an agreement arrived at direct between Austria and Russia would be the best possible solution. I would press no proposal as long as there was a prospect of that, but my information this morning was that the Austrian Government have declined the suggestion of the Russian Government that the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh should be authorised to discuss directly with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs the means of settling the Austro-Servian conflict. The press correspondents at St. Petersburgh had been told that Russian Government would mobilise. The German Government had said that they were favourable in principle to mediation between Russia and Austria if necessary. They seemed to think the particular method of conference, consultation or discussion, or even conversations *à quatre* in London too formal a method. I urged that the German Government should suggest any method by which the influence of the four Powers could be used together to prevent war between Austria and Russia. France agreed, Italy agreed. The whole idea of mediation or mediating influence was ready to be put into operation by any method that Germany could suggest if mine was not acceptable. In fact mediation was ready to come into operation by any method that Germany thought possible if only Germany would "press the button" in the interests

No. 85.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 29, 1914.

I was asked to call upon the Chancellor to-night. His Excellency had just returned from Potsdam.

He said that should Austria be attacked by Russia a European conflagration might, he feared, become inevitable, owing to Germany's obligations as Austria's ally.

in spite of his continued efforts to maintain peace. He then proceeded to make the following strong bid for British neutrality. He said that it was clear, so far as he was able to judge the main principle which governed British policy, that Great Britain would never stand by and allow France to be crushed in any conflict there might be. That, however, was not the object at which Germany aimed. Provided that neutrality of Great Britain were certain, every assurance would be given to the British Government that the Imperial Government aimed at no territorial acquisitions at the expense of France should they prove victorious in any war that might ensue.

I questioned his Excellency about the French colonies, and he said that he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that respect. As regards Holland, however, his Excellency said that, so long as Germany's adversaries respected the integrity and neutrality of the Netherlands, Germany was ready to give His Majesty's Government an assurance that she would do likewise. It depended upon the action of France what operations Germany might be forced to enter upon in Belgium, but when the war was over, Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against Germany.

His Excellency ended by saying that ever since he had been Chancellor the object of his policy had been, as you were aware, to bring about an understanding with England; he trusted that these assurances might form the basis of that understanding which he so much desired. He had in mind a general neutrality agreement between England and Germany, though it was of course at the present moment too early to discuss details, and an assurance of British neutrality in the conflict which present crisis might possibly produce, would enable him to look forward to realisation of his desire.

In reply to his Excellency's inquiry how I thought his request would appeal to you, I said that I did not think it probable that at this stage of events you would care to bind yourself to any course of action and that I was of opinion that you would desire to retain full liberty.

Our conversation upon this subject having come to an end, I communicated the contents of your telegram of to-day* to his Excellency, who expressed his best thanks to you.

* See No. 77.

No. 86.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.) ROME, July 29, 1914.

Minister for Foreign Affairs thinks that moment is past for any further discussions on basis of Servian note, in view of communication made to-day by Russia at Berlin regarding partial mobilisation. The utmost he now hope for is that Germany may use her influence at Vienna to prevent or moderate any further demands on Servia.

No. 87.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

FOREIGN OFFICE, July 29, 1914.

Sir,

After telling M. Cambon to-day how grave the situation seemed to be, I told him that I meant to tell the German Ambassador to-day that he must not be misled by the friendly tone of our conversations into any sense of false security

that we should stand aside if all the efforts to preserve the peace, which we were now making in common with Germany, failed. But I went on to say to M. Cambon that I thought it necessary to tell him also that public opinion here approached the present difficulty from a quite different point of view from that taken during the difficulty as to Morocco a few years ago. In the case of Morocco the dispute was one in which France was primarily interested, and in which it appeared that Germany, in an attempt to crush France, was fastening a quarrel on France on a question that was the subject of a special agreement between France and us. In the present case the dispute between Austria and Servia was not one in which we felt called to take a hand. Even if the question became one between Austria and Russia we should not feel called upon to take a hand in it. It would then be a question of the supremacy of Teuton or Slav—a struggle for supremacy in the Balkans; and our idea had always been to avoid being drawn into a war over a Balkan question. If Germany became involved and France became involved, we had not made up our minds what we should do; it was a case that we should have to consider. France would then have been drawn into a quarrel which was not hers, but in which, owing to her alliance, her honour and interest obliged her to engage. We were free from engagements, and we should have to decide what British interests required us to do. I thought it necessary to say that, because, as we know, we were taking all precautions with regard to our fleet, and I was about to warn Prince Lichnowsky not to count on our standing aside, but it would not be fair that I should let M. Cambon be misled into supposing that this meant that we had decided what to do in a contingency that I still hoped might not arise.

M. Cambon said that I had explained the situation very clearly. He understood it to be that in a Balkan quarrel, and in a struggle for supremacy between Teuton and Slav we should not feel called to intervene; should other issues be raised and Germany and France became involved, so that the question became one of the hegemony of Europe, we should then decide what it was necessary for us to do. He seemed quite prepared for this announcement, and made no criticism upon it.

He said French opinion was calm, but decided. He anticipated a demand from Germany that France would be neutral while Germany attacked Russia. This assurance France, of course, could not give; she was bound to help Russia if Russia was attacked.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

No. 88.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

FOREIGN OFFICE, July 29, 1914.

Sir,

I told the German Ambassador this afternoon of the information that I had received, that Russia had informed Germany respecting her mobilisation. I also told him of the communication made by Count Benckendorff, that the Austrian declaration of war manifestly rendered vain any direct conversations between Russia and Austria. I said that the hope built upon those direct conversations by the German Government yesterday had disappeared to-day. To-day the German Chancellor was working in the interest of mediation in Vienna and St. Petersburgh. If he succeeded, well and good. If not, it was more important than ever that Germany should take up what I had suggested to the German Ambassador this morning, and propose some method by which the four Powers should be able to work together to

keep the peace of Europe. I pointed out, however, that the Russian Government, while desirous of mediation, regarded it as a condition that the military operations against Servia should be suspended, as otherwise a mediation would only drag on matters, and give Austria time to crush Servia. It was of course too late for all military operations against Servia to be suspended. In a short time, I supposed, the Austrian forces would be in Belgrade, and in occupation of some Servian territory. But even then it might be possible to bring some mediation into existence, if Austria, while saying that she must hold the occupied territory until she had complete satisfaction from Servia, stated that she would not advance further, pending an effort of the Powers to mediate between her and Russia.

The German Ambassador said that he had already telegraphed to Berlin what I had said to him this morning.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

No. 89.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

FOREIGN OFFICE, July 29, 1914.

Sir,

After speaking to the German Ambassador this afternoon about the European situation, I said that I wished to say to him, in a quite private and friendly way, something that was on my mind. The situation was very grave. While it was restricted to the issues at present actually involved we had no thought of interfering in it. But if Germany became involved in it, and then France, the issue might be so great that it would involve all European interests; and I did not wish him to be misled by the friendly tone of our conversation—which I hoped would continue—into thinking that we should stand aside.

He said that he quite understood this, but he asked whether I meant that we should, under certain circumstances, intervene?

I replied that I did not wish to say that, or to use anything that was like a threat or an attempt to apply pressure by saying that, if things became worse, we should intervene. There would be no question of our intervening if Germany was not involved, or even if France was not involved. But we knew very well that, if the issue did become such that we thought British interests required us to intervene, we must intervene at once, and the decision would have to be very rapid, just as the decisions of other Powers had to be. I hoped that the friendly tone of our conversations would continue as at present, and that I should be able to keep as closely in touch with the German Government in working for peace. But if we failed in our efforts to keep the peace, and if the issue spread so that it involved practically every European interests, I did not wish to be open to any reproach from him that the friendly tone of all our conversations had misled him or his Government into supposing that we should not take action, and to the reproach that, if they had not been so misled, the course of things might have been different.

The German Ambassador took no exception to what I had said; indeed he told me that it accorded with what he had already given in Berlin as his view of the situation.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

No. 90.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

FOREIGN OFFICE, July 29, 1914.

Sir,

In addition to what passed with the German Ambassador this morning, as recorded in my telegram of the 29th July* to Your Excellency, I gave the Ambassador a copy of Sir Rennell Rodd's telegram of the 28th July† and of my reply to it.‡ I said I had begun to doubt whether even a complete acceptance of the Austrian demands by Servia would now satisfy Austria. But there appeared, from what the Marquis di San Giuliano had said, to be a method by which, if the Powers were allowed to have any say in the matter, they might bring about complete satisfaction for Austria, if only the latter would give them an opportunity. I could, however, make no proposal, for the reasons I have given in my telegram to you, and could only give what the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs had said to the German Ambassador for information, as long as it was understood that Austria would accept no discussion with the Powers over her dispute with Servia. As to mediation between Austria and Russia, I said it could not take the form simply of urging Russia to stand on one side while Austria had a free hand to go to any length she pleased. That would not be mediation, it would simply be putting pressure upon Russia in the interests of Austria. The German Ambassador said the view of the German Government was that Austria could not by force be humiliated, and could not abdicate her position as a Great Power. I said I entirely agreed but it was not a question of humiliating Austria, it was a question of how far Austria meant to push the humiliation of others. There must, of course, be some humiliation of Servia, but Austria might press things so far as to involve the humiliation of Russia.

The German Ambassador said that Austria would not take Servian territory, as to which I observed that, by taking territory while leaving nominal Servian independence, Austria might turn Servia practically into a vassal State, and this would affect the whole position of Russia in the Balkans.

I observed that when there was danger of European conflict it was impossible to say who would not be drawn into it. Even the Netherlands apparently were taking precautions.

The German Ambassador said emphatically that some means must be found of preserving the peace of Europe.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

* See No. 84 † See No. 64 ‡ See No. 81.

No. 91.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

FOREIGN OFFICE, July 29, 1914.

SIR,—The Austrian Ambassador told me to-day he had ready a long memorandum which he proposed to leave, and which he said gave an account of the conduct of Servia towards Austria, and an explanation of how necessary the Austrian action was.

I said that I did not wish to discuss the merits of the question between Austria and Servia. The news to-day seemed to me very bad for the peace of Europe. The Powers were not allowed to help in getting satisfaction for Austria, which they

might get if they were given an opportunity, and European peace was at stake.

Count Mensdorff said that the war with Servia must proceed. Austria could not continue to be exposed to the necessity of mobilizing again and again, as she had been obliged to do in recent years. She had no idea of territorial aggrandisement, and all she wished was to make sure that her interests were safeguarded.

I said that it would be quite possible, without nominally interfering with the independence of Servia or taking away any of her territory, to turn her into a sort of vassal State.

Count Mensdorff deprecated this.

In reply to some further remarks of mine, as to the effect that the Austrian action might have upon the Russian position in the Balkans, he said that, before the Balkan war, Servia had always been regarded as being in the Austrian sphere of influence.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

No. 92

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

FOREIGN OFFICE, July 29, 1914.

SIR,—The Italian Ambassador made to me to-day a communication from the Marquis di San Giuliano suggesting that the German objections to the mediation of the four Powers, a mediation that was strongly favoured by Italy, might be removed by some change in the form of procedure.

I said that I had already anticipated this by asking the German Government to suggest any form of procedure under which the idea of mediation between Austria and Russia, already accepted by the German Government in principle, could be applied

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

No. 93.

TELEGRAMS COMMUNICATED BY COUNT BENCKENDORFF. JULY 30, 1913.

1, Russian Ambassador at Vienna to M. Sazonof.

(Translation.)

VIENNE,

(Télégraphique.) Le 15 (28) juillet 1914.

J'ai entretenu aujourd'hui le Comte Berchtold dans le sens des instructions de votre Excellence. Je lui fis observer, en termes les plus amicaux, combien il était désirable de trouver une solution qui, en consolidant les bons rapports entre l'Autriche-Hongrie et la Russie, donnerait à la Monarchie austro-hongroise des garanties sérieuses pour ses rapports futurs avec la Serbie.

(Telegraphic.)

VIENNA, July 15 (28), 1914.

I spoke to Count Berchtold to-day in the sense of your Excellency's instructions. I brought to his notice, in the most friendly manner, how desirable it was to find a solution which, while consolidating good relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia, would give to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy genuine guarantees for its future relations with Servia.

J'attirais l'attention du Comte Berchtold sur tous les dangers pour la paix de l'Europe, qu'entraînerait un conflit armé entre l'Autriche-Hongrie et la Serbie.

Le Comte Berchtold me répondit qu'il se rendait parfaitement compte du sérieux de la situation et des avantages d'une franche explication avec le Cabinet de Saint-Pétersbourg. Il me dit que d'un autre côté le Gouvernement austro-hongrois, qui ne s'était décidé que très mal volontiers aux mesures énergiques qu'il avait prises contre la Serbie, ne pouvait plus ni reculer, ni entrer en discussion au sujet des termes de la note austro-hongroise.

Le Comte Berchtold ajouta que la crise était devenue si aiguë, et que l'excitation de l'opinion publique avait atteint tel degré, que le Gouvernement, le voulait-il, ne pouvait plus y consentir, d'autant moins, me dit-il, que la réponse même de la Serbie donne la preuve du manque de sincérité de ses promesses pour l'avenir.

I drew Count Berchtold's attention to all the dangers to the peace of Europe which would be involved by an armed conflict between Austria-Hungary and Servia.

Count Berchtold replied that he was well aware of the gravity of the situation and of the advantages of a frank explanation with the St. Petersburgh Cabinet. He told me that on the other hand the Austro-Hungarian Government, who had only decided, much against their will, on the energetic measures which they had taken against Servia, could no longer recede, nor enter into any discussion about the terms of the Austro-Hungarian note.

Count Berchtold added that the crisis had become so acute, and that public opinion had risen to such a pitch of excitement, that the Government, even if they wished it, could no longer consent to such a course. This was all the more impossible, he said, inasmuch as the Servian reply itself furnished proof of the insincerity of Servia's promises for the future.

2. M. Savanoff to Count Benckendorff.

SAINT-PÉTERSBOURG,

(Télégraphique.) le 16 (29) juillet 1914.

L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne m'informe au nom du Chancelier, que l'Allemagne n'a pas cessé d'exercer à Vienne une influence modératrice et qu'elle continuera cette action même après la déclaration de guerre. Jusqu'à ce matin il n'y avait aucune nouvelle que les armées autrichiennes aient franchi la frontière serbe. J'ai prié l'Ambassadeur de transmettre au Chancelier mes remerciements pour la teneur amicale de cette communication. Je l'ai informé des mesures militaires prises par la Russie, dont aucune, lui dis-je, n'était dirigée contre l'Allemagne; j'ajoutais qu'elles ne préjugeaient pas non plus des mesures agressives contre l'Autriche-Hongrie, ces mesures s'expliquant par la mobilisation de la plus grande partie de l'armée austro-hongroise.

L'ambassadeur se prononçant en faveur d'explications directes avec le Cabinet de

ST. PETERSBURGH,

July 16 (29), 1914

(Telegraphic.)

The German Ambassador informs me, in the name of the Chancellor, that Germany has not ceased to exercise a moderating influence at Vienna, and that she will continue to do so even after the declaration of war. Up to this morning there has been no news that the Austrian army has crossed the Servian frontier. I have begged the Ambassador to express my thanks to the Chancellor for the friendly tenour of this communication. I have informed him of the military measures taken by Russia, none of which, I told him, were directed against Germany; I added that neither should they be taken as aggressive measures against Austria-Hungary, their explanation being the mobilization of the greater part of the Austro-Hungarian army.

The Ambassador said that he was in favour of direct explanations between the

Vienne et nous, je répondis que j'y étais tout disposé, pour peu que les conseils du Cabinet de Berlin dont il parlait trouvent écho à Vienne.

En même temps je signalais que nous étions tout disposés à accepter le projet d'une conférence des quatre Puissances, un projet auquel, paraissait-il, l'Allemagne ne sympathisait pas entièrement.

Je dis que, dans mon opinion, le meilleur moyen pour mettre à profit tous les moyens propres à produire une solution pacifique, consisterait en une action parallèle des pourparlers d'une conférence à quatre de l'Allemagne, de la France, de l'Angleterre et de l'Italie et d'un contact direct entre l'Autriche-Hongrie et la Russie, à l'instar à peu près de ce qui avait eu lieu aux moments les plus critiques de la crise de l'an dernier.

Je dis à l'ambassadeur qu'après les concessions faites par la Serbie, un terrain de compromis pour les questions restées ouvertes ne serait pas très difficile à trouver, à condition toutefois de quelque bonne volonté de la part de l'Autriche et à condition que toutes les Puissances usent de toute leur influence dans un sens de conciliation.

Austrian Government and ourselves, and I replied that I, too, was quite willing, provided that the advice of the German Government, to which he had referred, found an echo at Vienna.

I said at the same time that we were quite ready to accept the proposal for a conference of the four Powers, a proposal with which, apparently, Germany was not in entire sympathy.

I told him that in my opinion, the best manner on turning to account the most suitable method of finding a peaceful solution would be by arranging for parallel discussions to be carried on by a conference of the four Powers—Germany, France, England, and Italy—and by a direct exchange of views between Austria-Hungary and Russia on much the same lines as occurred during the most critical moments of last year's crisis.

I told the Ambassador that, after the concessions which had been made by Servia, it should not be very difficult to find a compromise to settle the other questions which remained outstanding, provided that Austria showed some good-will and that all the Powers used their entire influence in the direction of conciliation.

3. *M. Sazonof to Count Benckendorff.*

SAINT-PÉTERSBOURG,
le 16 (29) juillet 1914.

(Télégraphique.)

Lors de mon entretien avec l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, dont traite mon télégramme précédent, je n'avais pas encore reçu le télégramme du 15 (28) juillet de M. Schébéko.

Le contenu de ce télégramme constitue un refus du cabinet de Vienne de procéder à un échange d'idées direct avec le Gouvernement Impérial.

Dès lors, il ne nous reste plus qu'à nous en remettre entièrement au Gouvernement britannique pour l'initiative des démarches qu'il jugera utile de provoquer.

ST. PETERSBURGH,
July 16 (29), 1914.

(Telegraphic.)

At the time of my interview with the German Ambassador, dealt with in my preceding telegram, I had not yet received M. Schébéko's telegram of the 15th (28th), July.

This telegram reports the refusal of the Vienna Cabinet to agree to a direct exchange of views with the Imperial Government.

From now on, nothing remains for us to do but to rely entirely on the British Government to take the initiative in the steps which they may consider advsable.

No. 94.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 30.)

Vienna, July 29, 1914.

(Telegraphic.)

I learn that mobilisation of Russian corps destined to carry out operations on Austrian frontier has been ordered. My informant is Russian Ambassador. Ministry for Foreign Affairs here has realised, though somewhat late in the day, that Russia will not remain indifferent in present crisis. I believe tht the news of Russian mobilisation will not be a surprise to the Ministry, but so far it is not generally known in Vienna this evening. Unless mediation, which German Government declared themselves ready to offer in concert with three other Great Powers not immediately interested in the Austro-Servian dispute be brought to bear forthwith, irrevocable steps may be taken in present temper of this country. German Ambassador feigns surprise that Servian affairs should of such interest to Russia. Both my Russian and French colleagues have spoken to him to-day. Russian Ambassador expressed the hope that it might still be possible to arrange matters, and explained that it was impossible for Russia to do otherwise than take an interest in the present dispute. Russia, he said, had done what she could already at Belgrade to induce Servian Government to meet principal Austrian demands in a favourable spirit; if approached in a proper manner, he thought she would probably go still further in this direction. But she was justly offended at having been completely ignored, and she could not consent to be excluded from the settlement. German Ambassador said that if proposals were put forward which opened any prospect of possible acceptance by both sides, he personally thought that Germany might consent to act as mediator in concert with the three other Powers.

I gather from what Russian Ambassador said to me that he is much afraid of the effect that any serious engagement may have upon Russian public opinion. I gathered, however, that Russia would go a long way to meet Austrian demands on Servia.

No. 95.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 30.)

Vienna, July 30, 1914.

(Telegraphic.)

Russian Ambassador hopes that Russian mobilisation will be regarded by Austria as what it is, viz., a clear intimation that Russia must be consulted regarding the fate of Servia, but he does not know how the Austrian Government are taking it. Se says that Russia must have an assurance that Servia will not be crushed, but she would understand that Austria-Hungary is compelled to exact from Servia measures which will secure her Slav provinces from the continuance of hostile propaganda from Servian territory.

The French Ambassador hears from Berlin that the German Ambassador at Vienna is instructed to speak seriously to the Austro-Hungarian Government against acting in a manner calculated to provoke a European war.

Unfortunately the German Ambassador is himself so identified with extreme anti-Russian and nati-Slavian feeling prevalent in Vienna that he is unlikely to plead the cause of peace with entire sincerity.

Although I am not able to verify it, I have private information that the German Ambassador knew the text of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia before it was

despatched and telegraphed it to the German Emperor. I know from the German Ambassador himself that he endorses every line of it.

No. 96.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 30.)

VIENNA, July 30, 1914.

(Telegraphic.)

The Russian Ambassador gave the French Ambassador and myself this afternoon at the French Embassy, where I happened to be, an account of his interview with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, which he said was quite friendly. The Minister of Foreign Affairs had told him that as Russia had mobilised, Austria must, of course, do the same. This, however, should not be regarded as a threat, but merely as the adoption of military precautions similar to those which had been taken across the frontier. He said he had no objection to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg continuing their conversations, although he did not say that they could be resumed on the basis of the Servian reply.

On the whole, the Russian Ambassador is not dissatisfied. He had begun to make his preparations for his departure on the strength of a rumour that Austria would declare war in reply to mobilisation. He now hopes that something may yet be done to prevent war with Austria.

No. 97.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 30.)

(Telegraphic.) ST. PETERSBURG, July 30, 1914.

French Ambassador and I visited Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning. His Excellency said that German Ambassador had told him yesterday afternoon that German Government were willing to guarantee Servian integrity would be respected by Austria. To this he had replied that this might be so, but nevertheless Servia would become an Austrian vassal, just as, in similar circumstances Bokhara had become a Russian vassal. There would be a revolution in Russia if she were to tolerate such a state of affairs.

M. Sazonof told us that absolute proof was in possesion of Russian Government that German was making military and naval preparations against Russia—more particularly in the direction of the Gulf of Finland.

German Ambassador had a second interview with Minister of Foreign Affairs at 2 a.m., when former completely broke down on seeing that war was inevitable. He appealed to M. Sazonof to make some suggestion which he could telegraph to German Government as a last hope. M. Sazonof accordingly drew up and handed to German Ambassador a formula in French, of which following is transalation:—

> "If Austria, recognising that her conflict with Servia has assumed character of question of European interest, declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum points which violate principle of sovereignty of Servia, Russia engages to stop all military preparations."

Preparations for general mobilisation will be proceeded with if this proposal is rejected by Austria, and inevitable results will be a European war. Excitement here has reached such a pitch that, if Austria refuses to make a concession, Russia cannot hold back, and, now that she knows that Germany is arming, she can hardly postpone, for strategical reasons, converting partial into general mobilisation.

No. 98.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 30.)

(Telegraphic.) BERLIN, July 30, 1914.

Secretary of State informs me that immediately on receipt of Prince Lichnowsky's telegram recording his last conversation with you he asked Austro-Hungarian Government whether they would be willing to accept meditation on basis of occupation by Austrian troops of Belgrade or some other point and issue their conditions from there. He has up till now received no reply, but he fears Russian mobilisation against Austria will have increased difficulties, as Austria-Hungary, who has as yet only mobilised against Servia, will probably find it necessary also against Russia. Secretary of State says if you can succeed in getting Russia to agree to above basis for an arrangement and in persuading her in the meantime to take no steps which might be regarded as an act of aggression against Austria he still sees some chance that European peace may be preserved.

He begged me to impress on you difficulty of Germany's position in view of Russian mobilisation and military measures which he hears are being taken in France. Beyond recall of officers on leave—a measure which had been officially taken after, and not before, visit of French Ambassador yesterday—Imperial Government had done nothing special in way of military preparations. Something, however, would have soon to be done, for it might be too late, and when they mobilised they would have to mobilise on three sides. He regretted this, as he knew France did not desire war, but it would be a military necessity.

His Excellency added that telegram received from Prince Lichnowsky last night contains matter which he had heard with regret, but not exactly with surprise, and at all events he thoroughly appreciated frankness and loyalty with which you had spoken.

He also told me that this telegram had only reached Berlin very late last night; had it been received earlier Chancellor would, of course, not have spoken to me in way he had done.

No. 99.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 30,)

(Telegraphic.) PARIS, July 30, 1914.

President of the Republic tells me that the Russian Government have been informed by the German Government that unless Russia stopped her mobilisation Germany would mobilise. But a further report, since received from St. Petersburgh, states that the German communication had been modified, and was now a request to be informed on what conditions Russia would consent to demobilisation. The answer given is that she agrees to do so on condition that Austria-Hungary gives an assurance that she will respect the sovereignty of Servia and submit certain of the demands of the Austrian note, which Servia has not accepted, to an international discussion.

President thinks that these conditions will not be accepted by Austria. He is convinced that peace between the Powers is in the hands of Great Britain. If His Majesty's Government announced that England would come to the aid of France in the event of a conflict between France and Germany as a result of the present differences between Austria and Servia, there would be no war, for Germany would at once modify her attitude.

I explained to him how difficult it would be for His Majesty's Government to make such announcement, but he said that he must maintain that it would be in the interests of peace. France, he said, is pacific. She does not desire war, and all that she had done at present is to make preparations for mobilisation so as not to be taken unawares.

The French Government will keep His Majesty's Government informed of everything that may be done in that way. They have reliable information that the German troops are concentrated round Thionville and Metz ready for war. If there were a general war on the Continent it would inevitably draw England into it for the protection of her vital interests. A declaration now of her intention to support France, whose desire it is that peace should be maintained, would almost certainly prevent Germany from going to war.

No. 100.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 30.)

(Telegraphic.) ROME, July 30, 1914.

German Ambassador told me last night that he thought that Germany would be able to prevent Austria from making any exorbitant demands if Servia could be induced to submit, and to ask for peace early, say, as soon as the occupation of Belgrade had been accomplished.

I made to his Excellency the personal suggestion that some formula might be devised by Germany which might be acceptable for an exchange of views.

I see, however, that you have already made this suggestion.

No. 101.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(Telegraphic.)

FOREIGN OFFICE, July 30, 1914.

Your telegram of 29th July.*

His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment entertain the Chancellor's proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality on such terms.

What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French colonies are taken and France is beaten so long as Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the colonies.

From the material point of view such a proposal is unacceptable, for France, without further territory in Europe being taken from her, could be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power, and become subordinate to German policy.

Altogether, apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the good name of this country would never recover.

The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away whatever obligation or interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium. We could not entertain that bargain either.

Having said so much, it is unnecessary to examine whether the prospect of a future general neutrality agreement between England and Germany offered positive advantages sufficient to compensate us for tying our hands now. We must preserve our full freedom to act as circumstances may seem to us to require in any such unfavourable and regrettable development of the present crisis as the Chancellor contemplates.

You should speak to the Chancellor in the above sense, and add most earnestly that the only way of maintaining the good relations between England and Germany is that they should continue to work together to preserve the peace of Europe; if we succeed in this object, the mutual relations of Germany and England will, I believe, be *ipso facto* improved and strengthened. For that object His Majesty's Government will work in that way with all sincerity and good-will.

*See No. 87.

And I will say this: If [illegible] Europe can be preserved, and the present crisis safely passed, my own object will be to promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggresive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately. I have desired this and worked for it, as far as I could, through the last Balkan crisis, and, Germany having a corresponding object, our relations sensibly improved. The idea has hitherto been too Utopian to form the subject of definite proposals, but if this present crisis, so much more acute than any that Europe has gone through for generations, be safely passed, I am hopeful that the relief and reaction which will follow may make possible some more definite rapprochement between the Powers than has been possible hitherto.

No. 102.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(Telegraphic.)

FOREIGN OFFICE, July 30, 1914.

I have warned Prince Lichnowsky that Germany must not count upon our standing aside in all circumstances. This is doubtless the substance of the telegram from Prince Lichnowsky to German Chancellor, to which reference is made in the last two paragraphs of your telegram of 30 July.*

* See No. 98.

No. 103.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Bethmann.

(Telegraphic.)

FOREIGN OFFICE, July 30, 1914.

German Ambassador informs me that German Government would endeavour to influence Austria, after taking Belgrade and Servian territory in region of frontier, to promise not to advance further, while Powers endeavoured to arrange that Servia should give satisfaction sufficient to pacify Austria. Territory occupied would of course be evacuated when Austria was satisfied. I suggested this yesterday as a possible relief to the situation, and, if it can be obtained, I would earnestly hope that it might be agreed to suspend further military preparations on all sides.

Russian Ambassador has told me of condition laid down by M. Sazonof, as quoted in your telegram of the 30th July,* and fears it cannot be modified; but if Austria advance were stopped after occupation of Belgrade, I think Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs' formula might be changed to read that the Powers would examine how Servia could fully satisfy Austria without impairing Servian sovereign rights or independence.

If Austria, having occupied Belgrade and neighbouring Servian territory, declares herself ready, in the interest of European peace, to cease her advance and to discuss how a complete settlement can be arrived at, I hope that Russia would also consent to discussion and suspension of further military preparations, provided that other Powers did the same.

It is slender chance of preserving peace, but the only one I can suggest if Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs can come to no agreement at Berlin. You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs.

* See No. 97.

No. 104.

Sir [illegible] to Sir F. Bertie.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 30, 1914.

You should inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs of my telegram to Sir G. Buchanan of to-day,* and say that I know that he has been urging Russia not to precipitate a crisis. I hope he may be able to support this last suggestion at St. Petersburgh.

* See No. 101.

No. 105.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

Foreign Office, July 30, 1914.

Sir,—M. Cambon reminded me to-day of the letter I had written to him two years ago in which we agreed that, if the peace of Europe was seriously threatened, we would discuss what we were prepared to do. I enclose for convenience of reference copies of the letter in question and of M. Cambon's reply. He said that the peace of Europe was never more seriously threatened than it was now. He did not wish to ask me to say directly that we would intervene, but he would like me to say what we should do if certain circumstances arose. The particular hypothesis he had in mind was an aggression by Germany on France. He gave me a paper, of which a copy is also enclosed, showing that the German military preparations were more advanced and more on the offensive upon the frontier than anything France had yet done. She anticipated that the aggression would take the form of either a demand that France should cease her preparations, or a demand that she should engage to remain neutral if there was war between Germany and Russia. Neither of these things could France admit.

I said that the Cabinet was to meet to-morrow morning, and I would see him again to-morrow afternoon.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

[Enclosure 1 in No. 105.]

Sir Edward Grey to M. Cambon.

Foreign Office, November 22, 1912.

My dear Ambassador,—From time to time in recent years the French and British naval and military experts have consulted together. It has always been understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between experts is not, and ought not to be regarded as, an engagement that commits either Government to action in a contingency that has not arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French and British fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement to co-operate in war.

You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave reasons to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, it might become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other.

I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common. If these measures involved action, the plans of the General Staffs would at once be taken into consideration, and the Governments would then decide what effect should be given to them.

Yours, &c.,

E. GREY.

[Enclosure 2 in No. 105.]

L'AMBASSADE DE FRANCE, LONDRES.

ce 23 novembre 1912.

Cher Sir Edward,

Par votre lettre en date d'hier, 22 novembre, vous m'avez rappelé que, dans ces dernières années, les autorités militaires et navales de la France et de la Grande-Bretagne s'étaient consultées de temps en temps; qu'il avait toujours été entendu que ces consultations ne restreignaient pas la liberté, pour chaque Gouvernement, de décider dans l'avenir s'ils se prêteraient l'un l'autre le concours de leurs forces armées; que de part et d'autre, ces consultations entre spécialistes n'étaient et ne devaient pas être considérées comme des engagements obligeants nos Gouvernements à agir dans certains cas; que cependant je vous avais fait observer que, si l'un ou l'autre des deux Gouvernements avait de graves raisons d'appréhender une attaque non provoquée de la part d'une tierce Puissance, il deviendrait essentiel de savoir s'il pourrait compter sur l'assistance armée de l'autre.

Votre lettre répond à cette observation, et je suis autorisé à vous déclarer que, dans le cas où l'un de nos deux Gouvernements aurait un motif grave d'appréhender soit l'agression d'une tierce puissance, soit quelque événement menaçant pour la paix générale, ce Gouvernement examinerait immédiatement avec l'autre si les deux Gouvernements doivent agir de concert en vue de prévenir l'agression ou de sauvegarder la paix. Dans ce cas, les deux Gouvernements délibéreraient sur les mesures qu'ils seraient disposés à prendre en commun; si ces mesures comportaient une action, les deux Gouvernements prendraient aussitôt en considéra-

(Translation.)

FRENCH EMBASSY, LONDON,

November 23, 1912.

Dear Sir Edward,

You reminded me in your letter of yesterday, 22nd November, that during the last few years the military and naval authorities of France and Great Britain had consulted with each other from time to time; that it had always been understood that these consultations should not restrict the liberty of either Government to decide in the future whether they should lend each other the support of their armed forces; that, on either side, these consultations between experts were not and should not be considered as engagements binding our Governments to take action in certain eventualities; that, however, I had remarked to you that, if one or other of the two Governments had grave reasons to fear an unprovoked attack on the part of a third Power, it would become essential to know whether it could count on the armed support of the other.

Your letter answers that point, and I am authorized to state that, in the event of one of our two Governments having grave reasons to fear either an attack from a third Power, or some event threatening the General peace, that Government would immediately examine with the other the question whether both Governments should act together in order to prevent aggression or preserve peace. If so, the two Governments would deliberate as to the measures which they would be prepared to take in common; if those measures involved action, the two Governments would take into immediate consideration the plans of their

tion les plans de leurs états majors et décideraient alors de la suite qui devrait être donnée à ces plans.

Votre sincèrement dévoué,

PAUL CAMBON.

general staffs and would then decide as to the effect to be given to those plans.

Yours, &c.,

PAUL CAMBON.

[Enclosure 3 in No. 105.]

French Minister for Foreign Affairs to M. Cambon.

(Translation.)

L'armée allemande a ses avant-postes sur nos bornes-frontières, hier vendredi; par deux fois des patrouilles allemandes ont pénétré sur notre territoire. Nos avant-postes sont en retraite à 10 kilom. en arrière de la frontière. Les populations ainsi abandonnées à l'attaque de l'armée adverse protestent; mais le Gouvernement tient à montrer à l'opinion publique et au Gouvernement britannique que l'agresseur ne sera en aucun cas la France. Tout le 16e Corps de Metz renforcé par une partie de 8e venu de Trèves et de Cologne occupe la frontière de Metz au Luxembourg. Le 15e Corps d'Armée de Strasbourg a serré sur la frontière. Sous menace d'être fusillés les Alsaciens-Lorrains des pays annexés ne peuvent pas passer la frontière; des réservistes par dizaines de milliers sont rappelés en Allemagne; c'est le dernier stade avant la mobilisation: or, nous n'avons rappelé aucun réserviste.

Comme vous le voyez, l'Allemagne l'a fait. J'ajoute que toutes nos informations concordent pour montrer que les préparatifs allemands ont commencé samedi, le jour même de la remise de la note autrichienne.

Ces éléments, ajoutés à ceux contenus dans mon télégramme d'hier, vous permettent de faire la preuve au Gouvernement britannique de la volonté pacifique de l'un et des intentions agressives de l'autre.

PARIS, le 31 juillet 1914.

The German army had its advance-posts on our frontiers yesterday (Friday). German patrols twice penetrated on to our territory. Our advance-posts are withdrawn to a distance of 10 kilom. from the frontier. The local population is protesting against being thus abandoned to the attack of the enemy's army, but the Government wishes to make it clear to public opinion and to the British Government that in no case will France be the aggressor. The whole 16th corps from Metz, reinforced by a part of the 8th from Treves and Cologne, is occupying the frontier at Metz on the Luxemburg side. The 15th army corps from Strassburg has closed up on the frontier. The inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine are prevented by the threat of being shot from crossing the fronties. Reservists have been called back to Germany by tens of thousands. This is the last stage before mobilization, whereas we nave not called out a single reservist.

As you see, Germany has done it. I would add that all my information goes to show that the German preparations began on Saturday, the very day on which the Austrian note was handed in.

These facts, added to those contained in my telegram of yesterday, will enable you to prove to the British Government the pacific intentions of the one party and the aggressive intentions of the other.

PARIS, July 31, 1814.

No. 106.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.) ROME, July 30, 1914.

I learnt from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who sent for me this evening, that the Austrian Government had declined to continue the direct exchange of views with the Russian Government. But he had reason to believe that Germany was now

I pressed that more conciliatory advice to Austria, as she seemed convinced that we should act with France and Russia, and was most anxious to avoid issue with us.

He said he was telegraphing to the Italian Ambassador at Berlin to ask the German Government to suggest that the idea of an exchange of views between the four Powers should be resumed in any form which Austria would consider acceptable. It seemed to him that Germany might invite Austria to state exactly the terms which she would demand from Servia, and give a guarantee that she would neither deprive her of independence nor annex territory. It would be useless to ask for anything less than was contained in the Austrian ultimatum, and Germany would support no proposal that did not imply non-success for Austria. We might, on the other hand, ascertain from Russia what she would accept, and, once we knew the standpoints of these two countries, discussions could be commneced at once. There was still time so long as Austria had received no check. He in any case was in favour of continuing an exchange of views with His Majesty's Government if the idea of discussions between the four Powers was impossible.

No. 107.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.) BERLIN, July 30, 1914.

I do not know whether you have received a reply from the German Government to the communication* which you made to them through the German Ambassador in London asking whether they could suggest any method by which the four Powers could use their mediating influence between Russia and Austria. I was informed last night that they had not had time to send an answer yet. To-day, in reply to an enquiry from the French Ambassador as to whether the Imperial Government had proposed any course of action, the Secretary of State said that he had felt that time would be saved by communicating with Vienna direct, and that he had asked the Austro-Hungarian Government what would satisfy them. No answer had, however, yet been returned.

The Chancellor told me last night that he was "pressing the button" as hard as he could, and that he was not sure whether he had not gone so far in urging moderation at Vienna that matters had been precipitated rather than otherwise.

* See No. 84.

No. 108.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.) BERLIN, July 31, 1914.

Chancellor infoms me that his efforts to preach peace and moderation at Vienna have been seriously handicapped by the Russian mobilisation against Austria. He has done everything possible to attain his object at Vienna, perhaps even rather more than was altogether palatable at the Ballplatz. He could not, however, leave his country defenceless while time was being utilised by other Powers; and if, as he learns is the case, military measures are now being taken by Russia against Germany also, it would be impossible for him to remain quiet. He wished to tell me that it was quite possible that in a very short time, to-day perhaps, the German Government would take some very serious step; he was, in fact, just on the point of going to have an audience with the Emperor.

His Excellency added that the news of the active preparations on the Russo-German frontier had reached him just when the Czar had appealed to the Emperor, in

the name of their old friendship, to mediate at Vienna, and when the Emperor was actually conforming to that request.

No. 109.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.) BERLIN, July 31, 1914.

I read to the Chancellor this morning your answer to his appeal for British neutrality in the event of war, as contained in your telegram of yesterday.* His Excellency was so taken up with the news of the Russian measures along the frontier, referred to in my immediately preceding telegram, that he received your communication without comment. He asked me to let him have the message that I had just read to him as a memorandum, as he would like to reflect upon it before giving an answer and his mind was so full of grave matters that he could not be certain of remembering all its points. I therefore handed to him the text of your message on the understanding that it should be regarded merely as a record of conversation, and not as an official document.

His Excellency agreed.

* See No. 101.

No. 110.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.) FOREIGN OFFICE, July 31, 1914.

I learn from the German Ambassador that, as a result of suggestions by the German Government, a conversation has taken place at Vienna between the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Russian Ambassador. The Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh has also been instructed that he may converse with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and that he should give explanations about the Austrian ultimatum to Servia, and discuss suggestions and any questions directly affecting Austro-Russian relations. If the Russian Government object to the Austrians mobilising eight army corps it might be pointed out that this is not too great a number against 400,000 Servians.

The German Ambassador asked me to urge the Russian Government to show goodwill in the discussions and to suspend their military preparations.

It is with great satisfaction that I have learnt that discussions are being resumed between Austria and Russia, and you should express this to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and tell him that I earnestly hope he will encourage them.

I informed the German Ambassador that, as regards military preparations, I did not see how Russia could be urged to suspend them unless some limit were put by Austria to the advance of her troops into Servia.

No. 111.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(Telegraphic.) FOREIGN OFFICE, July 31, 1913.

I hope that the conversations which are now proceeding between Austria and Russia may lead to a satisfactory result. The stumbling-block hitherto has been Austrian mistrust of Servian assurances, and Russian mistrust of Austrian inten-

tions with regard to the independence and integrity of Servia. It has occurred to me that, in the event of this mistrust preventing a solution being found by Vienna and St. Petersburgh, Germany might sound Vienna, and I would undertake to sound St. Petersburgh, whether it would be possible for the four disinterested Powers to offer to Austria that they would undertake to see that she obtained full satisfaction of her demands on Servia, provided that they did not impair Servian sovereignty and the integrity of Servian territory. As your Excellency is aware, Austria has already declared her willingness to respect them. Russia might be informed by the four Powers that they would undertake to prevent Austrian demands going the length of impairing Servian sovereignty and integrity. All Powers would of course suspend further military operations or preparations.

You may sound the Secretary of State about this proposal.

I said to German Ambassador this morning that if Germany could get any reasonable proposal put forword which made it clear that Germany and Austria were striving to preserve European peace, and that Russia and France would be unreasonable if they rejected it, I would support it at St. Petersburgh and Paris, and go the length of saying that if Russia and France would not accept it His Majesty's Government would have nothing more to do with the consequences; but, otherwise, I told German Ambassador that if France became involved we should be drawn in.

You can add this when sounding Chancellor or Secretary of State as to proposal above.

No. 112.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.) BERLIN, July 31, 1914.

According to information just received by German Government from their Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, whole Russian army and fleet are being mobilised. Chancellor tells me that "Kriegsgefahr" will be proclaimed at once by German Government, as it can only be against Germany that Russian general mobilisation is directed. Mobilisation would follow almost immediately. His Excellency added in explanation that "Kriegsgefahr" signified the taking of certain precautionary measures consequent upon strained relations with a foreign country.

This news from St. Petersburgh, added his Excellency, seemed to him to put an end to all hope of a peaceful solution of the crisis. Germany must certainly prepare for all emergencies.

I asked him whether he could not still put pressure on the authorities at Vienna to do something in general interests to reassure Russia and to show themselves disposed to continue discussions on a friendly basis. He replied that last night he had begged Austria to reply to your last proposal, and that he had received a reply to the effect that Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs would take wishes of the Emperor this morning in the matter.

No. 113.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.) ST. PETERSBURGH, July 31, 1914.

It has been decided to issue orders for general mobilisation.

This decision was taken in consequence of report received from Russian Ambassador in Vienna to the effect that Austria is determined not to yield to intervention of Powers, and that she is moving troops against Russia as well as against Servia.

Russia has also reason to believe that Germany is making active military preparations, and she cannot afford to let her get a start.

No. 114.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie and Sir E. Goschen.

(Telegraphic.) FOREIGN OFFICE, July 31, 1914.

I still trust that situation is not irretrievable, but in view of prospect of mobilisation in Germany it becomes essential to His Majesty's Government, in view of existing treaties, to ask whether French (German) Government is prepared to engage to respect neutrality of Belgium so long as no other Power violates it.

A similar request is being addressed to German (French) Government. It is important to have an early answer.

No. 115.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Villiers.

(Telegraphic.) FOREIGN OFFICE, July 31, 1914.

In view of existing treaties, you should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs that, in consideration of the possibility of a European war, I have asked French and German Governments whether each is prepared to respect the neutrality of Belgium provided it is violated by no other Power.

You should say that I assume that the Belgian Government will maintain to the utmost of her power her neutrality, which I desire and expect other Powers to uphold and observe.

You should inform the Belgian Government that an early reply is desired.

No. 116.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(Telegraphic.) FOREIGN OFFICE, July 31, 1914.

I have received your telegram of yesterday's date.*

Nobody here feels that in this dispute, so far as it has yet gone, British treaties or obligations are involved. Feeling is quite different from what it was during the Morocco question. That crisis involved a dispute directly involving France, whereas in this case France is being drawn into a dispute which is not hers.

I believe it to be quite untrue that our attitude has been a decisive factor in situation. German Government do not expect our neutrality.

We cannot undertake a definite pledge to intervene in a war. I have so told the French Ambassador, who has urged His Majesty's Government to reconsider this decision.

I have told him that we should not be justified in giving any pledge at the present moment, but that we will certainly consider the situation again directly there is a new development.

* See No. 99.

No. 117.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.) PARIS, July 31, 1914.

AT 7 o'clock this evening I was sent for by Minister for Foreign Affairs. When I arrived the German Ambassador was leaving his Excellency.

German Ambassador had informed his Excellency that, in view of the fact that orders had been given for the total mobilisation of Russian army and fleet, German Government have in an ultimatum which they have addressed to the Russian Government required that Russian forces should be demobilised.

The German Government will consider it necessary to order the total mobilisation of the German army on the Russian and French frontiers if within twelve hours the Russian Government do not give an undertaking to comply with German demand.

The Minister for Foreign Affaiars asks me to communicate this to you, and enquires what; in these circumstances, will be the attitude of England.

German Ambassador could not say when the twelve hours terminates. He is going to call at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to-morrow (Saturday) at 1 p.m. in order to receive the French Government's answer as to the attitude they will adopt in the circumstances.

He intimated the possibility of his requiring his passports.

I am informed by the Russian Ambassador that he is not aware of any general [illegible] Russian forces having taken [illegible]

No. 118.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.) VIENNA, July 31, 1914.

I am informed by Count Forgach, Under-Secretary of State, that although Austria was compelled to respond to Russian mobilisation, which he deplored, the Austrian Ambassador in London has received instructions to inform you that mobilisation was not to be regarded as a necessarily hostile act on either side. Telegrams were being exchanged between the Emperor of Russia and the German Emperor, and conversations were proceeding between Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh and Russian Minister for Foreign Afftirs. A general war might, he seriously hoped, be staved off by these efforts. On my expressing my fear that Germany would mobilise, he said that Germany must do something, in his opinion, to secure her position. As regards Russian intervention on behalf of Servia, Austria-Hungary found it difficult to recognize such a claim. I called his attentiin to the fact that during the discussion of the Albanian frontier at the London Conference of Ambassadors the Russian Government had stood behind Servia, and that a compromise between the views of Russia and Austria-Hungary resulted with accepted frontier line. Although he spoke in a conciliatory tone, and did not regard the situation as desperate, I could not get from him any suggestion for a similar compromise in the present case. Count Forgach is going this afternoon to see the Russian Ambassador, whom I have informed of the above conversation.

The Russian Ambassador has explained that Russia has no desire to interfere unduly with Servia; that, as compared with the late Russian Minister, the present Minister at Belgrade is a man of very moderate views; and that, as regards Austrian demands, Russia had counselled Servia to yield to them as far as she possibly could

without sacrificing her independence. His Excellency is exerting himself strongly in the interests of peace.

No. 119.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

Sir, FOREIGN OFFICE, July 31, 1914.

M. Cambon referred to-day to a telegram that had been shown to Sir Arthur Nicolson this morning from the French Ambassador in Berlin, saying that it was the uncertainty with regard to whether we would intervene which was the encouraging element in Berlin, and that, if we would only declare definitely on the side of Russia and France, it would decide the German attitude in favour of peace.

I said that it was quite wrong to suppose that we had left Germany under the impression that we would not intervene. I had refused overtures to promise that we should remain neutral. I had not only definitely declined to say that we would remain neutral, I had even gone so far this morning as to say to the German Ambassador that, if France and Germany became involved in war, we should be drawn into it. That, of course, was not the same thing as taking an engagement to France, and I told M. Cambon of it only to show that we had not left Germany under the impression that we would stand aside.

Mr. Cambon then asked me for my reply to what he had said yesterday.

I said that we had come to the conclusion, in the Cabinet to-day, that we could not give any pledge at the present time. Though we should have to put our policy before Parliament, we could not pledge Parliament in advance. Up to the present moment, we did not feel, and public opinion did not feel, that any treaties or obligations of this country were involved. Further developments might alter this situation and cause the Government and Parliament to take the view that intervention was justified. The preservation of the neutrality of Belgium might be, I would not say a decisive, but an important factor, in determining our attitude. Whether we proposed to Parliament to intervene or not to intervene in a war, Parliament would wish to know how we stood with regard to the neutrality of Belgium, and it might be that I should ask both France and Germany whether each was prepared to undertake an engagement that she would not be the first to violate the neutrality of Belgium.

M. Cambon repeated his question whether we would help France if Germany made an attack on her.

I said that I could only adhere to the answer that, as far as things had gone at present, we could not take any engagement.

M. Cambon urged that Germany had from the beginning rejected proposals that might have made for peace. It could not be to England' interest that France should be crushed by Germany. We should then be in a very diminished position with regard to Germany. In 1870 we had made a great mistake in allowing an enormous increase of Germna strength, and we should now be repeating the mistake. He asked me whether I could not submit his question to the Cabinet again.

I said that the Cabinet would certainly be summoned as soon as there was some new development, but at the present moment the only answer I could give was that we could not undertake any definite engagement.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

No. 120.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.) ST. PETERSBURG, July 31, 1914.

Minister for Foreign Affairs sent for me and French Ambassador and asked us to telegraph to our respective Governments subjoined formula as best calculated to amalgamate proposal made by you in your telegram of 30th July* with formula recorded in my telegram of 30th July.† He trusted it would meet with your approval:—

"Si l'Autriche consentira à arrêter marche de ses troupes sur le territoire serbe, si, reconnaissant que le conflit austro-serbe a assumé le caractère d'une question d'intérêt européen, elle admet que les Grandes Puissances examinent la satisfaction que la Serbie pourrait accorder au Gouvernement d'Autriche-Hongrie sans laisser porter atteinte à ses droits d'Etat souverain et à son indépendance, la Russie s'engage à conserver son attitude expectante." ‡

"If Austria will agree to check the advance of her troops on Servian territory; if, recognizing that the dispute between Austria and Servia has assumed a character of European interest, she will allow the Great Powers to look into the matter and determine whether Servia could satisfy the Austro-Hungarian Government without impairing her rights as a sovereign State or her independence, Russia will undertake to maintain her waiting attitude."

His Excellency then alluded to the telegram sent to German Emperor by Emperor of Russia in reply to the former's telegram. He said that Emperor Nicholas had begun by thanking Emperor William for his telegram and for the hopes of peaceful solution which it held out. His Majesty had then proceeded to assure Emperor William that no intention whatever of an aggressive character was concealed behind Russian military preparations. So long as conversation with Austria continued, His Imperial Majesty undertook that not a single man should be moved across the frontier; it was, however, of course impossible, for reasons explained, to stop a mobilisation which was already in progress.

M. Sazonof said that undoubtedly there would be better prospect of a peaceful solution if the suggested conversation were to take place in London, where the atmosphere was far more favourable, and he therefore hoped that you would see your way to agreeing to this.

His Excellency ended by expressing his deep gratitude to His Majesty's Government, who had done so much to save the situation. It would be largely due to them if war were prevented. The Emperor, the Russian Government, and the Russian people would never forget the firm attitude adopted by Great Britain.

* See No. 103.
† See No. 97.

No. 121.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 1.)

BERLIN, July 31, 1914.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram of 31st July.*

I spent an hour with Secretary of State urging him most earnestly to accept your proposal and make another effort to prevent terrible catastrophe of a European war.

He expressed himself very sympathetically towards your proposal, and appreciated your efforts to maintain peace, but said it was impossible for the Imperial

Government to consider any proposal until they had received an answer from Russia to their communication of to-day; this communication, which he admitted had the form of an ultimatum, being that, unless Russia could inform the Imperial Government within twelve hours that she would immediately countermand her mobilisation against Germany and Austria, Germany would be obliged on her side to mobilise at once.

I asked his Excellency why they had made their demand even more difficult for Russia to accept by asking them to demobilise in south as well. He replied that it was in order to prevent Russia from saying all her mobilisation was only directed against Austria.

His Excellency said that if the answer from Russia was satisfactory he thought personally that your proposal merited favourable consideration, and in any case he would lay it before the Emperor and Chancellor, but he repeated that it was no use discussing it until the Russian Government had sent in their answer to the German demand.

He again assured me that both the Emperor William, at the request of the Emperor of Russia, and the German Foreign Office had even up till last night been urging Austria to show willingness to continue discussions—and telegraphic and telephonic communications from Vienna had been of a promising nature—but Russia's mobilisation had spoilt everything.

* See No. 111.

No. 122.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 1.)

BERLIN, July 31, 1914.

(Telegraphic.)

Neutrality of Belgium, referred to in your telegram of 31st July to Sir F. Bertie.†

I have seen Secretary of State, who informs me that he must consult the Emperor and the Chancellor before he could possibly answer. I gathered from what he said that he thought any reply they might give could not but disclose a certain amount of their plan of campaign in the event of war ensuing, and he was therefore very doubtful whether they would return any answer at all. His Excellency, nevertheless, took note of your request.

It appears from what he said that German Government consider that certain hostile acts have already been committed by Belgium. As an instance of this, he alleged that a consignment of corn for Germany had been placed under an embargo already.

I hope to see his Excellency to-morrow again to discuss the matter further, but the prospect of obtaining a definite answer seems to me remote.

In speaking to me to-day the Chancellor made it clear that Germany would in any case desire to know the reply returned to you by the French Government.

* See No. 114.

No. 123.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 1, 1914.

Sir,

I told the German Ambassador to-day that the reply* of the German Government with regard to the neutrality of Belgium was a matter of very great regret,

* See No. 122.

because the neutrality of Belgium affected feeling in this country. If Germany could see her way to give the same assurance as that which had been given by France it would materially contribute to relieve anxiety and tension here. On the other hand, if there were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant while the other respected it, it would be extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in this country. I said that we had been discussing this question at a Cabinet meeting, and as I was authorized to tell him this I gave him a memorandum of it.

He asked me whether, if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgium neutrality we would engage to remain neutral.

I replied that I could not say that; our hands were still free, and we were considering what our attitude should be. All I could say was that our attitude would be determined largely by public opinion here, and that the neutrality of Belgium would appeal very strongly to public opinion here. I did not think that we could give a promise of neutrality on that condition alone.

The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not formulate conditions on which we would remain neutral. He even suggested that the integrity of France and her colonies might be guaranteed.

I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise to remain neutral on similar terms, and I could only say that we must keep our hands free.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

No. 124.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 1.)

PARIS, July 31, 1914.

(Telegraphic.)

On the receipt at 8.30 to-night of your telegram of this afternoon,* I sent a message to Minister for Foreign Affairs requesting to see him. He received me at 10.30 to-night at the Elysée, where a Cabinet Council was being held. He took a note of the enquiry as to the respecting by France of the neutrality of Belgium which you instructed me to make.

He told me that a communication had been made to you by the German Ambassador in London of the intention of Germany to order a general mobilisation of her army if Russia do not demobilise at once. He is urgently anxious as to what the attitude of England will be in the circumstances, and begs an answer may be made by His Majesty's Government at the earliest moment possible.

Minister for Foreign Affairs also told me that the German Embassy is packing up.

* See No. 114.

No. 125.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 1.)

PARIS, July 31, 1914.

(Telegraphic.)

My immediately preceding telegram.*

Political Director has brought me the reply of the Minister for Foreign Affairs to your enquiry respecting the neutrality of Belgium. It is as follows:—

* See No. 124.

French Government are resolved to respect the neutrality of Belgium, and it would only be in the event of some other Power violating that neutrality that France might find herself under the necessity, in order to assure defence of her own security, to act otherwise. This assurance has been given several times. President of the Republic spoke of it to the King of the Belgians, and the French Minister at Brussels has spontaneously renewed the assurance to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day.

No. 126.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 1.)

PARIS, August 1, 1914.

(Telegraphic.)

I have had conversation with the Political Director, who states that the German Ambassador was informed, on calling at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs this morning, that the French Government failed to comprehend the reason which prompted his communication of yesterday evening. It was pointed out to his Excellency that general mobilisation in Russia had not been ordered until after Austria had decreed a general mobilisation, and that the Russian Government were ready to demobilise if all Powers did likewise. It seemed strange to the French Government that in view of this and of the fact that Russia and Austria were ready to converse, the German Government should have at that moment presented an ultimatum at St. Petersburgh requiring immediate demobilisation by Russia. There were no differences at issue between France and Germany, but the German Ambassador had made a menacing communication to the French Government and had requested an answer the next day, intimating that he would have to break off relations and leave Paris if the reply were not satisfactory. The Ambassador was informed that the French Government considered that this was an extraordinary proceeding.

The German Ambassador, who is to see the Minister for Foreign Affairs again this evening, said nothing about demanding his passports, but he stated that he had packed up.

No. 127.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 1.)

VIENNA, August 1, 1914.

(Telegraphic.)

General mobilisation of army and fleet.

No. 128.

Sir F. Villiers to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 1.)

BRUSSELS, August 1, 1914.

(Telegraphic.)

Belgian neutrality.

The instructions conveyed in your telegram of yesterday* have been acted upon.

Belgium expects and desires that other Powers will observe and uphold her neutrality, which she intends to maintain to the utmost of her power. In so informing me, Minister for Foreign Affairs said that, in the event of the violation of the neutrality of their territory, they believed that they were in a position to defend them-

* See No. 115.

selves against intrusion. The relations beaween Belgium and her neighbours were excellent, and there was no reason to suspect their intentions; but he thought it well, nevertheless, to be prepared against emergencies.

No. 129.

Minister of State, Luxemburg, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 2.)

LUXEMBOURG, 2 août 1914.

(Télégraphique.)

Ministre d'Etat du Luxembourg Eyschen vient de recevoir par l'intermédiaire du Ministre d'Allemagne à Luxembourg, M. de Buch, un télégramme du Chancelier de l'Empire allemand Bethmann-Hollweg disant que les mesures militaires à Luxembourg ne constituent pas un acte hostile contre le Luxembourg, mais sont uniquement des mesures destinées à assurer contre l'attaque éventuelle d'une armée française. L'exploitation des voies ferrées affermées à l'Empire Luxembourg recevra complète indemnité pour dommages éventuels.

(Translation.)

LUXEMBURG, August 2, 1914.

(Telegraphic.)

The Luxemburg Minister of State has just received through the German Minister in Luxemburg, M. de Buch, a telegram from the Chancellor of the German Empire, Bethmann-Hollweg, to the effect that the military measures taken in Luxemburg do not constitute a hostile act against Luxemburg, but are only intended to insure against a possible attack of a French army. Full compensation will be paid to Luxemburg for any damage caused by using the railways which are leased to the Empire.

No. 130.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 1, 1914.

(Telegraphic.)

We are informed that authorities at Hamburg have forcibly detained steamers belonging to the Great Central Company and other British Merchant-ships.

I cannot ascertain on what grounds the detention of British ships has been ordered.

You should request German Government to send immediate orders that they should be allowed to proceed without delay. The effect on public opinion here will be deplorable unless this is done. His Majesty's Government, on their side, are most anxious to avoid any incident of an aggressive nature, and the German Government will, I hope, be equally careful not to take any step which would make the situation between us impossible.

No. 131.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 1, 1914.

(Telegraphic.)

I still believe that it might be possible to secure peace if only a little respite in time can be gained before any Great Power begins war.

The Russian Government has communicated to me the readiness of Austria to discuss with Russia and the readiness of Austria to accept a basis of mediation which is not open to the objections raised in regard to the formula which Russia originally suggested.

Things ought not to be hopeless so long as Austria and Russia are ready to converse, and I hope that German Government may be able to make use of the Russian communications referred to above, in order to avoid tension. His Majesty's Government are carefully abstaining from any act which may precipitate matters.

No. 132.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 1, 1914.

(Telegraphic.)

Following telegram from Mr. Sazonof to Count Benckendorff of the 31st July communicated to me to-day:—

"(Urgent.)

"Formule amendée conformént à la proposition anglaise: 'Si Autriche consent à arrêter la marché de ses troupes sur le territoire serbe et si, reconnaissant que le conflit austro-serge a assumé le caractère d'une question d'intérêt européen, elle admet que les Grandes Puissances examinent la satisfaction que la Serbie pourrait accorder au Gouvernement austro-hongrois sans laisser porter atteinte à des droits d'Etat souverain et à son indépendance, la Russie s'engage à conserver son attitude expectante".

TRANSLATION—"Formula amended in accordance with the English proposal: "If Austria consents to stay the march of her troops in Servian territory, and if recognising that the Austro-Servian confflict has assumed the character of a question of European interest, she admits that the Great Powers may examine the satisfaction which Servia can accord to the Austro-Hungarian Government without injury to her sovereign rights as a State and to her independence, Russia undertakes to preser her waiting attitude."

(Above communicated to all Powers.)

No. 133.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(Telegraphic.) FOREIGN OFFICE, August 1, 1914.

M. de Etter came to-day to communicate the contents of a telegram from M. Sazonoff, dated the 31st July, which are as follows:—

> "The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador declared the readiness of his Government to discuss the substance of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia. M. Sazonoff replied by expressing his satisfaction, and said it was desirable that the discussions should take place in London with the participation of the Great Powers.
>
> "M. Sazonoff hoped that the British Government would assume the direction of these discussions. The whole of Europe would be thankful to them. It would be very important that Austria should meanwhile put a stop provisionally to her military action on Servian territory."

(The above has been communicated to the six Powers.)

No. 134.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.) PARIS, August 1, 1914.

President of the Republic has informed me that German Government were trying to saddle Russia with the responsibility; that it was only after a decree of general mobilisation had been issued in Austria that the Emperor of Russia ordered a general mobilisation; that, although the measures which the German Government have already taken are in effect a general mobilisation they are not so designated; that a French general mobilisation will become necessary in self-defence, and that France is already forty-eight hours behind Germany as regards German military preparations; that the French troops have orders not to go nearer to the German frontier than a distance of 10 kilom. so as to avoid any grounds for accusations of provocation to Germany, whereas the German troops, on the other hand, are actually on the French frontier and have made incursions on it; that, notwithstanding mobilisations, the Emperor of Russia has expressed himself ready to continue his conversations with the German Ambassador with a view to preserving the peace; that French Government, whose wishes are markedly pacific, sincerely desire the preservation of peace and not quite despair, even now, of its being possible to avoid war.

No. 135.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.) FOREIGN OFFICE, August 1, 1914.

Information reaches me from a most reliable source that Austrian Government have informed German Government that though the situation has been changed by the mobilisation of Russia they would in full appreciation of the efforts of England for the preservation of peace be ready to consider favourably my proposal for mediation between Austria and Servia. The understanding of this acceptance would naturally be that the Austrian military action against Servia would continue for the present, and that the British Government would urge upon Russian Government to stop the mobilisation of troops directed against Austria, in which case Austria would naturally cancel those defensive counter-measures in Galicia, which have been forced upon Austria by Russian mobilisation.

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs and say that if, in the consideration of the acceptance of mediation by Austria, Russia can agree to stop mobilisation, it appears still to be possible to preserve peace. Presumably the matter should be discussed with German Government, also by Russian Government.

No. 136.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.) PARIS, August 1, 1914.

Minister of War informed military attaché this afternoon that orders had been given at 3.40 for a general mobilisation of the French army. This became necessary because the Minister of War knows that, under the system of "Kriegszustand," the Germans have called up six classes. Three classes are sufficient to bring their covering troops up to war strength, the remaining three being the reserve. This, he says, being tantamount to mobilisation, is mobilisation under another name.

The French forces on the frontier have opposed to them eight army corps on a war footing, and an attack is expected at any moment. It is, therefore, of the utmost importance to guard against this. A zone of 10 kilom. has been left between the French troops and German frontier. The French troops will not attack, and the Minister of War is anxious that it should be explained that this act of mobilisation is one for purely defensive purposes.

No. 137.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(Telegraphic.) FOREIGN OFFICE, August 1, 1914.

I saw the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador this morning. He supplied me with the substance of a telegram which the Austro-Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs had sent to the Austrian Ambassador in Paris. In this telegram His Excellency was given instructions to assure the French Minister for Foreign Affairs that there was no intention in the minds of the Austro-Hungarian Government to impair the sovereign rights of Servia or to obtain territorial aggrandisement. The Ambassador added that he was further instructed to inform the French Minister for Foreign Affairs that there was no truth in the report which had been published in Paris to the effect that Austria-Hungary intended to occupy the sanjak.

Count Mensdorff called again later at the Foreign Office. He informed me of a telegram sent yesterday to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh by Count Berchtold, and gave me the substance.

It states that Count Berchtold begged the Russian Ambassador, whom he sent for yesterday, to do his best to remove the wholly erroneous impression in St. Petersburgh that the "door had been banged" by Austria-Hungary on all further conversations. The Russian Ambassador promised to do this. Count Berchtold repeated on this occasion to the Russian Ambassador the assurance which had already been given at St. Petersburgh, to the effect that neither an infraction of Servian sovereign rights nor the acquisition of Servian territory was being contemplated by Austria-Hungary.

Special attention was called by Count Mensdorff to the fact that this telegram contains a statement to the effect that conversations at St. Petersburgh had not been broken off by Austria-Hungary.

No. 138.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.) BERLIN, August 1, 1914.

Your telegram of to-day.*

I have communicated the substance of the above telegram to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and spent a long time arguing with him that the chief dispute was between Austria and Russia, and that Germany was only drawn in as Austria's ally. If therefore Austria and Russia were, as was evident, ready to discuss matters and Germany did not desire war on her own account, it seemed to me only logical that Germany should hold her hand and continue to work for a peaceful settlement. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that Austria's readiness to discuss was the result of German influence at Vienna, and, had not Russia mobilized against Germany, all would have been well. But Russia by abstaining from answering Germany's demand that she should demobilize, had caused Germany to mobilize also. Russia had said that her mobilisation did not necessarily imply war, and that

* See No. 131.

she could perfectly well remain mobilised for months without making war. This was not the case with Germany. She had the speed and Russia had the numbers, and the safety of the German Empire forbade that Germany should allow Russia time to bring up masses of troops from all parts of her wide dominions. The situation now was that, though the Imperial Government had allowed her several hours beyond the specified time, Russia had sent no answer. Germany had therefore ordered mobilisation, and the German representative at St. Petersburgh had been instructed within a certain time to inform the Russian Government that the Imperial Government must regard their refusal to answer as creating a state of war.

No. 139.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.) ST. PETERSBURGH, August 1, 1914.

My telegram of 31st July.*

The Emperor of Russia read his telegram to the German Emperor to the German Ambassador at the audience given to his Excellency yesterday. No progress whatever was made.

In the evening M. Sazonof had an interview with the Austrian Ambassador who, not being definitely instructed by his Government, did his best to deflect the conversation towards a general discussion of the relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia instead of keeping to the question of Servia. In reply the Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed his desire that these relations should remain friendly, and said that, taken in general, they were perfectly satisfactory; but the real question which they had to solve at this moment was whether Austria was to crush Servia and to reduce her to the status of a vassal, or whether she was to leave Servia a free and independent State. In these circumstances, while the Servian question was unsolved, the abstract discussion of the relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia was a waste of time. The only place where a successful discussion of this question could be expected was London, and any such discussion was being made impossible by the action of Austria-Hungary in subjecting Belgrade, a virtually unfortified town, to bombardment.

M. Sazonof informed the French Ambassador and myself this morning of his conversation with the Austrian Ambassador. He went on to say that during the Balkan crisis he had made it clear to the Austrian Government that war with Russia must inevitably follow an Austrian attack on Servia. It was clear that Austrian domination of Servia was as intolerable for Russia as the dependence of the Netherlands on Germany would be to Great Britain. It was, in fact, for Russia a question of life and death. The policy of Austhria had throughout been both tortuous and immoral, and she thought that she could treat Russia with defiance, secure in the support of her German ally. Similarly the policy of Germany had been an equivocal and double-faced policy, and it mattered little whether the German Government knew or did not know the terms of the Austrian ultimatum; what mattered was that her intervention with the Austrian Government had been postponed until the moment had passed when its influence would have been felt. Germany was unfortunate in her representatives in Vienna and St. Petersburgh: the former was a violent Russophobe who had urged Austria on, the latter had reported to his Government that Russia would never go to war. M. Sazanof was completely weary of the ceaseless endeavours he had made to avoid a war. No suggestion held out to him had been refused. He had accepted the proposal for a conference of four, for mediation by Great Britain and Italy, for direct conversation between Austria and Russia; but Germany and Austria-Hungary had either rendered these attempts for peace ineffective by evasive replies or had refused them altogether. The action of the Austro-Hungarian Government and the German preparations had forced the Russian Government to order mobilisation, and the mobilisation of Germany had created a desperate situation.

* See No. 120.

M. Sazonof added that the formula, of which the text is contained in my telegram of 31st July,* had been forwarded by the Russian Government to Vienna, and he would adhere to it if you could obtain its acceptance before the frontier was crossed by German troops. In no case would Russa begin hostilities first.

I now see no possibility of a general war being avoided unless the agreement of France and Germany can be obtained to keep their armies mobilised on their own sides of the frontier, as Russia has expressed her readiness to do, pending a last attempt to reach a settlement of the present crisis.

* See No. 120.

No. 140.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.) PARIS, August 1, 1914.

The Minister of War again sent for the military attaché this evening, as he said he wished to keep him informed of the situation. He laid great stress on the fact that the zone of 10 kilom. which he had arranged between the French troops and the German frontier, and which was still occupied by peasants, was a proof of the French endeavours to commit no provocative act.

No. 141.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.) VIENNA, August 1, 1914.

I am to be received to-morrow by Minister for Foreign Affairs. This afternoon he is to see the French and Russian Ambassadors. I have just been informed by the Russian Ambassador of German ultimatum requiring that Russia should demobilise within twelve hours. On being asked by the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs whether the inevitable refusal of Russia to yield to this curt summons meant war, the German Ambassador replied that Germany would be forced to mobilise if Russia refused. Russian Ambassador at Vienna thinks that war is almost inevitable, and that mobilisation is too expensive to be kept for long, Germany will attack Russia at once. He says that the so-called mobilisation of Russia amounted to nothing more that that Russia had taken military measures corresponding to those taken by Germany. There seems to be even greater tension between Germany and Russia than there is between Austria and Russia. Russia would, according to the Russian Ambassador, be satisfied even now with assurance respecting Servian integrity and independence. He says that Russia had no intention to attack Austria. He is going again to-day to point out to the Minister of Foreign Affairs that most terrific consequences must ensue from refusal to make this slight concession. This time Russia would fight to the last extremity. I agree with his Excellency that the German Ambassador at Vienna desired war from the first, and that his strong personal bias probably coloured his action here. The Russian Ambassador is convinced that the German Government also desired war from the first.

It is the intention of the French Ambassador to speak earnestly to the Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day on the extreme danger of the situation, and to ask whether proposals to serve as a basis of mediation from any quarter are being considered. There is great anxiety to know what England will do. I fear that nothing can alter the determination of Austro-Hungarian Government to proceed on their present course, if they have made up their mind with the approval of Germany.

No. 142.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.) BERLIN, August 1, 1914.

Orders have just been issued for the general mobilisation of the navy and army, the first day of mobilisation to be 2nd August.

No. 143.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.) BERLIN, August 1, 1914.

Detention of British merchant ship at Hamburg.

Your telegram of 1st August* acted on.

Secretary of State, who expressed the greatest surprise and annoyance, has promised to send orders at once to allow steamers to proceed without delay.

* See No. 130.

No. 144.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.) BERLIN, August 2, 1914.

Secretary of State has just informed me that, owing to certain Russian troops having crossed frontier, Germany and Russia are now in a state of war.

No. 145.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.) BERLIN, August 2, 1914.

My telegram of 1st August.*

Secretary of State informs me that orders were sent last night to allow British ships in Hamburg to proceed on their way. He says that this must be regarded as a special favour to His Majesty's Government, as no other foreign ships have been allowed to leave. Reason of detention was that mines were being laid and other precautions being taken.

* See No. 143.

No. 146.

Sir F. Villiers to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.) BRUSSELS, August 2, 1914.

The news that a German force has entered Grand Duchy of Luxemburg has been officially confirmed to the Belgian Government.

No. 147.

Minister of State, Luxemburg, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 2.)

(Télégraphique.)

LUXEMBOURG, le 2 août 1914.

J'ai l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de votre Excellence les faits suivants: Dimanche, 2 août, de grand matin, les troupes allemandes, d'après les informations qui sont parvenues au Gouvernement Grand ducal à l'heure actuelle, ont pénétré sur le territoire luxembourgeois par les ponts de Wasserbillig et de Remich, se dirigeant spécialement vers le sud du pays et vers la ville de Luxembourg, capitale du Grand Duché. Un certain nombre de trains blindés avec des troupes et des munitions ont été acheminés par la voie de chemin de fer de Wasserbillig à Luxembourg, et l'on s'attend de les voir arriver. D'un instant à l'autre, ces faits impliquent des actes manifestement contraire à la neutralité du Grand Duché garantie par le Traité de Londres de 1867. Le Gouvernement luxembourgeois n'a pas manqué de protester énergiquement contre cette agression auprès des représentants de Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Allemagne à Luxembourg. Une protestation identique va être transmise télégraphiquement au Secrétaire d'Etat pour les Affaires Etrangères à Berlin.

(Translation.)

LUXEMBURG, August 2, 1914.

(Telegraphic.)

I have the honour to bring to your Excellency's notice the following facts:—

On Sunday, the 2nd August, very early, the German troops, according to the information which has up to now reached the Grand Ducal Government, penetrated into Luxemburg territory by the bridges of Wasserbillig and Remich, and proceeded particularly towards the south and in the direction of Luxemburg, the capital of the Grand Duchy. A certain number of armoured trains with troops and ammunition have been sent along the railway line from Wasserbillig to Luxemburg, where their arrival is expected. These occurrences constitute acts which are manifestly contrary to the neutrality of the Grand Duchy as guaranteed by the Treaty of London of 1867. The Luxemburg Government have not failed to address an energetic protest against this aggression to the representatives of His Majesty the German Emperor at Luxemburg. An identical protest will be sent by telegraph to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at Berlin.

No. 148.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(Telegraphic.) FOREIGN OFFICE, August 2, 1914.

After the Cabinet this morning I gave M. Cambon the following memorandum:—

"I am authorised to give an assurance that, if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power.

"This assurance is of course subject to the policy of His Majesty's Government receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be taken as binding His Majesty's Government to take any action until the above contingency of action by the German fleet takes place."

I pointed out that we had very large questions and most difficult issues to consider, and that Government felt that they could not bind themselves to declare war upon Germany necessarily if war broke out between France and Germany to-morrow, but it was essential to the French Government, whose fleet had long been concentrated in the Mediterranean, to know how to make their dispositions with their north coast entirely undefended. We therefore thought it necessary to give them this assurance. It did not bind us to go to war with Germany unless the German fleet took the action

indicated, but it did give a security to France that would enable her to settle the disposition of her own Mediterranean fleet.

M. Cambon asked me about the violation of Luxemburg. I told him the doctrine on that point laid down by Lord Derby and Lord Clarendon in 1867. He asked me what we should say about the violation of the neutrality of Belgium. I said that was a much more important matter; we were considering what statement we should make in Parliament to-morrow—in effect, whether we should declare violation of Belgian neutrality to be a *casus belli*. I told him what had been said to the German Ambassador on this point.

No. 149.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(Telegraphic.) FOREIGN OFFICE, August 2, 1914.

Your telegram of 1st August.*

I regret to learn that 100 tons of sugar was compulsorily unloaded from the British steamship "Sappho" at Hamburg and detained. Similar action appears to have been taken with regard to other British vessels loaded with sugar.

You should inform Secretary of State that, for reasons stated in my telegram of 1st August,† I most earnestly trust that the orders already sent to Hamburg to allow the clearance of British ships covers also the release of their cargoes, the detention of which cannot be justified.

* See No. 143. † See No. 136.

No. 150.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 3.)

(Telegraphic.) BERLIN, August 3, 1914.

Your telegram of 2nd August*: Detention of British ships at Hamburg.

No information available.

* See No. 149.

No. 151.

Sir F. Villiers to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 3.)

(Telegraphic.) BRUSSELS, August 3, 1914.

French Government have offered through their military attaché the support of five French army corps to the Belgian Government. Following reply has been received to-day:—

> "We are sincerely grateful to the French Government for offering eventual support. In the actual circumstances, however, we do not propose to appeal to the guarantee of the Powers. Belgian Government will decide later on the action which they may think it necessary to take."

No. 152.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 3, 1914.

Sir,—On the 1st instant the French Ambassador made the following communication:—

"In reply to the German Government's intimation of the fact that ultimatums had been presented to France and Russia, and to the question as to what were the intentions of Italy, the Marquis di San Guiliano replied:—

"'The war undertaken by Austria, and the consequences which might result, had in the words of the German Ambassador himself, an aggressive object. Both were therefore in conflict with the purely defensive character of the Triple Alliance, and in such circumstances Italy would remain neutral.'"

In making this communication, M. Cambon was instructed to lay stress upon the Italian declaration that the present war was not a defensive but an aggressive war, and that, for this reason, the *casus fœderis* under the terms of the Triple Alliance did not arise.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

No. 153.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(Telegraphic.) FOREIGN OFFICE, August 4, 1914.

The King of the Belgians has made an appeal to His Majesty the King for diplomatic intervention on behalf of Belgium in the following terms:—

"Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's friendship and that of your predecessor, and the friendly attitude of England in 1870 and the proof of friendship you have just given us again, I make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention of your Majesty's Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium."

His Majesty's Government are also informed that the German Government has delivered to the Belgian Government a note proposing friendly neutrality entailing free passage through Belgian territory, and promising to maintain the independence and integrity of the kingdom and its possessions at the conclusion of peace, threatening in case of refusal to treat Belgium as an enemy. An answer was requested within twelve hours.

We also understand that Belgium has categorically refused this as a flagrant violation of the law of nations.

His Majesty's Government are bound to protest against this violation of a treaty to which Germany is a party in common with themselves, and must request an assurance that the demand made upon Belgium will not be proceeded with and that her neutrality will be respected by Germany. You should ask for an immediate reply.

No. 154.

Sir F. Villiers to Sir Edward Grey. (Received August 4.)

(Telegraphic.) BRUSSELS, August 4, 1914.

German Minister has this morning addressed note to Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that as Belgian Government have declined the well-intentioned proposals submitted to them by the Imperial Government, the latter will, deeply to their regret, be compelled to carry out, if necessary by force of arms, the measures considered indispensable in view of the French menaces.

No. 155.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Villiers.

(Telegraphic.) FOREIGN OFFICE, August 4, 1914.

You should inform Belgian Government that if pressure is applied to them by Germany to induce them to depart from neutrality, His Majesty's Government expect

that they will resist by any means in their power, and that His Majesty's Government will support them in offering such resistance, and that His Majesty's Government in this event are prepared to join Russia and France, if desired, in offering to the Belgian Government at once common action for the purpose of resisting use of force by Germany against them, and a guarantee to maintain their independence and integrity in future years.

No. 156.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(Telegraphic.) FOREIGN OFFICE, August 4, 1914.

I continue to receive numerous complaints from British firms as to the detention of their ships at Hamburg, Cuxhaven, and other German ports. This action on the part of the German authorities is totally unjustifiable. It is in direct contravention of international law and of the assurances given to your Excellency by the Imperial Chancellor. You should demand the immediate release of all British ships if such release has not yet been given.

No. 157.

German Foreign Secretary to Prince Lichnowsky.—(Communicated by German Embassy, August 4.

(Telegraphic.) BERLIN, August 4, 1914.

Please dispel any mistrust that may subsist on the part of the British Government with regard to our intentions, by repeating most positively formal assurance that, even in the case of armed conflict with Belgium, Germany will, under no pretence whatever, annex Belgian territory. Sincerity of this declaration is borne out by fact that we solemnly pledged our word to Holland strictly to respect her neutrality. It is obvious that we could not profitably annex Belgian territory without making at the same time territorial acquisitions at expense of Holland. Please impress upon Sir E. Gray that German army could not be exposed to French attack across Belgium, which was planned according to absolutely unimpeachable information. Germany had consequently to disregard Belgian neutrality, it being for her a question of life or death to prevent French advance.

No. 158.

Sir F. Villiers to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 4.)

(Telegraphic.)

BRUSSELS, August 4, 1914.

Military attaché has been informed at War Office that German troops have entered Belgian territory, and that Liège has been summoned to surrender by small party of Germans who, however, were repulsed.

No. 159.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(Telegraphic.)

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 4, 1914.

We hear that Germany has addressed note to Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that German Government will be compelled to carry out, if necessary, by force of arms, the measures considered indispensable.

We are also informed that Belgian territory has been violated at Gemmenich.

In these circumstances, and in view of the fact that Germany declined to give the same assurance respecting Belgium as France gave last week in reply to our request made simultaneously at Berlin and Paris, we must repeat that request, and ask that a satisfactory reply to it and to my telegram of this morning* be received here by 12 o'clock to-night. If not, you are instructed to ask for your passports, and to say that His Majesty's Government feel bound to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany is as much a party as ourselves.

* See No. 153.

RETURN

(40*d*)

SPEECHES DELIVERED IN IMPERIAL HOUSE OF COMMONS IN AUGUST, 1914, RELATIVE TO GREAT BRITAIN AND EUROPEAN POWERS.

STATEMENT BY SIR EDWARD GREY.

The SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Sir Edward Grey): Last week I stated that we were working for peace not only for this country, but to preserve the peace of Europe. To-day events move so rapidly that it is exceedingly difficult to state with technical accuracy the actual state of affairs, but it is clear that the peace of Europe cannot be preserved. Russia and Germany, at any rate, have declared war upon each other.

Before I proceed to state the position of His Majesty's Government, I would like to clear the ground so that, before I come to state to the House what our attitude is with regard to the present crisis, the House may know exactly under what obligations the Government is, or the House can be said to be, in coming to a decision on the matter. First of all let me say, very shortly, that we have consistently worked with a single mind, with all the earnestness in our power, to preserve peace. The House may be satisfied on that point. We have always done it. During these last years, as far as His Majesty's Government are concerned, we would have no difficulty in proving that we have done so. Throughout the Balkan crisis, by general admission, we worked for peace. The co-operation of the Great Powers of Europe was successful in working for peace in the Balkan crisis. It is true that some of the Powers had great difficulty in adjusting their points of view. It took much time and labour and discussion before they could settle their differences, but peace was secured, because peace was their main object, and they were willing to give time and trouble rather than accentuate differences rapidly.

In the present crisis, it has not been possible to secure the peace of Europe; because there has been little time, and there has been a disposition—at any rate in some quarters on which I will not dwell—to force things rapidly to an issue, at any rate, to the great risk of peace, and, as we now know, the result of that is that the policy of peace, as far as the Great Powers generally are concerned, is in danger. I do not want to dwell on that, and to comment on it, and to say where the blame seems to us to lie, which Powers were most in favour of peace, which were most disposed to risk or endanger peace, because I would like the House to approach this crisis in which we are now, from the point of view of British interests, British honour, and British obligations, free from all passion as to why peace has not been preserved.

We shall publish Papers as soon as we can regarding what took place last week when we were working for peace; and when those Papers are published, I have no doubt that to every human being they will make it clear how strenuous and genuine and whole-hearted our efforts for peace were, and that they will enable people to form their own judgment as to what forces were at work which operated against peace.

I come first, now, to the question of British obligations. I have assured the House—and the Prime Minister has assured the House more than once—that if any crisis such as this arose, we should come before the House of Commons and be able to say to the House that it was free to decide what the British attitude should be, that we would have no secret engagement which we should spring upon the House, and tell

the House that, because we had entered into that engagement, there was an obligation of honour upon the country. I will deal with that point to clear the ground first.

There has been in Europe two diplomatic groups, the Triple Alliance and what came to be called the "Triple Entente," for some years past. The Triple Entente was not an Alliance—it was a Diplomatic group. The House will remember that in 1908 there was a crisis, also a Balkan crisis, originating in the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Russian Minister, M. Isvolsky, came to London, or happened to come to London, because his visit was planned before the crisis broke out. I told him definitely then, this being a Balkan crisis, a Balkan affair, I did not consider that public opinion in this country would justify us in promising to give anything more than diplomatic support. More was never asked from us, more was never given, and more was never promised.

In this present crisis, up till yesterday, we have also given no promise of anything more than diplomatic support—up till yesterday no promise of more than diplomatic support. Now I must make this question of obligation clear to the House. I must go back to the first Moroccan crisis of 1906. That was the time of the Algeciras Conference, and it came at a time of very great difficulty to His Majesty's Government when a General Election was in progress, and Ministers were scattered over the country, and I—spending three days a week in my constituency and three days at the Foreign Office—was asked the question whether if that crisis developed into war between France and Germany we would give armed support. I said then that I could promise nothing to any foreign Power unless it was subsequently to receive the whole-hearted support of public opinion here if the occasion arose. I said, in my opinion, if war was forced upon France, then on the question of Morocco—a question which had just been the subject of agreement between this country and France, an agreement exceedingly popular on both sides—that if out of that agreement war was forced on France at that time, in my view public opinion in this country would have rallied to the material support of France.

I gave no promise, but I expressed that opinion during the crisis, as far as I remember, almost in the same words, to the French Ambassador and the German Ambassador at the time. I made no promise, and I used no threats; but I expressed that opinion. That position was accepted by the French Government, but they said to me at the time—and I think very reasonably "If you think it possible that the public opinion of Great Britain might, should a sudden crisis arise, justify you in giving to France the armed support which you cannot promise in advance, you will not be able to give that support, even if you wish to give it, when the time comes, unless some "conversations have already taken place between naval and military experts." There was force in that. I agreed to it, and authorised those conversations to take place, but on the distinct understanding that nothing which passed between military or naval experts should bind either Government or restrict in any way their freedom to make a decision as to whether or not they would give that support when the time arose.

As I have told the House, upon that occasion a General Election was in prospect. I had to take the responsibility of doing that without the Cabinet. It could not be summoned. An answer had to be given. I consulted Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, the Prime Minister; I consulted, I remember, Lord Haldane, who was then Secretary of State for War, and the present Prime Minister, who was then Chancellor of the Exchequer. That was the most I could do, and they authorised that on the distinct understanding that it left the hands of the Government free whenever the crisis arose. The fact that conversations between military and naval experts took place was later on—I think much later on, because that crisis passed, and the thing ceased to be of importance—but later on it was brought to the knowledge of the Cabinet.

The Agadir crisis came another Morocco crisis and throughout that I took precisely the same line that had been taken in 1906. But subsequently, in 1912, after discussion and consideration in the Cabinet it was decided that we ought to have a definite understanding in writing, which was to be only in the form of an unofficial letter, that these conversations which took place were not binding upon the freedom of either Government; and on the 22nd of November, 1912, I wrote to the French Ambassador the letter which I will now read to the House, and I received from him a letter in similar terms in reply. The letter which I have to read to the House is this, and it will be known to the public now as the record that, whatever took place between military and naval experts, they were not binding engagements upon the Government:—

> "My dear Ambassador,—From time to time in recent years the French and British naval and military experts have consulted together. It has always been understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between experts is not and ought not to be regarded as an engagement that commits either Government to action in a contingency that has not yet arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French and British Fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagament to co-operate in war.
>
> "You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, it might become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other.
>
> "I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common."

Lord CHARLES BERESFORD: What is the date of that?

Sir E. GREY: The 22nd November, 1912. That is the starting point for the Government with regard to the present crisis. I think it makes it clear that what the Prime Minister and I said to the House of Commons was perfectly justified, and that, as regards our freedom to decide in a crisis what our line should be, whether we should intervene or whether we should abstain, the Government remained perfectly free and, *a fortiori*, the House of Commons remains perfectly free. That I say to clear the ground from the point of view of obligation. I think it was due to prove our good faith to the House of Commons that I should give that full information to the House now, and say what I think is obvious from the letter I have just read, that we do not construe anything which has previously taken place in our diplomatic relations with other Powers in this matter as restricting the freedom of the Government to decide what attitude they should take now, or restrict the freedom of the House of Commons to decide what their attitude should be.

Well, Sir, I will go further, and I will say this: The situation in the present crisis is not precisely the same as it was in the Morocco question. In the Morocco question it was primarily a dispute which concerned France—a dispute which concerned France and France primarily—a dispute, as it seemed to us, affecting France, out of an agreement subsisting between us and France, and published to the whole world, in which we are engaged to give France diplomatic support. No doubt we were pledged to give nothing but diplomatic support; we were, at any rate, pledged by a definite public agreement to stand with France diplomatically in that question.

The present crisis has originated differently. It has not originated with regard to Morocco. It has not originated as regards anything with which we had a special agreement with France; it has not originated with anything which primarily con-

cerned France. It has originated in a dispute between Austria and Servia. I can say this with the most absolute confidence—no Government and no country has less desire to be involved in war over a dispute with Austria and Servia than the Government and the country of France. They are involved in it because of their obligation of honour under a definite alliance with Russia. Well, it is only fair to say to the House that that obligation of honour cannot apply in the same way to us. We are not parties to the Franco-Russian Alliance. We do not even know the terms of that Alliance. So far I have, I think, faithfully and completely cleared the ground with regard to the question of obligation.

I now come to what we think the situation requires of us. For many years we have had a long-standing friendship with France. (An hon. Member: "And with Germany!") I remember well the feeling in the House—and my own feeling—for I spoke on the subject, I think, when the late Government made their agreement with France—the warm and cordial feeling resulting from the fact that these two nations, who had had perpetual differences in the past, had cleared these differences away. I remember saying, I think, that it seemed to me that some benign influence had been at work to produce the cordial atmosphere that had made that possible. But how far that friendship entails obligation—it has been a friendship between the nations and ratified by the nations—how far that entails an obligation let every man look into his own heart, and his own feelings, and construe the extent of the obligation for himself. I construe it myself as I feel it, but I do not wish to urge upon anyone else more than their feelings dictate as to what they should feel about the obligation. The House, individually and collectively may judge for itself. I speak my personal view, and I have given the House my own feeling in the matter.

The French fleet is now in the Mediterranean, and the Northern and Western coasts of France are absolutely undefended. The French fleet being concentrated in the Mediterranean the situation is very different from what it used to be, because the friendship which has grown up between the two countries has given them a sense of security that there was nothing to be feared from us.

The French coasts are absolutely undefended. The French fleet is in the Mediterranean, and has for some years been concentrated there because of the feeling of confidence and friendship which has existed between the two countries. My own feeling is that if a foreign fleet engaged in a war which France had not sought, and in which she had not been the aggressor, came down the English Channel and bombarded and battered the undefended coasts of France, we could not stand aside and see this going on practically within sight of our eyes, with our arms folded, looking on dispassionately, doing nothing! I believe that would be the feeling of this country. There are times when one feels that if these circumstances actually did arise, it would be a feeling which would spread with irresistible force throughout the land.

But I also want to look at the matter without sentiment, and from the point of view of British interests, and it is on that I am going to base and justify what I am presently going to say to the House. If we say nothing at this moment, what is France to do with her fleet in the Mediterranean? If she leaves it there, with no statement from us as to what we will do, she leaves her Northern and Western coasts absolutely undefended, at the mercy of a German fleet coming down the Channel, to do as it pleases in a war which is a war of life and death between them. If we say nothing, it may be that the French fleet is withdrawn from the Mediterranean. We are in the presence of a European conflagration; can anybody set limits to the consequences that may arise out of it. Let us assume that to-day we stand aside in an attitude of neutrality, saying, "No, we cannot undertake and engage to help either party in this conflict." Let us suppose the French fleet is withdrawn from the Mediterranean; and let us assume that the consequences—which are already tremendous in what has happened in Europe even to countries which are at peace—in fact, equally whether countries are at peace or at war—let us assume that out of that come consequences unforeseen, which make it

necessary at a sudden moment that, in defence of vital British interests, we should go to war; and let us assume—which is quite possible—that Italy, who is now neutral —(Hon. Members: "Hear, hear!")—because, as I understand, she considers that this war is an aggressive war, and the Triple Alliance being a defensive alliance her obligation did not arise—let us assume that consequences which are not yet foreseen—and which perfectly legitimately consulting her own interests make Italy depart from her attitude of neutrality at a time when we are forced in defence of vital British interests ourselves to fight, what then will be the position in the Mediterranean? It might be that at some critical moment those consequences would be forced upon us because our trade routes in the Mediterranean might be vital to this country?

Nobody can say that in the course of the next few weeks there is any particular trade route the keeping open of which may not be vital to this country. What will be our position then? We have not kept a fleet in the Mediterranean which is equal to dealing alone with a combination of other fleets in the Mediterranean. It would be the very moment when we could not detach more ships to the Mediterranean, and we might have exposed this country from our negative attitude at the present moment to the most appalling risk. I say that from the point of view of British interests. We feel strongly that France was entitled to know—and to know at once!—whether or not in the event of attack upon her unprotected Northern and Western Coasts she could depend upon British support. In that emergency, and in these compelling circumstances, yesterday afternoon I gave to the French Ambassador the following statement:—

> "I am authorised to give an assurance that if the German fleet comes into the channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against the French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power. This assurance is, of course, subject to the policy of His Majesty's Government receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be taken as binding His Majesty's Government to take any action until the above contingency of action by the German fleet takes place."

I read that to the House, not as a declaration of war on our part, not as entailing immediate aggressive action on our part, but as binding us to take aggressive action should that contingency arise. Things move very hurriedly from hour to hour. Fresh news comes in and I cannot give this in any very formal way; but I understand that the German Government would be prepared, if we would pledge ourselves to neutrality, to agree that its fleet would not attack the Northern coast of France. I have only heard that shortly before I came to the House, but it is far too narrow an engagement for us. And, Sir, there is the more serious consideration becoming more serious every hour—there is the question of the neutrality of Belgium.

I shall have to put before the House at some length what is our position in regard to Belgium. The governing factor is the Treaty of 1839, but this is a Treaty with a history—a history accumulated since. In 1870, when there was war between France and Germany, the question of the neutrality of Belgium arose, and various things were said. Amongst other things, Prince Bismarck gave an assurance to Belgium that, confirming his verbal assurance, he gave in writing a declaration which he said was superfluous in reference to the Treaty in existence—that the German Confederation and its allies would respect the neutrality of Belgium, it being always understood that that neutrality would be respected by the other belligerent Powers. That is valuable as a recognition in 1870 on the part of Germany of the sacredness of these Treaty rights.

What was our own attitude? The people who laid down the attitude of the British Government were Lord Granville in the House of Lords, and Mr. Gladstone in the House of Commons. Lord Granville, on the 8th of August, 1870, used these words. He said:—

> "We might have explained to the country and to foreign nations that we did not think this country was bound either morally or internationally or that

its interests were concerned in the maintenance of the neutrality of Belgium, though this course might have had some convenience, though it might have been easy to adhere to it, though it might have saved us from some immediate danger, it is a course which Her Majesty's Government thought it impossible to adopt in the name of the country with any due regard to the country's honour or to the country's interests."

Mr. Gladstone spoke as follows two days later:—

"There is, I admit, the obligation of the Treaty. It is not necessary, nor would time permit me, to enter into the complicated question of the nature of the obligations of that Treaty; but I am not able to subscribe to the doctrine of those who have held in this House what plainly amounts to an assertion, that the simple fact of the existence of a guarantee is binding on every party to it, irrespectively altogether of the particular position in which it may find itself at the time when the occasion for acting on the grantee arises. The great authorities upon foreign policy to whom I have been accustomed to listen, such as Lord Aberdeen and Lord Palmerston, never to my knowledge took that rigid and, if I may venture to say so, that impracticable view of the guarantee. The circumstance that there is already an existing guarantee in force is of necessity an important fact, and a weighty element in the case to which we are bound to give full and ample consideration. There is also this further consideration, the force of which we must all feel most deeply, and that is, the common interests against the unmeasured aggrandisement of any Power whatever."

The Treaty is an old Treaty—1839—and that was the view taken of it in 1870. It is one of those Treaties which are founded, not only on consideration for Belgium, which benefits under the Treaty, but in the interests of those who guarantee the neutrality of Belgium. The honour and interests are, at least, as strong to-day as in 1870, and we cannot take a more narrow view or a less serious view of our obligations, and of the importance of those obligations than was taken by Mr. Gladstone's Government in 1870.

I will read to the House what took place last week on this subject. When mobilisation was beginning, I knew that question must be a most important element in our policy—a most important subject for the House of Commons. I telegraphed at the same time in similar terms to both Paris and Berlin to say that it was essential for us to know whether the French and German Governments respectively were prepared to undertake an engagement to respect the neutrality of Belgium. These are the replies. I got from the French Government this reply:—

"The French Government are resolved to respect the neutrality of Belgium, and it would only be in the event of some other Power violating that neutrality that France might find herself under the necessity, in order to assure the defence of her security, to act otherwise. This assurance has been given several times. The President of the Republic spoke of it to the King of the Belgians, and th French Minister at Brussels has spontaneously renewed the assurance to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to-day."

From the German Government the reply was:—

"The Secretary of State, for Foreign Affairs could not possibly give an answer before consulting the Emperor and the Imperial Chancellor."

Sir Edward Goschen, to whom I had said it was important to have an answer soon, said he hoped the answer would not be too long delayed. The German Minister for Foreign Affairs then gave Sir Edward Goschen to understand that he rather doubted whether they could answer at all, as any reply they might give could not fail, in the event of war, to have the undesirable effect of disclosing, to a certain extent, part of their plan of campaign. I telegraphed at the same time to Brussels to the Belgian Government, and I got the following reply from Sir Francis Villiers:—

"The Minister for Foreign Affairs thanks me for the communication, and replies that Belgium will, to the utmost of her power, maintain neutrality, and

expects and desires other Powers to observe and uphold it. He begged me to add that the relations between Belgium and the neighbouring Powers were excellent, and there was no reason to suspect their intentions, but that the Belgian Government believe, in the case of violation, they were in a position to defend the neutrality of their country."

It now appears from the news I have received to-day—which has come quite recently, and I am not yet quite sure how far it has reached me in an accurate form—that an ultimatum has been given to Belgium by Germany, the object of which was to offer Belgium friendly relations with Germany on condition that she would facilitate the passage of German troops through Belgium. Well, Sir, until one has these things absolutely definitely, up to the last moment, I do not wish to say all that one would say if one were in a position to give the House full, complete, and absolute information upon the point. We were sounded in the course of last week as to whether if a guarantee were given that, after the war, Belgium integrity would be preserved that would content us. We replied that we could not bargain away whatever interests or obligations we had in Belgian neutrality.

Shortly before I reached the House I was informed that the following telegram had been received from the King of the Belgians by our King—King George:—

"Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's friendship and that of your predecessors, and the friendly attitude of England in 1870, and the proof of friendship she has just given us again, I make a supreme appeal to the Diplomatic intervention of your Majesty's Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium."

Diplomatic intervention took place last week on our part. What can diplomatic intervention do now? We have great vital interests in the independence—and integrity is the least part—of Belgium. If Belgium is compelled to submit to allow her neutrality to be violated, of course the situation is clear. Even if by agreement she admitted the violation of her neutrality, it is clear she could only do so under duress. The smaller States in that region of Europe ask but one thing. Their one desire is that they should be left alone and independent. The one thing they fear is, I think, not so much that their integrity but that their independence should be interfered with. If in this war which is before Europe the neutrality of one of those countries is violated, if the troops of one of the combatants violate its neutrality and no action be taken to resent it, at the end of the war, whatever the integrity may be, the independence will be gone.

I have one further quotation from Mr. Gladstone as to what he thought about the independence of Belgium. It will be found in "Hansard," Volume 203, Page 1787. I have not had time to read the whole speech and verify the context, but the thing seems to me so clear that no context could make any difference to the meaning of it. Mr. Gladstone said:—

"We have an interest in the independence of Belgium which is wider than that which we may have in the literal operation of the guarantee. It is found in the answer to the question whether under the circumstances of the case, this country, endowed as it is with influence and power, would quietly stand by and witness the perpetration of the direst crime that ever stained the pages of history, and thus become participators in the sin."

No, Sir, if it be the case that there has been anything in the nature of an ultimatum to Belgium, asking her to compromise or violate her neutrality, whatever may have been offered to her in return, her independence is gone if that holds. If her independence goes, the independence of Holland will follow. I ask the House from the point of view of British interests, to consider what may be at stake. If France is beaten in a struggle of life and death, beaten to her knees, loses her position as a great Power, becomes subordinate to the will and power of one greater than herself—con-

sequences which I do not anticipate, because I am sure that France has the power to defend herself with all the energy and ability and patriotism which she has shown so often— still, if that were to happen, and if Belgium fell under the same dominating influence, and then Holland, and then Denmark, then would not Mr. Gladstone's words come true, that just opposite to us there would be a common interest against the unmeasured aggrandisement of any Power?

It may be said, I suppose, that we might stand aside, husband our strength, and that whatever happened in the course of this war at the end of it intervene with effect to put things right, and to adjust them to our own point of view. If, in a crisis like this, we run away from those obligations of honour and interest as regards the Belgian Treaty, I doubt whether, whatever material force we might have at the end, it would be of very much value in face of the respect that we should have lost. And do not believe, whether a great Power stands outside this war or not, it is going to be in a position at the end of it to exert its superior strength. For us, with a powerful Fleet, which we believe able to protect our commerce, to protect our shores, and to protect our interests, if we are engaged in war, we shall suffer but little more than we shall suffer even if we stand aside.

We are going to suffer, I am afraid, terribly in this war whether we are in it or whether we stand aside. Foreign trade is going to stop, not because the trade routes are closed, but because there is no trade at the other end. Continental nations engaged in war—all their populations, all their energies, all their wealth, engaged in a desperate struggle—they cannot carry on the trade with us that they are carrying on in times of peace, whether we are parties to the war or whether we are not. I do not believe for a moment, that at the end of this war, even if we stood aside and remained aside, we should be in a position, a material position, to use our force decisively to undo what had happened in the course of the war, to prevent the whole of the West of Europe opposite to us—if that had been the result of the war—falling under the domination of a single Power, and I am quite sure that our moral position would be such as to have lost us respect. I can only say that I have put the question of Belgium somewhat hypothetically, because I am not yet sure of all the facts, but, if the facts turn out to be as they have reached us at present, it is quite clear that there is an obligation on this country to do its utmost to prevent the consequences to which those facts will lead if they are undisputed.

I have read to the House the only engagements that we have yet taken definitely with regard to the use of force. I think it is due to the House to say that we have taken no engagement yet with regard to sending Expeditionary armed force out of the country. Mobilization of the Fleet has taken place; mobilization of the Army is taking place; but we have as yet taken no engagement, because I do not feel that in the case of a European conflagration such as this, unprecedented, with our enormous responsibilities in India and other parts of the Empire, or in countries in British occupation, with all the unknown factors, we must take very carefully into consideration the use which we make of sending an Expeditionary Force out of the country until we know how we stand. One thing I would say.

The one bright spot in the whole of this terrible situation is Ireland. The general feeling throughout Ireland—and I would like this to be clearly understood abroad —does not make the Irish question a consideration which we feel we have now to take into account. I have told the House how far we have at present gone in commitments and the conditions which influence our policy, and I have put to the House and dwelt at length upon how vital is the condition of the neutrality of Belgium.

What other policy is there before the House? There is but one way in which the Government could make certain at the present moment of keeping outside this war, and that would be that it should immediately issue a proclamation of unconditional neutrality. We cannot do that. We have made the commitment to France that I

have read to the House which prevents us from doing that. We have got the consideration of Belgium which prevents us also from any unconditional neutrality, and, without those conditions absolutely satisfied and satisfactory, we are bound not to shrink from proceeding to the use of all the forces in our power. If we did take that line by saying, "We will have nothing whatever to do with this matter" under no conditions—the Belgian Treaty obligations, the possible position in the Mediterranean, with damage to British interests, and what may happen to France from our failure to support France—if we were to say that all those things mattered nothing, were as nothing, and to say we would stand aside, we should, I believe, sacrifice our respect and good name and reputation before the world, and should not escape the most serious and grave economic consequences.

My object has been to explain the view of the Government, and to place before the House the issue and the choice. I do not for a moment conceal, after what I have said, and after the information, incomplete as it is, that I have given to the House with regard to Belgium, that we must be prepared, and we are prepared, for the consequences of having to use all the strength we have at any moment—we know not how soon—to defend ourselves and to take our part. We know, if the facts all be as I have stated them, though I have announced no intending agressive action on our part, no final decision to resort to force at a moment's notice, until we know the whole of the case, that the use of it may be forced upon us. As far as the forces of the Crown are concerned, we are ready. I believe the Prime Minister and my right hon. Friend the First Lord of the Admiralty have no doubt whatever that the readiness and the efficiency of those Forces were never at a higher mark than they are to-day, and never was there a time when confidence was more justified in the power of the Navy to protect our commerce and to protect our shores. The thought is with us always of the suffering and misery entailed from which no country in Europe will escape abstention, and from which no neutrality will save us. The amount of harm that can be done by an enemy ship to our trade is infinitesimal, compared with the amount of harm that must be done by the economic condition that is caused on the Continent.

The most awful responsibility is resting upon the Government in deciding what to advise the House of Commons to do. We have disclosed our mind to the House of Commons. We have disclosed the issue, the information which we have, and made clear to the House, I trust, that we are prepared to face that situation, and that should it develop, as probably it may develop, we will face it. We worked for peace up to the last moment, and beyond the last moment. How hard, how persistently, and how earnestly we strove for peace last week, the House will see from the Papers that will be before it.

But that is over, as far as the peace of Europe is concerned. We are now face to face with a situation and all the consequences which it may yet have to unfold. We believe we shall have the support of the House at large in proceeding to whatever the consequences may be and whatever measures may be forced upon us by the development of facts or action taken by others. I believe the country, so quickly has the situation been forced upon it, has not had time to realize the issue. It perhaps is still thinking of the quarrel between Austria and Servia, and not the complications of this matter which have grown out of the quarrel between Austria and Servia. Russia and Germany we know are at war. We do not yet know officially that Austria, the ally whom Germany is to support, is yet at war with Russia. We know that a good deal has been happening on the French frontier. We do not know that the German Ambassador has left Paris.

The situation has developed so rapidly that technically, as regards the condition of the war, it is most difficult to describe what has actually happened. I wanted to bring out the underlying issues which would affect our own conduct, and our own policy, and to put them clearly. I have put the vital facts before the House, and if,

as seems not improbable, we are forced, and rapidly forced, to take our stand upon those issues, then I believe, when the country realises what is at stake, what the real issues are, the magnitude of the impending dangers in the West of Europe, which I have endeavoured to describe to the House, we shall be supported throughout, not only by the House of Commons, but by the determination, the resolution, the courage, and the endurance of the whole country.

Mr. BONAR LAW: The right hon. Gentleman has made an appeal for support, and it is necessary I should say a word or two. They shall be very few. I wish to say, in the first place, that I do not believe there is a single Member of this House who doubts that, not only the right hon. Gentleman himself, but the Government which he represents, have done everything in their power up to the last moment to preserve peace, and I think we may be sure that, if any other course is taken, it is because it is forced upon them, and that they have absolutely no alternative. One thing only, further, I would like to say. The right hon. Gentleman spoke of the bright spot in the picture which only a day or two ago was a black spot on the political horizon. Everything he has said I am sure is true. I should like to say, further, that if the contingencies, which he has not put into words, but which are all in our minds as possible, arise, then we have already had indications that there is another bright spot, and that every one of His Majesty's Dominions beyond the Seas will be behind us in whatever action it is necessary to take. This only I shall add: The Government already know, but I give them now the assurance on behalf of the party of which I am Leader in this House, that in whatever steps they think it necessary to take for the honour and security of this country, they can rely on the unhesitating support of the Opposition.

The PRIME MINISTER (Mr. Asquith): In asking the House to agree to the resolution which Mr. Speaker has just read from the Chair, I do not propose, because I do not think it is in any way necessary to traverse the ground again which was covered by my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary two or three nights ago. He stated—and I do not think any of the statements he made are capable of answer and certainly have not yet been answered—the grounds upon which with the utmost reluctance and with infinite regret His Majesty's Government have been compelled to put this country in a state of war with what for many years and indeed generations past has been a friendly Power. But, Sir, the papers which have since been presented to Parliament, and which are now in the hands of hon. Members will, I think, show how strenuous, how unremitting, how persistent, even when the last glimmer of hope seemed to have faded away, were the efforts of my right hon. Friend to secure for Europe an honourable and a lasting peace. Everyone knows in the great crisis which occurred last year in the East of Europe, it was largely if not mainly, by the acknowledgment of all Europe due to the steps taken by my right hon. Friend that the area of the conflict was limited, and that so far as the great Powers are concerned, peace was maintained. If his efforts upon this occasion have, unhappily, been less successful, I am certain that this House and the country, and I will add posterity and history will accord to him what is, after all, the best tribute that can be paid to any statesman: that, never derogating for an instant or by an inch from the honour and interests of his own country, he has striven, as few men have striven, to maintain and preserve the greatest interest of all countries—universal peace. These papers which are now in the hands of hon. Members show something more than that. They show what were the terms which were offered to us in exchange for our neutrality. I trust that not only the Members of this House, but all our fellow-subjects everywhere will read the communications, will read, learn and mark the communications which passed only a week ago to-day between Berlin and London in this matter. The terms by which it was sought to buy our neutrality are containe in the communication made by the German Chancellor to Sir Edward Goschen on the 29th July, No. 85 of the published Paper. I think I must refer to them for a moment. After referring to the state of things as between Austria and Russia, Sir Edward Goschen goes on:—

"He then proceeded to make the following strong bid for British neutrality. He said that it was clear, so far as he was able to judge the main principle which governed British policy, that Great Britain would never stand by and allow France to be crushed in any conflict there might be. That, however, was not the object at which Germany aimed. Provided that neutrality of Great Britain were certain, every assurance would be given to the British Government"—

Let the House observe these words——

"Aimed at no territorial acquisition at the expense of France should they prove victorious in any war that might ensue."

Sir Edward Goschen proceeded to put a very pertinent question:—

"I questioned His Excellency about the French colonies"—

What are the French colonies? They mean every part of the dominions and possessions of France outside the geographical area of Europe—

"and he said that he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that respect."

Let me come to what, in my mind, personally, has always been the crucial and almost the governing consideration, namely, the position of the small States:—

"As regards Holland, however, His Excellency said that so long as Germany's adversaries respected the integrity and neutrality of the Netherlands, Germany was ready to give His Majesty's Government an assurance that she would do likewise."

Then we come to Belgium:—

"It depended upon the action of France what operations Germany might be forced to enter upon in Belgium, but when the war was over, Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against Germany.

Let the House observe the distinction between those two cases. In regard to Holland it was not only independence and integrity but also neutrality; but in regard to Belgium, there was no mention of neutrality at all, nothing but an assurance that after the war came to an end the integrity of Belgium would be respected. Then His Excellency added:—

"Ever since he had been Chancellor the object of his policy had been to bring about an understanding with England. He trusted that these assurances"——

the assurances I have read out to the House——

"might form the basis of that understanding which he so much desired."

What does that amount to? Let me just ask the House. I do so, not with the object of inflaming passion, certainly not with the object of exciting feeling against Germany, but I do so to vindicate and make clear the position of the British Government in this matter. What did that proposal amount to? In the first place, it meant this: That behind the back of France—they were not made a party to these communications—we should have given, if we had assented to that, a free license to Germany to annex, in the event of a successful war, the whole of the extra European dominions and possessions of France. What did it mean as regards Belgium? When she addressed, as she has addressed in these last few days, her moving appeal to us to fulfil our solemn guarantee of her neutrality, what reply should we have given? What reply should we have given to that Belgian appeal? We should have been obliged to say that without her knowledge we had bartered away to the Power threatening her our obligation to keep our plighted word. The House has read, and the country has read, of course, in the last few hours, the most pathetic appeal addressed by the King of Belgium, and I do not envy the man who can read that appeal with an unmoved heart. Belgium are fighting and losing their lives. What

would have been the position of Great Britain to-day in the face of that spectacle if we had assisted to this infamous proposal? Yes, and what are we to get in return for the betrayal of our friends and the dishonour of our obligations? What are we to get in return? A promise—nothing more; a promise as to what Germany would do in certain eventualities; a promise, be it observed—I am sorry to have to say it, but it must be put upon record—given by a Power which was at that very moment announcing its intention to violate its own treaty, and inviting us to do the same. I can only say, if we had dallied or temporized, we, as a Government, should have covered ourselves with dishonour, and we should have betrayed the interests of this country, of which we are trutsees. I am glad, and I thing the country will be glad, to turn to the reply which my right hon. friend made, and of which I will read to the House two of the more salient passages. This document No. 101 of my Paper, puts on record a week ago the attitude of the British Government, and, as I believe, of the British people. My right hon. friend says:—

> "His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment entertain the Chancellor's proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality on such terms. What he asks in effect is to engage to stand by while French Colonies are taken if France is beaten, so long as Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the Colonies. From the material point of view"—

My right hon. Friend, as he always does, used very temperate language:—

> "such a proposal is unacceptable, for France, without further territory in Europe being taken from her, could be so crushed as to lose her position as a great Power, and become subordinate to German policy."

That is the material aspect. But he proceeded:—

> "Altogether apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the good name of this country would never recover. The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away whatever obligation or interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium. We could not entertain that bargain either."

He then says:—

> "We must preserve our full fredom to act, as circumstances may seem to us to require."

And he added, I think, in sentences which I think the House will appreciate:—

> "You should . . . add most earnestly that the one way of maintain the good relations between England and Germany is that they should continue to work together to preserve the peace of Europe. . . For that object this Government will work in that way with all sincerity and good-will.
>
> "If the peace of Europe can be preserved and the present crisis safety passed, my own endeavour will be to promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately. I have desired this and worked for it"—

The statement was never more true——

> "as far as I could, through the last Balkan crisis and Germany having a corresponding object, our relations sensibly improved. The idea has hitherto been too Utopian to form the subject of definite proposals, but if this present crisis, so much more acute than any that Europe has gone through for generations, be safely passed, I am hopeful that the relief and reaction which will follow may make possible some more definite rapprochement between the Powers than has been possible hitherto."

That document, in my opinion, states clearly, in temperate and convincing language the attitude of this Government. Can any one who reads it fail to appre-

ciate the tone of obvious sincerity and earnestness which underlies it; can any one honestly doubt that the Government of this country in spite of great provocation—and I regard the proposals made to us as proposals which we might have thrown aside without consideration and almost without answer—can any one doubt that in spite of great provocation the right hon. gentleman, who had already earned the title—and no one ever more deserved it—of Peace Maker of Europe, persisted to the very last moment of the last hour in that beneficent but unhappily frustrated purpose. I am entitled to say, and I do so on behalf of this country—I speak not for a party, I speak for the country as a whole—that we made every effort any Government could possibly make for peace. But this war has been forced upon us. What is it we are fighting for? Every one knows, and no one knows better than the Government the terrible incalculable suffering, economic, social, personal and political, which war, and especially a war between the Great Powers of the world must entail. There is on man amongst us sitting upon this bench in these trying days—more trying perhaps than any body of statesmen for a hundred years have had to pass through, there is not a man amongst us who has not, during the whole of that time, had clearly before his vision the almost unequalled suffering which war, even in just cause, must bring about, not only to the peoples who are for the moment living in this country and in the other countries of the world, but to posterity and to the whole prospects of European civilization. Every step we took with that vision before our eyes, and with a sense of responsibility which it is impossible to describe. Unhappily, if in spite of all our efforts to keep the peace, and with that full and overpowering consciousness of the result, if the issue be decided in favour of war, we have, nevertheless, thought it to be the duty as well as the interest of this country to go to war, the House may be well assured it was because we believe, and I am certain the country will believe, we are unsheathing our sword in a just cause.

If I am asked what we are fighting for I reply in two sentences. In the first place to fulfil a solemn international obligation, an obligation which, if it had been entered into between private persons in the ordinary concerns of life, would have been regarded as an obligation not only of law but of honour, which no self-respecting man could possibly have repudiated. I say, secondly, we are fighting to vindicate the principle which, in these days when force, material force, sometimes seems to be the dominant influence and factor in the development of mankind, we are fighting to vindicate the principle that small nationalities are not to be crushed, in defiance of international good faith, by the arbitrary will of a strong and overmastering Power. I do not believe any nation ever entered into a great controversy—and this is one of the greatest history will ever know with a clearer conscience and stronger conviction that it is fighting, not for aggression, not for the maintenance even of its own selfish interest, but that it is fighting in defence of principles, the maintenance of which is vital to the civilisation of the world. With a full conviction, not only of the wisdom and justice, but of the obligations which lay upon us to challenge this great issue, we are entering into the struggle. Let us now make sure that all the resources, not only of this United Kingdom, but of the vast Empire of which it is the centre, shall be thrown into the scale, and it is that that object may be adequately secured, that I am now about to ask this Committee—to make the very unusual demand upon it—to give the Government a Vote of Credit of £100,000,000. I am not going, and I am sure the Committee do not wish it, into the technical distinctions between Votes of Credit and Supplementary Estimates and all the rarities and refinements which arise in that connection. There is a much higher point of view than that. If it were necessary, I could justify, upon purely technical grounds, the course we propose to adopt, but I am not going to do so, because I think it would be foreign to the temper and disposition of the Committee. There is one thing to which I do call attention, that is, the Title and Heading of the Bill. As a rule, in the past Votes of this kind have been taken simply for naval and military operations, but we have thought it right to ask the Committee to give us its confidence in the extension of the traditional area of Votes of

Credit so that this money which we are asking them to allow us to expend may be applied not only for strictly naval and military operations, but to assist the food supplies, promote the continuance of trade, industry, business, and communications, whether by means of insurance or indemnity against risk or otherwise, for the relief of distress, and generally for all expenses arising out of the existence of a state of war. I believe the Committee will agree with us that it was wise to extend the area of the Vote of Credit so as to include all these various matters. It gives the Government a free hand. Of course, the Treasury will account for it, and any expenditure that takes place will be subject to the approval of the House. I think it would be a great pity—in fact, a great disaster—if, in a crisis of this magnitude, we were not enabled to make provision—provision far more needed now than it was under the simpler conditions that prevailed in the old days—for all the various ramifications and developments of expenditure which the existence of a state of war between the great Powers of Europe must entail on any one of them.

I am asking also in my character of Secretary of State for War—a position which I held until this morning—for a Supplementary Estimate for men for the Army. Perhaps the Committee will allow me for a moment just to say on that personal matter that I took upon myself the office of Secretary of State for War under conditions, upon which I need not go back but which are fresh in the minds of everyone, in the hope and with the object that the conditions of things in the Army, which all of us deplored, might speedily be brought to an end and complete confidence re-established. I believe that is the case; in fact, I know it to be. There is no more loyal and united body, no body in which the spirit and habit of discipline are more deeply ingrained and cherished than in the British Army. Glad as I should have been to continue the work of that office, and I would have done so under normal conditions, it would not be fair to the Army, it would not be just to the country, that any Minister should divide his attention between that Deparment and another, still less that the First Minister of the Crown, who has to look into the affairs of all departments and who is ultimately responsible for the whole policy of the Cabinet, should give, as he could only give, perfunctory attention to the affairs of our Army in a great war. I am very glad to say that a very distinguished soldier and administrator, in the person of Lord Kitchener, with that great public spirit and patriotism that everyone would expect from him, at my request stepped into the breach. Lord Kitchener, as every one knows, is not a politician. His association with the Government as a Member of the Cabinet for this purpose must not be taken as in any way identifying him with any set of political opinions. He has, at a great public emergency, responded to a great public call, and I am certain he will have with him, in the discharge of one of the most arduous tasks that has ever fallen upon a Minister, the complete confidence of all parties and all opinions.

I am asking on his behalf for the Army, power to increase the number of men of all ranks, in addition to the number already voted, by no less than 500,000. I am certain the Committee will not refuse its sanction, for we are encouraged to ask for it not only by our own sense of the gravity and the necessities of the case, but by the knowledge that India is prepared to send us certainly two Divisions, and that every one of our self-governing Dominions, spontaneously and unasked, has already tendered to the utmost limits of their possibilities, both in men and in money, every help they can afford to the Empire in a moment of need. Sir, the Mother Country must set the example, while she responds with gratitude and affection to those filial overtures from the outlying members of her family.

Sir, I will say no more. This is not an occasion for controversial discussion. In all that I have said, I believe I have not gone, either in the statement of our case or in my general description of the provision we think it necessary to make, beyond the strict bounds of truth. It is not my purpose—it is not the purpose of any patriotic man—to inflame feeling, to indulge in rhetoric, to excite international animosities. The occasion is far too grave for that. We have a great duty to perform, we have a great

trust to fulfil, and confidently we believe that Parliament and the country will enable us to do it.

Mr. Bonar Law: No Minister has ever fulfilled a duty more responsible or in regard to which the responsibility was more acutely felt than that which has just been fulfilled by the right hon. Gentleman. This is not a time for speech making, and I should have been quite ready to leave the statement which he has given to the Committee as the expression of the view, not of a party but of a nation. But as this, I think, will be the only opportunity which will be given for expressing the views of a large section of this Committee, I feel that I am bound to make clear to the Committee and to the country what is the attitude of His Majesty's Opposition on this question. There are two things which I desire to impress upon the Committee. The first is that we have dreaded war and have longed for peace as strongly as any Member of this Committee; and the second is that in our belief we are in a state of war against our will, and that we, as a nation, have done everything in our power to prevent such a condition of things arising. When this crisis first arose I confess I was one of those who had the hope that even then, though a European conflagration took place, we might be able to stay out of it. I held that hope strongly, but in a short time I became convinced of this, that into this war we should inevitably be drawn, and that it really was a question, and a question only, whether we should enter it honourably or be dragged into it with dishonour. I remember that on the first occasion after the retirement of my right hon. Friend, when I had to speak on foreign affairs, I made this statement, which perhaps is wrong, though I do not think so even yet. I said that if ever war arose between Great Britain and Germany it would not be due to inevitable causes, for I did not believe in inevitable war. I said it would be due to human folly. It is due to human folly, and to human wickedness, but neither the folly nor the wickedness is here. What other course was open to us? It is quite true, as the Foreign Secretary explained to the House the other day, that we were under no formal obligation to take part in such a struggle, but every Member in this House knows that the Entente meant this in the minds of this Government and of every other Government, that if any of the three Powers were attacked aggressively the others would be expected to step in to give their aid. The question, therefore, to my mind was this: Was this war in any way provoked by those who will now be our allies? No one who has read the White Paper can hesitate to answer that question. I am not going to go into it even as fully as the Prime Minister has done, but I would remind the House of this, that in this White Paper is contained the statement made by the German Ambassador, I think, at Vienna, that Russia was not in a condition and could not go to war, and in the same letter are found these words:—

> "As for Germany, she knew very well what she was about in backing up Austria-Hungary in this matter."

Everyone for years has known that the key to peace or war lay in Berlin. Everyone knew it, and at this crisis there is no one who can doubt that Berlin, if it had chosen, could have prevented this terrible conflict. I am afraid that the miscalculation which was made about Brussels was made also about us. The dispatch which the right hon. Gentleman referred to is a dispatch of a nature that I, at least, believe would not have been addressed to Great Britain if it had been believed that our hands were free, and that we held the position which we had always held before. That, at least, is my belief. Now what does this mean? We are fighting, as the Prime Minister said, for the honour, and with the honour is bound up always the interest, of our country. But we are fighting also for the whole basis of the civilisation for which we stand, and for which Europe stands. I do not wish, any more than the Prime Minister, to inflame passion, and I only ask the House to consider this one aspect. Look at the way Belgium is being treated to-day. There is a report—if it is not true now, it may be true to-morrow—that the city of Liege is attacked by German troops, and that civilians, as in the days of the middle ages, are fighting for their hearths and homes against trained

troops. How has that been brought about? In a state of war, war must be waged, but remember that this plan is not of to-day or of yesterday. It has been long matured. The Germans knew that they would have others to face, and they were ready to take the course which they took the other day of saying to Belgium, "Destroy your independence and allow our troops to go through, or we will come down upon you with a might which it is impossible for you to resist." If we had allowed that to be done, our position as one of the great nations of the world, and our honour as one of the nations of the world, would, in my opinion, have been gone. This is no small struggle. This is the greatest, perhaps, that this country has ever been engaged in, and the issue is uncertain. It is Napoleonism once again. Thank heaven, so far as we know, there is no Napoleon.

I am not going to say anything more about the causes of the war, for I do not desire to encourage controversy on this subject. But, if I may be allowed to say so, I should like to say this, that I read yesterday with real pleasure an article in a paper which does not generally commend itself to me, the "Manchester Guardian." In that article it still held that the war ought not to have been entered into, but it took this view, that that was a question for history, and that now we were in it, there was only one question for us, and that was to bring it to a successful issue. I have felt sympathy, far more than at any other time, for the Prime Minister and for the Foreign Secretary. I can imagine nothing more terrible than that the Foreign Secretary should have a feeling that perhaps he has brought this country into an unnecessary war. No feeling can be worse. I can say this, and whether we are right or wrong, the whole House agrees with it I am sure, that that is a burden which the right hon. Gentleman can carry with a good conscience, and that every one of us can put up unhesitatingly this prayer, may God defend the right.

I should like, if I may to go to another topic—this is the only opportunity I shall have, and I think it is worth saying—and to ask the House to consider the conditions under which this war is going to be carried on. I was pleased to hear the Prime Minister say the other day in answer to a speech by the hon. Member (Mr. Arthur Anderson), and he has developed it in describing the terms of this Vote of Credit, that he realised, as we all must realise, that in a country situated like ours the development of industry and the supply of food at home is just as much an operation of war as is the conduct of our armed forces. I do not wish to minimise our difficulties, but I am quite sure, as sure as I can be of anything, that there is no danger of a scarcity of food, and that the only danger is the fear of scarcity of food. Everyone who has been in business knows that what causes panic prices is not actual scarcity at the time, but the fear of scarcity coming, and this is a case where every one of us must do what he can to impress upon the people of this country that there is, as I believe, no danger. Here I should like, if I may, to give one warning note. Remember, at least I believe it, this war, unexpected by us, is not unexpected by our enemy. I shall be greatly surprised if we do not find that at first on our trade routes there is a destruction of our property which might raise a panic. That is inevitable, I think, at the outset. Let us be prepared for it, and let us realise that it has no bearing whatever on the ultimate course of the war. There is something else which I think, if I am right, it is important to say. We had a discussion yesterday about credit. That is the basis of successful war, as it is of every branch of industry at this moment. I think the Government have taken the right course. I have followed it closely, and I know that they have been supported by those who best understand the situation. I think the danger is minimised as much as it can be. But, after all, the question of credit really depends on what we believe is going to be the effect of this war upon our trade and our industry. I hope the House will not think I am too optimistic, but I do think there is a danger of our taking too gloomy a view of what the effects may be, and by taking that gloomy view helping to bring about the very state of affairs that we wish to avoid.

Again, I wish to guard myself against seeming to be too hopeful. But let us look at the facts as if we were examining a chess problem. If we keep the command of the

sea, what is going to happen? It all depends on that. I admit that if that goes the position is gloomy indeed, but of that I have no fear. If we keep the command of the sea, what is going to happen? Five-sixths of our production is employed in the Home trade. What goes abroad is very important, for, of course, if the population which supplied the sixth were thrown out of work, that would react upon the Home trade. But, after all, the total amount of our exports to all the European countries which are now at war is only a small part of our total exports. There is here no question of fiscal policy. We are far beyond that. It is a fact. Our total exports to all the countries which are now at war do not, in my belief—I have not looked into the figures—exceed our exports to India and Australia taken alone. We shall have free trade, if the sea routes are maintained, with the Colonies and with the whole of the American Continent, and, unfortunately for them, both our allies our enemies will not be competing with us in those markets. Look at it as a problem, and I think we have a right to believe, not that trade will be good, but that it will be much more nearly normal than is generally believed. I hope the House will not think that a useless thing to say. There is one thing more which I would desire to say. This is the affair of the Nation. Everyone would desire to help. There is a great deal of work to be done which cannot be done by the Government. I was glad that the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister has already asked the co-operation of my right hon. Friend the Member for West-Birmingham and my right hon. Friend the Member for the Strand. They gave it gladly. But I am sure that I speak not only for this bench, but for the whole of our party, when I say that the Government has only got to requisition any one of us and we will serve it and our country to the best of our ability.

DOCUMENTS

RELATIVE TO THE

EUROPEAN WAR

(SUPPLEMENT)

DESPATCH FROM HIS MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR AT BERLIN RESPECTING THE RUPTURE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT.

DESPATCH FROM HIS MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR AT BERLIN RESPECTING THE RUPTURE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.

LONDON, August 8, 1914.

SIR,—In accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram of the 4th instant* I called upon the Secretary of State that afternoon and inquired, in the name of His Majesty's Government, whether the Imperial Government would refrain from violating Belgian neutrality. Herr von Jagow at once replied that he was sorry to say that his answer must be "No," as, in consequence of the German troops having crossed the frontier that morning, Belgian neutrality had been already violated. Herr von Jagow again went into the reasons why the Imperial Government had been obliged to take this step, namely, that they had to advance into France by the quickest and easiest way, so as to be able to get well ahead with their operations and endeavour to strike some decisive blow as early as possible. It was a matter of life and death for them, as if they had gone by the more southern route they could not have hoped, in view of the proximity of roads and the strength of the fortresses, to have got through without formidable opposition entailing great loss of time. This loss of time would have meant time gained by the Russians for bringing up their troops to the German frontier. Rapidity of action was the great German asset, while that of Russia was an inexhaustible supply of troops. I pointed out to Herr von Jagow that this *fait accompli* of the violation of the Belgian frontier rendered, as he would readily understand, the situation exceedingly grave, and I asked him whether there was not still time to draw back and avoid possible consequences, which both he and I would deplore. He replied that, for the reasons he had given me, it was now impossible for them to draw back.

During the afternoon I received your further telegram of the same date,† and, in compliance with the instructions therein contained, I again proceeded to the Imperial Foreign Office and informed the Secretary of State that unless the Imperial Government could give the assurance by 12 o'clock that night that they would proceed no further with their violation of the Belgian frontier and stop their advance, I had been instructed to demand my passports and inform the Imperial Government that His Majesty's Government would have to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany was as much a party as themselves.

Herr von Jagow replied that to his great regret he could give no other answer than that which he had given me earlier in the day, namely, that the safety of the Empire rendered it absolutely necessary that the Imperial troops should advance through Belgium. I gave His Excellency a written summary of your telegram and, pointing out that you had mentioned 12 o'clock as the time when His Majesty's Government would expect an answer, asked him whether, in view of the terrible consequences which would necessarily ensue, it were not possible even at the last moment that their answer should be reconsidered. He replied that if the time given were even 24 hours or more, his answer must be the same. I said that in that case I should have to demand my passports. This interview took place at about 7 o'clock. In a short com-

* See "Miscellaneous, No. 6 (1914)," No. 153.
† See "Miscellaneous, No. 6 (1914)," No. 159.

vers-t on which ensued Herr von Jagow expressed his poignant regret at the crumbling of his entire policy and that of the Chancellor, which had been to make friends with Great Britain and then, through Great Britain, to get closer to France. I said that this sudden end to my work in Berlin was to me also a matter of deep regret and disappointment, but that he must understand that under the circumstances and in view of our engagements, His Majesty's Government could not possibly have acted otherwise than they had done.

I then said that I should like to go and see the Chancellor, as it might be, perhaps the last time I should have an opportunity of seeing him. He begged me to do so. I found the Chancellor very agitated. His Excellency at once began a harangue, which lasted for about twenty minutes. He said that the step taken by His Majesty's Government was terrible to a degree; just for a word—"neutrality," a word which in war time had so often been disregarded—just for a scrap of paper Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with her. All his efforts in that direction had been rendered useless by this last terrible step, and the policy to which, as I knew, he had devoted himself since his accession to office had tumbled down like a house of cards. What we had done was unthinkable; it was like striking a man from behind while he was fighting for his life against two assailants. He held Great Britain responsible for all the terrible events that might happen. I protested strongly against that statement, and said that, in the same way as he and Herr von Jagow wished me to understand that for strategical reasons it was a matter of life and death to Germany to advance through Belgium and violate the latter's neutrality, so I would wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of "life and death" for the honour of Great Britain that she should keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium's neutrality if attacked. That solemn compact simply had to be kept, or what confidence could any one have in engagements given by Great Britain in the future? The Chancellor said, "But at what price will that compact have been kept. Has the British Government thought of that?" I hinted to His Excellency as plainly as I could that fear of consequences could hardly be regarded as an excuse for breaking solemn engagements, but his Excellency was so excited, so evidently overcome by the news of our action, and so little disposed to hear reason that I refrained from adding fuel to the flame by further argument. As I was leaving he said that the blow of Great Britain joining Germany's enemies was all the greater that almost up to the last moment he and his Government had been working with us and supporting our efforts to maintain peace between Austria and Russia. I said that this was part of the tragedy which saw the two nations fall apart just at the moment when the relations between them had been more friendly and cordial than they had been for years. Unfortunately, notwithstanding our efforts to maintain peace between Russia and Austria, the war had spread and had brought us face to face with a situation which, if we held to our engagements, we could not possibly avoid, and which unfortunately entailed our separation from our late fellow-workers. He would readily understand that no one regretted this more than I.

After this somewhat painful interview I returned to the embassy and drew up a telegraphic report of what had passed. This telegram was handed in at the Central Telegraph Office a little before 9 p.m. It was accepted by that office, but apparently never despatched.*

At about 9.30 p.m. Herr von Zimmermann, the Under-Secretary of State, came to see me. After expressing his deep regret that the very friendly official and personal relations between us were about to cease, he asked me casually whether a demand for passports was equivalent to a declaration of war. I said that such an authority on international law as he was known to be must know as well or better than I what was usual in such cases. I added that there were many cases where diplomatic relations had

*This telegram never reached the Foreign Office.

been broken off and, nevertheless, war had not ensued; but that in this case he would have seen from my instructions, of which I had given Herr von Jagow a written summary, that His Majesty's Government expected an answer to a definite question by 12 o'clock that night and that in default of a satisfactory answer they would be forced to take such steps as their engagements required. Herr Zimmermann said that that was, in fact, a declaration of war, as the Imperial Government could not possibly give the assurance required either that night or any other night.

In the meantime, after Herr Zimmermann left me, a flying sheet, issued by the "Berliner Tageblatt," was circulated stating that Great Britain had declared war against Germany. The immediate result of this news was the assemblage of an exceedingly excited and unruly mob before His Majesty's Embassy. The small force of police which had been sent to guard the embassy was soon overpowered, and the attitude of the mob became more threatening. We took no notice of this demonstration as long as it was confined to noise, but when the crash of glass and the landing of cobble stones into the drawing-room, where we were all sitting, warned us that the situation was getting unpleasant, I telephoned to the Foreign Office an account of what was happening. Herr von Jagow at once informed the Chief of Police, and an adequate force of mounted police, sent with great promptness, very soon cleared the street. From that moment on we were well guarded, and no more direct unpleasantness occurred.

After order had been restored Herr von Jagow came to see me and expressed his most heartfelt regrets at what had occurred. He said that the behaviour of his countrymen had made him feel more ashamed than he had words to express. It was an indelible stain on the reputation of Berlin. He said that the flying sheet circulated in the streets had not been authorized by the Government; in fact, the Chancellor had asked him by telephone whether he thought that such a statement should be issued, and he had replied, "Certainly not, until the morning." It was in consequence of his decision to that effect that only a small force of police had been sent to the neighbourhood of the embassy, as he had thought that the presence of a large force would inevitably attract attention and perhaps lead to disturbances. It was the "pestilential 'Tageblatt,'" which had somehow got hold of the news, that had upset his calculations. He had heard rumours that the mob had been excited to violence by gestures made and missiles thrown from the embassy, but he felt sure that that was not true (I was able soon to assure him that the report had no foundation whatever), and even if it was, it was no excuse for the disgraceful scenes which had taken place. He feared that I would take home with me a sorry impression of Berlin manners in moments of excitement. In fact, no apology could have been more full and complete.

On the following morning, the 5th August, the Emperor sent one of His Majesty's aides-de-camp to me with the following message:—

> "The Emperor has charged me to express to Your Excellency his regret for the occurrences of last night, but to tell you at the same time that you will gather from those occurrences an idea of the feelings of his people respecting the action of Great Britain in joining with other nations against her old allies of Waterloo. His Majesty also begs that you will tell the King that he has been proud of the titles of British Field-Marshal and British Admiral, but that in consequence of what has occurred he must now at once divest himself of those titles."

I would add that the above message lost none of its acerbity by the manner of its delivery.

On the other hand, I should like to state that I received all through this trying time nothing but courtesy at the hands of Herr von Jagow and the officials of the Imperial Foreign Office. At about 11 o'clock on the same morning Count Wedel handed

me my passports—which I had earlier in the day demanded in writing—and told me that he had been instructed to confer with me as to the route which I should follow for my return to England. He said that he had understood that I preferred the route viâ the Hook of Holland to that viâ Copenhagen; they had therefore arranged that I should go by the former route, only I should have to wait till the following morning. I agreed to this, and he said that I might be quite assured that there would be no repetition of the disgraceful scenes of the preceding night as full precautions would be taken. He added that they were doing all in their power to have a restaurant car attached to the train, but it was rather a difficult matter. He also brought me a charming letter from Herr von Jagow couched in the most friendly terms. The day was passed in packing up such articles as time allowed.

The night passed quietly without any incident. In the morning a strong force of police was posted along the usual route to the Lehrter Station, while the embassy was smuggled away in taxi-cabs to the station by side streets. We there suffered no molestation whatever, and avoided the treatment meted out by the crowd to my Russian and French colleagues. Count Wedel met us at the station to say good-bye on behalf of Herr von Jagow and to see that all the arrangements ordered for our comfort had been properly carried out. A retired colonel of the Guards accompanied the train to the Dutch frontier, and was exceedingly kind in his efforts to prevent the great crowds which thronged the platforms at every station where we stopped from insulting us; but beyond the yelling of patriotic songs and a few jeers and insulting gestures we had really nothing to complain of during our tedious journey to the Dutch frontier.

Before closing this long account of our last days in Berlin I should like to place on record and bring to your notice the quite admirable behaviour of my staff under the most trying circumstances possible. One and all, they worked night and day with scarcely any rest, and I cannot praise too highly the cheerful zeal with which counsellor, naval and military attachés, secretaries, and the two young attachés buckled to their work and kept their nerve with often a yelling mob outside and inside hundreds of British subjects clamouring for advice and assistance. I was proud to have such a staff to work with, and feel most grateful to them all for the invaluable assistance and support, often exposing them to considerable personal risk, which they so readily and cheerfully gave to me.

I should also like to mention the great assistance rendered to us all by my American colleague, Mr. Gerard, and his staff. Undeterred by the hooting and hisses with which he was often greeted by the mob on entering and leaving the embassy, His Excellency came repeatedly to see me to ask how he could help us and to make arrangements for the safety of stranded British subjects. He extricated many of these from extremely difficult situations at some personal risk to himself, and his calmness and *savoir-faire* and his firmness in dealing with the Imperial authorities gave full assurance that the protection of British subjects and interests could not have been left in more efficient and able hands.

I have, &c.,

W. E. GOSCHEN.